पार्वच है। भारत बरकार File No. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Volume distry rtman No. 24(20)-FEA/56. Collection No. Government of India Ministry of External Affairs be other D. 5159-FEA/56. ida aja विश्व प्राप्त ord C. Destroy la DECLASSIFIED साथीय नोट बुक में beson ed Netaji Enquiry Committee - Report submitted by Shei 5.0. ০ ব০/বর্তাদ্যত ও s tiels of S. O./S a g minas..... inte of Clark Later References Previous References 30(26) PEA/55 24(17) FEA /56 To be retained for 5 years: 140/5/RM/95 D-905/5/8 ० 97 (ऑबस्कनीय)/ 7 (Unblenched)/O. & M-58. समुदेश—159-19 जनरख एडसिन/ 77-78-मासमुदेश—(धी-153)—5-11-77-78,89,868-PTC-)159-19 General Adm./77-78—GIPTC—(C-158)—5-11.77—78,00,008,

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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Mr. Suresh Chandra Bose's Dissentient Report has now been received. His conclusion is that there was no aeroplane crash and consequently no death of Netaji from it.

The text of this report runs into 168 pages of typescript, and there are 40 pages of Appendix - as against 104 pages and 38 pages, respectively, of the majority report.

- 2. The present report has two broad features:
- (a) allegations and charges of impropriety against various people, and
- against various people, and

 (b) recapitulation and examination of the evidence, and the negative inference that there was no crash and no death of Netaji, made from contradictions therein.
- Minister, and the Chairman of the Committee, Major-General Shah Nawaz. In a comparatively minor way Mr. Bose's "colleagues in the Committee" (collectively), "some of the high officials in Delhi and Calcutta" (i.e. Dr. B.C. Roy, Mr. T.N. Kaul and Mr. S.K. Roy) are also featured. As regards the P.M., the following charges are made, either in words or by obvious implication:-
- (1) The P.M. did not desire an enquiry at all and so when pressed for one in Parliament on 29.9.1955, he said that the only satisfactory enquiry possible was by the Japanese Government and the most that we could do would be to co-operate, if they initiated one (p.18/19).
 - (2) He did not desire an enquiry because, as stated by him in Parliament as far back as on 5.3.1952, he was convinced that Netaji was dead (p.2/3).
- (3) Finally he did not desire an official enquiry, and, had his hands not been forced by a "pressing necessity" that subsequently arose, no official committee would have been constituted or sent. That necessity arose out of the resolution passed at Calcutta by the Netaji Samarak Samiti (Memorial Committee) on the 6th October 1955 to form a non-official committee including himself (Mr.

Bose) as the family representative to go abroad to ascertain definitely whether Netaji was dead or not. The danger of a non-official committee arriving at the conclusion that Netaji was not dead "would not only have been a challenge to the P.M.'s statements in Parliament but may also have disproved those statements". So "our high officials in Delhi set up this 3-man committee with 2 of their own men as members" (pp. 19/22).

- (4) The P.M. gave a "mandate" to the official members to arrive at findings in conformity with his statements made in Parliament (p.2 Actually he says "mandate from higher authorities", but the innuendo is clear).
- (5) Despite the Japanese Foreign Office having arranged for the Committee's visit to Taihoku the P.M. did not permit it. This was because the visit may have resulted in findings that would have altered the whole aspect of the findings of his colleagues (p. 17/18).
- (6) Despite Mr. Bose pointing out that the nomination of Mr. Shah Nawaz as Chairman was not appropriate and suggesting the name of Dr. Radha Binode Pal on the ground that a jurist was required for a judicial enquiry, the P.M. did not agree because Dr. Pal had already formed his opinion that the plane crash had not taken place. "Therefore one of the main qualifications for membership to the Committee was that one must be of the opinion that the plane crash occurred and Netaji died as a result, as expressed by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 29.9.1955" (pp. 29/30). Actually Mr. Bose has no less than 8½ pages on the composition of the Compositi tion of the Committee and gives a list of people who should have been selected in preference to Shri Shah Nawaz, viz., Messrs A.M. Sahay, Debnath Das, S.A. Iyer, N.G. Swamy, Major General J.K. Bhonsle, Col. Gulzara Singh, or Col. Pritam Singh. Shri Shah Nawaz, he says, had no qualifications whatever for the post on account of lack of position in the administrative set up of Netaji's Government or Military Establishment, lack of decoration for bravery etc., and lack of personal contact with Netaji. "Even if he does not continue to be a Pakistani, all his relations are there and he has property there. He has retained his feet in 2 territories profitably by praiseworthy tact and cleverness" (pp.22-31).
- 4. The motives attributed to the P.M. are mild however, compared to the allegations against the Chairman, which include the following:
 - (1) he accepted an advance mandate from "higher authorities" to arrive at findings conforming to the P.M.'s statements in Parliament and manipulated the evidence towards that end (p.2).
 - (2) This he did in various ways. One way was to confine

witnesses to those who would support the P.M.'s point of view. Although for the satisfaction of the public he advertised for people with any knowledge of the subject-matter of the enquiry to volunteer evidence (and Mr. Bose "believes a fair number of applications were received") he did not examine more than three of them because those three did not support his theory. He also kept Mr. Bose "in the dark about most of the applications received" (p.11).

- (3) Another way was by putting leading questions to witnesses, particularly questions from Mr. Iyer's book "Unto Him a Witness" which at times he even let the witnesses peruse. Those witnesses whose evidence did not comply with the conclusions arrived at in the book were cross-examined and asked various questions (as to the accuracy of their remembering these incidents after 11 years) calculated to create confusion of mind and put the desired words into their mouths. Finally, he even modified their statements while dictating them to the stenographer. That, says Mr. Bose, is why he was compelled to make his own notes. (pp. 14/15/16).
- (4) On one occasion he refused to let a witness (Diwijendra Nath Bose) make a statement about Netaji's watch on the ground that he was not entitled to make any statement about the watch as another witness (S.M. Goswami) had already made statements about that watch. On that occasion Mr. Maitra had to enlighten him to the effect that the second statement had also to be recorded (p.16).
- (5) At the house of Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose where the Committee inspected two watches and photographs of Netaji wearing round watches, the Chairman refused, even though requested, to have a note of inspection made (p. 32/33).
- (6) All this was due to his bias which is proved by the statement made by him immediately on arrival at Tokyo on 4th May 1956 to the effect that "his mission was merely to interview people who might offer direct evidence of Shri Bose's death" (p.3).
- 5. As regards his colleagues, collectively, he says that they manipulated the statements of some witnesses (p.4) and adopted a "hush-hush policy and other tactics for keeping him generally in the dark as evidenced by their sending excerpts, without his knowledge, of evidence and sketches drawn by witnesses to Shri A.M.N. Shastri, Aircraft Inspector, Accidents Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation Department, New Delhi; not showing him the four photographs sent to the

Committee by Col. Rehman because they went against theory of | his colleagues," etc.

- The comments against Dr. B.C. Roy and Mr. S.K. Roy arise in the course of his explanation as to why he left Delhi and what happened afterwards. They occur under the headings "HARASSMENT AND DEPARTURE FROM DELHI", "OBSTRUCTION AND PRESSURE" (pp. 44-49). The explanation (which starts on p.42) states that on the 12th July 1956 his daughter, with whom he was staying, suddenly had to vacate her quarters, and on the 13th he requested the Chairman to have Government accommodation arranged for him. On the 14th, accommodation having been arranged, all three members went to inspect it. On discovery that it was in a Kotah House hutment he told the Chairman that he "took this as an insult". He requested that the Chairman should arrange rooms for him at the Imperial Hotel. Chairman said that no more could be done till Monday as it was Saturday and already 1.45 p.m. To this Mr. Bose replied that "the matter was an urgent one....and as Government maintained phones in the residences of officers, it was expected that urgent work should be managed therefrom beyond office hours" (p. 45).
- of going through the report drafted by Mr. Maitra had reached p.42 of the draft, Mr. Bose "immediately and firmly protested" at the statement in the draft reading: "They all point to the fact that Netaji died at Taihoku Military Hospital on the night of the 18th August 1945. The Committee accepts this conclusion". He referred to the numerous discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence for which he said there could be me explanation other than that there was no crash and no death. He suggested therefore that his colleagues should change their findings accordingly. There was silence. It was then agreed that Mr. Bose should write a dissenting report and that Mr. Maitra should give him the remaining portion of the draft,

copies of all relevant papers, exhibits, photographs etc (pp. 42-44).

- 8. When they met again on Monday the 16th July, the Chairman told him that they could no longer sit together, whereupon he took leave of his colleagues and went to Mr. S.K. Roy at the Ministry. To him he explained the whole situation about the accommodation. Thereupon Mr. Roy provisionally reserved a room for him at the Imperial Hotel and promised to confirm this by 1 p.m. (On leaving Mr. Roy, he himself went to the Imperial Hotel and checked that rooms had? been reserved). As there was no phone from Mr. Roy by 1 p.m., Mr. Bose phoned him at 2.45, whereupon Mr. Roy personally visited him and promised definitely to confirm about the rooms by 4 p.m. Mr. Bose then "told him distinctly that if he failed to do so he would be compelled to leave Delhi, as he could no longer inconvenience himself and his friends, and there was a limit to their endurance". Mr. Roy did not turn up or phone by 4 p.m. but instead the driver of the Ministry's car came "to enquire when he should come the next day for taking me to the Imperial Hotel". The driver had no message, written or verbal, from the Ministry or from Mr. Roy. "With such indifference and callousness on the part of the officers concerned, and no assurance that accommodation would be arranged in the near future, and also as the Chairman had told me that I could no longer sit with them, but had not told me that he had arranged any place where I could sit separately for writing my dissentient report, I was left with no alternative other than leaving Delhi for Calcutta" (p. 45/46).
- 9. Mr. Bose then quotes the telegrams he exchanged from Calcutta with the Chairman, he demanding that the promised papers should be sent to him and the Chairman insisting that

mitted by the 30th July. He gives vent here to his views about the tone of the Chairman's last telegram, the suspicion that it had been "inspired from higher circles", the impossibility of compliance by the date stated without papers, and concludes that because he had disagreed with his colleagues and prevented them submitting an unanimous report such obstructions were purposely put in his way and impossible demands made, so that when he found himself unable to comply, his colleagues could announce that theirs was the only report submitted by the Committee (p. 47/48).

- 10. Mr. Bose briefly mentions the letters exchanged with the Prime Minister in August (p. 48) and continues that on the 15th August the Chief Minister of West Bengal called him and "started coaxing him in several ways to make him agree with the findings of his colleagues and to sign their report so as to make it an unanimous one". On Mr. Bose explaining why he could not do so, the question of the date of submission of Mr. Bose's dissenting report was discussed. Mr. Bose said that provided the papers etc., were received he could submit his report by 30th August. Thereupon the Chief Minister dictated his reply to the P.M. and forthwith the Chief Minister and another Minister tried to influence him through some of his nearest relatives to sign his colleagues report (pp. 48/49).
- 11. As regards (b), Mr. Bose's contention in regard to the substance of the matter is that the evidence in regard to important aspects is so contradictory, that the only conclusion can be arrived at is that there was no crash and consequently no death of Netaji from it. Some of these aspects concern the:

Take off from Taihoku and the crash.

Nature of the injuries suffered by Netaji.

Vehicle in which he was transported to the Taihoku hospital.

Place in the hospital in which he was placed.

Time and manner of death.

Telegram from the Japanese Southern Army saying that his body had been flown to Tokyo.

that his body had been flown to Tokyo.
Rectangular wrist watch which Netaji was stated to have been wearing at the time of the crash.

12. The evidence procured by the Committee about each of these and a great many other aspects is so minutely, repetitiously, and lengthily examined that it is impossible to summarise the relevant portions of the report within a brief compass. However the following abbreviated examples will serve to illustrate the type of reasoning by inference from contradictions that he adopts:

Take off from Taihoku and crash. Col. Rehman estimates a height of 1,000 ft and a time of 5/6 minutes in the air before the deafening noise that proclaimed the dropping out of the propellor and then left engine. Also that the crash was one to two miles outside the airport, in "plain open land".

Major Kono, the co-pilot, gives it as 100 ft and 3 seconds. The photograph in Appendix 'Q' produced by Col. Rehman does not substantiate the "plain open land theory". Mr. Bose makes a 9 page commentary about this and rejects Col. Rehman's evidence (pp.87-96). Again while Captain Arai states the plane to 1,500 ft. all other witnesses say the crash occurred immediately after the plane was airborne. Mr. Bose examines this and its implications in another 10 pages, and concludes that the only way of reconciling the contradictions in the testimony of the 7 witnesses that described the crash is by assuming that there was no crash at all.

Vehicle in which Netaji was taken to hospital. Col. Rehman says they were taken in a lorry. So does Major Takahashi and certain others. But Col. Nonogoki says Netaji was moved in a "Shidosha", the peculiar Japanese vehicle used for starting aeroplane propellers. Mr. Bose says it is strange that all 8 witnesses "all military officers and educated and respectable gentlemen, should give different versions regarding the simple questions as to the manner in which Netaji came out of the plane and was moved to the hospital. The only conclusion that can possibly be drawn is that as the crash did not take place each of them stated whatever came uppermost in his mind" (p.116).

Time of Death. Dr. Yoshimi, the Medical Officer, says Netaji was given a blood transfusion along with other treatment. At 7.0 - 7.30 his condition deteriorated and shortly after 8.0 he died. Dr. Tsuruta, the other doctor, does not recollect the blood transfusion and says he died between 7 and 8 0'Clock. The medical

orderly Mr. Kazuo says he expired at 9.30. Mr.
Nakamura corroborates this. The Formosan nurse
examined by Mr. Harin Shah in Formosa gave the time
as 11.0 p.m. In regard to all this (and the
treatment given) Mr. Bose says the evidence is "so
discrepant and contradictory that no reliance can
be placed on the same and what they stated has been
fabricated because the narration of a true incident,
even after a lapse of 10 years, could not be so discrepant
and contradictory". He also calls the evidence
"worthless" and says the incidents did not take place
but were concocted to support the secret plan of the
Japanese and of Netaji to announce Netaji's death
(pp. 126/127).

Rectangular Wrist Watch. Col. Rehman produced a rectangular watch, which eventually was passed to Shri Sarat Chandra Bose via Mr. Bhulabhai Desai and the P.M. The Col. said the watch had been given to him as belonging to Netaji by Dr. Yoshimi. The doctor however has denied all knowledge of the watch. In January 1947 Shri Diwijendranath Nath Bose challenged the Col. regarding this statement of his and the Col. failed to make any reply. No other witness has stated that Netaji used this watch and there is no photo of Netaji wearing it. The time shown is 8 minutes after 1.0 p.m. which does not reconcile with "2.38 p.m. at which the plane is alleged to have crashed". Others have stated Netaji always wore a round watch. Therefore it must be held that Netaji never wore the watch and Col. Rehman's attempt has ended in a miserable failure (62-64)

- 13. Apart from the above contradictions in the evidence procured 11 years after the event by the present Committee, Mr. Bose makes the point that the enquiries carried out by British and American intelligence immediately after the war had failed to establish that there had been a plane crash or that Netaji had died as a consequence. If after such searching -the-spot enquiries as the British and Americans, as victors, were capable of conducting in the hour of their victory and for the purpose of arresting Netaji and wrecking vengeance on him as a war criminal, resulted in the conclusion of the evidence being "inconclusive", howe could this Committee, he asks, came so definitely to the conclusion of crash and death after such a perfunctory itinerary and enquiry as it has conducted? furtherance of this argument he quotes ad lib from the relevant secret intelligence reports (pp. 136-145 particularly 141/2).
 - 14. Incidentally, attention may here be drawn to the fact

that in two portions of his report he actually gloats in a rather naive (or a calculatedly nefarious) manner at having by his sheer ingenuity secured certain top secret documents etc., despite the obstruction so of his colleagues and/or the Government: e.g. on p. 144 he says "I consider myself exceedingly fortunate to have succeeded in securing some Top Secret Reports the findings of which must be admitted by everybody to be very important and exceedingly reliable and in my having able to secure a few photographs, sketches and other papers.....which our Government have intentionally By the Almighty's Grace and Blessings withheld from me. I have been able to surmount.....obstructions and hindrances intentionally placed in my way by our Government to make it impossible for me to write this report, and He only has enabled me to fulfil my duty..... And on pp. 95/6 he says: "Now to return to the four photographs sent by Col. Rehman which along with other papers were not sent to me.... I have just managed after great difficulty, resourcefulness and expenditure to get hold of some of them".

- 15. Other matters that may be referred to in passing are:
 - (1) Mr. Bose's comment on the treasure which
 Netaji took. He says that since it is an
 important and complicated matter it should,
 if considered necessary, form the subject
 matter of a separate enquiry. In accordance
 with this view (p.59) he leaves it out entirely
 from his report.
 - (2) Mr. Bose's recommendation about the ashes in Renkoji Temple, Tokyo. He says that since they are not Netaji's, Government should refrain from taking any step to bring them to India (p. 133).
 - (3) Manner of concluding the report. Mr. Bose appeals to his "esteemed countrymen not to accept the majority report but to demand that the Government places at their disposal the evidence collected for forming their own opinion. And if the general opinion is that the aircraft accident did not occur and Netaji did not die, to demand an impeachment of all those who have taken part in this nefarious game" (p. 167).

17. As regards (a), it is suggested that whether in Parliament or elsewhere the Government should not enter into a controversy about the details, but should adopt two broad attitudes: (i) admit the contradictions but point out that having regard to the prevailing circumstances at the time, the matter for surprise is not that there have been contradictions and discrepancies about details, but that there have been any Japanese witnesses at all who could remember as much as they have done. The circumstances were that Japan had been defeated in war and had surrendered unconditionally only a few days earlier, two of her cities had been annihilated by a new and horrible weapon of fantastic conception and destructiveness, and the fates awaiting the homes, families, and futures of every Japanese was unknown. All this was naturally exercising an intense emotional strain on him. Is it possible, then, that at such a time of strain in his life he would be so meticulous, and cold-blobdedly objective and observant, as to have noted, and remembered 11 years thereafter, whether such things as a crashing plane containing 14 people with whom he had no emotional bond or relationship, whatever, had crashed at 12.00 or 1.00 p.m. or 2.00 p.m.? or on the 17th or 18th or 19th of August, 1945? Mr. Bose sitting down in cold blood now, 11 rears after the event, has gone through the testimony of the Japanese witnesses with a fine comb and floodlit the minutest discrepancy with a mass of penetrating intelligence, but has totally missed the elementary point that there is such a thing as "the fallibility of human observation" which is or should be known at least to all lawyers. In this connection there have been scores of experiments undertaken to prove that even when not under emotional strain people do not accurately observe what is happening around them, and generally fail to perceive even the things with which they come into daily contact. It is too much therefore to have expected the Japanese witnesses.

16. Such being the contents of Mr. Bose's report, the questions that arise are: (a) to what extent is it capable of convincing the objective reader that there was no crash and no death, (b) what action should be taken in connection with it in Parliament, and (c) whether it should be printed.

whose entire lives and livelihoods were at stake at the time to have done so with the degree of exactitude illustrated by Mr. Bose's present report. One should be thankful at least that they even observed and remembered the broad facts that they did do. (ii) point out that the weightiest possible evidence of Netaji's death lies in Netaji's own dynamic character, which could hardly have remained inactive, concealed and idle for 11 longyears, particularly when the very object for which all the secrecy was required (to carry on his fight for Indian Independence) had already been attained. (On page 49 Mr. Bose narrates certain episodes of Netaji's early life and is at pains to show how secretive Netaji was. These episodes particularly about the good works that he did. are evidently included in the report to substantiate Mr. Bose's theory of the secret plan, but the conception of 11 years of total inactivity in deference to secrecy for no obvious reason is too much to accept or reconcile with Netaji's other characteristics). (1) We now show the report of S

- 18. As regards (b), unless this report is tabled in Parliament, there will be an endless chain of questions and demands for debates and consequent waste of public time for many years to come. It is suggested therefore that the report should be tabled in Parliament, with a statement by the P.M. indicating Mr. Bose's conclusions, pointing out that they are based on mere contradictions in regard to details, and putting forward the two broad comments indicated in the previous paragraph.
- 19. As regards (c), it is suggested that there is no need to print and circulate the report as a priced publication, or to give any other kind of pointless publicity to Mr. Bose's scurrilous charges, since any publicity given to this report can only represent so much unmerited publicity

for Mr. Bose. (Actually in his forwarding letter dated 9.10.1956 Mr. Bose himself "trusts that it will be given the same recognition and publicity as report of his colleagues and which he can legitimately lay claim to".) A restricted number of copies could be printed for tabling in Parliament.

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(M. S. Sait) 30.10.1956.

J.S.(E)

Foreign Secretary may see the attached letter dated

October 9, 1956 from Shri Suresh C. Bose, brother of the late

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his dissentient report attached

therewith. Shri Sulaiman Sait, DS(E) has carefully examined the

report and written a long note analysing the main contentions of

Shri Suresh Chandra Bose. Apart from the suggestions made by

Shri Sulaiman Sait, I would suggest the following:

- (1) We may show the report of Shri Swresh Chandra Bose along with the note of Shri Sulaiman Sait to Shri Shah Navaz Khan and Shri S. N. Maitra, for any comments that they may wish to make.
- (2) We may place the dissentient report on the table of the two Houses of Parliament with a brief statement by the Prime Minister. I agree that we should not enter into Controversy about the details and should point out that after a lapse of 11 years it is not possible for various witnesses to give identical and exact details about minor matters. I agree that the report should not be printed, but copies may be placed on the table of the two Houses in Parliament, if considered necessary.
- (3) Shri Suresh Chandra Bose's letter may be acknowledged after the above points have been considered.
- (4) No action need be taken about bringing the ashes of
 Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose to India and erecting a memorial until
 this controversy has died out. No further enquiry about the

treasure that Netaji took with him need be made at the present I have crossed on the margin of Shri Sulaiman Sait's bearing on facts and which Gould be verified from the records. I would, however suggest that we need not go into details but confine ourselves to the broad facts only.

> (T. N. Kaul) 31. 10. 1956.

speak. Stole 2:11.15

JS(E)

Spoken 6- F.S No vonds like is report urgent. Sefore duplicating Convener F.S said he report sould be sent 6-Shie Stat Nowaz for Enick perusal & kindly rehard in a day or his, as P.M desired it to be taked if possible lefor he questions, of Nich votice les been given, ome up for answer. 2. dept- Minister for kfilways meg knidg see. Us. Six Seen. Daste is appendid - 6

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In his dissentient Report, Shri Suresh Chandra Bose has concentrated mostly on attributing motives, particularly to the Prime Minister and to me, as the Chairman of the Committee. Leaving aside personal allegations like "loyality to Government has been their guiding principle and "interest" has had the better of duty" (page 2 para.2), I feel there are certain serious allegations made in his Report, which need clarification.

- (1) He has stated on page 3 of his Report that on landing at Tokyo the Chairman said that his mission was mainly to interview people who might offer direct evidence on Netaji's death. This statement is wholly incorrect and malicious.
- (2) He has also stated that he was demied access to various confidential documents and letters. This again is an absolutely false statement. All the confidential files and documents that were in the possession of the Committee were given to Shri Bose and each file bears his signatures for the days that he was in possession of it. Actually Shri Bose had extracts made from these files and with a view to create confusion, issued them to the press long before the Committee submitted its Report to the Government. His allegation is wholly mullified by the fact that in the latter part of the Report he has quoted extensively from confidential documents of the Ministries of Defence and the Home Affairs.

In addition to official files all the letters received from various people wishing to volunteer evidence before the Committee either in India or abroad, were put up before the whole Committee and almost invariably initialled by Shri Bose and the

Chairman. A, large number of irrelevant letters were also received from people wishing to volunteer evidence which obviously had mo bearing on the case: Their requests were turned down. For instance, in Japan, there was one gentleman, who approached the Chairman to say that he knew Shri Subhash Chandra Bose very well and that he had married a Japanese lady and that his children were in Tokyo. This obviously was a reference to Shri Raj Behari Bose and not Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. But I reiterate that all letters from persons who could have tendered useful evidence, were duly considered by the Committee.

"My personal note", Shri Bose has tried to make out that the list of agreed points on which the Report of the Committee was to be based was a piece of paper meant purely for his personal reference and that it was obtained from him surreptitiously by Shri Maitra. This again is an absolutely false statement. This mote was actually drafted by Shri Bose himself and signed by all the three members of the Committee and a copy kept by each for record. Shri Maitra and I still have those copies in our possession and so must Shri Bose.

Apart from this I have little comment to offer on Shri Bose's arguments, reasons and conclusions. These are, to say the least, fantastic - take for instance the question of the plane-crash. He quotes direct evidence from this a number of witnesses who were themselves actually involved in the crash, but because according to Habib-ul-Rehman the plane crashed from an altitude of 1,000 ft. and according to Col. Nonogaki and others from 150 to 300 ft., he comes

to strange conclusion that the plane did not crash at all. Throughout his Report he has given exaggerated importance to minor discrepancies and doubtful evidence. It is strange to observe that in one part of his Report, Shri Bose has alleged that the Japanese witnesses were tutored by the Japanese Foreign Office through whom they were called and in the other part he has pointed out numerous discrepancies in their statements. The mere fact that there were discrepancies in their statements goes to prove that there was no "tutoring". In fairness to the Japanese Foreign Office I will say that their attitude in abstaining from interfering with the evidence of witnesses in any way was really praiseworthy.

Besides this, there are masses of incorrect statements and mutilation of evidence.

In para. 1 of page 8 of his Report, Shri Bose has said that Shri H.K.Roy and Shri Dey had stated in their evidence that they did not believe the evidence of the Japanese that Netaji was dead. In actual fact, Shri H.K.Roy, who accompanied Mr.Devis to Formosa and who helped Mr.Devis to write out the Report, stated that the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Devis was that the plane had crashed and that Netaji had expired as a result thereof.

Shri Bose has thought it fit to rely on flimsy evidence of witnesses, who could nave not possibly have any direct knowledge of the accident. For instance, Shri Sen, who was in Tokyo at the time, is said to have stated that Netaji was not present in the plane that crashed. Sarvashree Aurobindo Bose, Dwijan Bose, Netaji's nephews, and Shri Dutt, Netaji's uncle, whom he has given so much importance

in his Report, have only propounded theories.

The basic difference in Shri Bose's outlook and the outlook of the other two members of the Committee has been that he held that the position of the members of the Committee was somewhat akin to that of judicial officers, whereas the other two members acted as members of a "fact-finding mission".

One page 16 of his Report, Shri Bose has dwelt at some length on the failure of the Committee to go to Taihokau (Formosa). All the letters that were exchanged between our Embassy in Tokyo and the Foreign Ministry in Delhi were brought to the notice of Shri Bose and he fully endorsed the view of the Government that it would be inadvisable for us to proceed to Formosa (Taihokau). How a man of his age and education can make such deliberately false statements passes my comprehension.

Page 44 - Chapter Harassment & Departure from Delhi.

He has explained reasons for his sudden departure from Delhi. I feel that I should explain this in some detail. Since he first arrived in Delhi early in April, he stayed with his daughter in the hutments in Pataudi House. Again on return from Tokyo, he stayed with his daughter and son-in-law in Air Force Hutments on Lodi Road. The accommodation which was secured for him in the Kotah House was definitely better than the hutments in Pataudi House and Lodi Road. After he declined to accept accommodation in Kotah House, accommodation was arranged for him in the Western Court. This was also rejected by him on the plea that it was "beneath his dignity" to stay in the Western Court. He insisted on being accommodated in the best hotel

in Delhi. Accordingly, arrangements were made to accommodate him in the Imperial Hotel. He desired that the Government should bear all the expenses of his board and lodging in the Imperial Hotel in addition to a daily allowance of Rs.42/8/- which he was receiving in Delhi. I felt that there was no justification for this and Shri Bose was told that if he wished to stay in the Imperial Hotel he will have to pay for it from his daily allowance. This was perhaps the real reason why he decided to leave Delhi. One of his nephews, Shri Dwijan Bose, was also in Delhi at that time to persuade him to leave. He did so without informing anybody. From Calcutta he asked for papers including confidential files to be sent to him. Since he had already leaked out top secret information to the press it was not considered safe to entrust confidential documents to him at Calcutta. He was asked to return to Delhi where all the documents would be made available to him. This he refused presumably because the Report was to be written in consultation with his son, Shri Aurobindo Bose, and other members of his family, who, I found, were deeply imbued with anti-Govt. and Anti-Nehru feelings. The whole of Shri Bose's Report is a clear reflection of those feelings. One very interesting omission from Shri Bose's Report is in reference to the statement of Col. Figess, who was an Intelligence Staff Officer on the staff of Gen. Gardener who was in Tokyo as a personal representative of Mr. Churchill attached to Gen. MaC Arthur Col. Figess, under instructions from the South East Asia Command had certain inquiries instituted into the plane-crash in which Netaji was involved. He

19-

stated clearly before the Committee that his conclusion was that the plane had crashed and that Netaji had died in a hospital as a result of burns received in the plane-crash.

I really fail to understand the motive which has inspired Shri Bose to write such a Report.

He, his sons and his mephews are intelligent enough to understand that keeping alive this myth any longer would not further any of their political ends. One possible reason could perhaps be the fear of implications arising out of acceptance of Netaji's death on his share of family property at Cuttack and Bhubneshwar. These are at present in the possession of Shri Suresh Chandra Bose and his family.

Shahwawa Elan

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

7 starred Parliamentary questions in connection with Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee placed below were received last week. Tentative answers to most of them were framed and discussed with Joint Secretary, Shri T.N. Kaul, who is away from Headquarters on tour until the 7th November.

- 2. Shri Kaul's opinion was that such questions are likely to continue, it would be advisable for Shri Suresh Chandra Bose's dissentient report to be tabled in Parliament and for the Prime Minister to make a statement on the occasion.
- 3. It would be appreciated if this suggestion is kindly submitted to the Prime Minister and his instructions taken.

(M. S. Sait)
Deputy Secretary.
5.11.1956.

P.S. to P.M. (Shri C.R. Srinivasan)

M.E.A. u.o. No. 1.5495+EALS dated 5/11/56

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A Place.

-22 -

PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT

I did not know that Shri Suresh Chandra Bose's dissentient note had been received by us. In any event, I think we should place it on the table of the House. As a matter of fact, the Hindustan Standard is going to publish the whole of it serially.

- 2. I have no idea how big the report is. It does not appear necessary to get it printed. It should be enough to place, let us say, two copies on the table of the House.
- 3. I think that one answer should be framed to all these questions. It should state (1) that a separate report has been received from Shri Suresh Chandra Bose. This will be laid on the table of the House. (2) The Government of India have accepted the findings of the majority of the Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee and find no reason to vary that decision. (3) As has been previously stated, the question of bringing the ashes to India is dependent not merely on the Government's wishes, but on other factors. In view of this fact, no steps can be taken at present either to bring the ashes to India or in regard to a suitable memorial.

J Lulus (J. Nehru) 5.11.1956

F.8.

Only two questions are due to be answered on November 4, three others are to be answered on November 19, one on Nov. 20 and the remaining one on November 27. The questions for November 14 should be answered together on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister. Reference may be made to the earlier answer in dealing with the subsequent questions.

2. Shri Bose's report is, I believe, being sent to Shri Shah Nawaz Khan. Shri Shah Nawaz Khan should be asked to return the report within two or three days with such comments as he may have. Meantime, Deputy Secretary may find out from the Lok Sabha Sectt. whether it is essential to place more than one copy on the table of the House. It does not seem necessary to print or cyclostyle a large number of copies.

(S. Dutt) 6.11.56

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MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

with reference to my conversation with F.S. earlier to-day, the Lok Sabha (Mr. Nandi, Deputy Secretary) and the Rajya Sabha (Mr. Bannerji, Deputy Secretary) have been consulted, and have respectively stated that they require a minimum of 12 copies and 9 copies of all matter tabled in the respective Houses. Apart from the copies to be placed in Parliament, extra copies are required for their record rooms and libraries.

- 2. It would, therefore, appear that Mr. Suresh Chandra Bose's dissenting report will have to be stencilled. It will take about 4 to 5 days for stencilling the report, if the report were split into 2 portions and 2 typists are employed. (It will not be possible, however, to stencil the sketches, plans, photographs, etc., in the appendices of the report).
- 3. As instructed by F.S., I have already sent the report to Deputy Railway Minister, Mr. Shah Nawaz Khan, who has promised on the phone to return it within 2 days. Assuming he does so by the 8th evening, the stencilled copies may be expected to be ready by the 14th morning.
- Sabha, I enquired also whether it is necessary, according to the rules, that each member of the House should be supplied with a copy. Both Deputy Secretaries replied to the effect that it was entirely for Government to decide whether or not to supply copies to members, but in view of the facts that such great interest had been aroused in the work of this Committee and that the matter was a controversial one, there is bound to

be a demand for additional copies. Whether that demand should be met is entirely a question for Government to I suggest, however, that this question may be given consideration over the next few days. The stencil that will be cut for making the 21 copies required for tabling will be capable of taking the necessary copies for each member of both Houses, if

The Lok Sabha confirmed that it would be possible to arrange for all Parliamentary questions in connection with Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and/or the findings of this Enquiry Committee to be tabled for answering on the same day if a request to that effect is made and an indication given of the earliest date on which they should be put down for answer. I suggest we might indicate any date during the week beginning Monday the 19th November, before the beginning of which week the report will have been tabled in Parliament. (D.F.A. placed below).

(M. S. Sait) Deputy Secretary.

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F.S.

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MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

The Ministry of External Affairs has so far received 7 Parliamentary questions in connection with the findings of the Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee and/or the dissenting report which one of its members, Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, has recently submitted.

- 2. These questions have been tentatively put down for answer on the 14th, 19th, 20th and 27th November, but as they are all substantially identical or closely related to each other the Prime Minister is of opinion that it would save public time if the report of Shri Suresh Chandra Bose were first tabled in both Houses of Parliament and the questions were then all put down for answer together on a single day subsequent to the tabling of the report.
- This would result in the questions concerning the report and/or its gist all becoming redundant, and the remaining questions already received or to be received, all being disposed of in a short time on a single day.
- 4. The Ministry of External Affairs is accordingly arranging for the stencilling of Shri Suresh Chandra Bose's dissenting report and expects to send the minimum number of copies for tabling in the House on or before the 19th instant. It is accordingly requested that all questions in connection with this report or the Netaji Enquiry Committee's (Majority) Report, and/or their contents or implications, may kindly be put down for any session of the House on or after the 21st instant.

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(M. S. Sait)
Deputy Secretary.
7.11.1956.

Lok Sabha Sectt. (Shri Arthur Lingh Richi). Tel. 32350 M.E.A. u.o. No. 55 %-PEMER dated 9/11/56

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Prime Minister has instructed that the dissenting report recently received from Mr. Suresh Chandra Bose, who was one of the 3 members of the Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee, should be tabled in Parliament.

F.S. has directed that the report should be stencilled and forwarded to the Secretariats of the 2 Houses of Parliament by the 16th instant at the latest in order to be tabled on the morning of 19th November. Top priority is to be given to this work.

- 2. As the report runs into about 190 pages, it will be necessary for at least 2 first class typists to be placed on the task by the Issue Section so that the entire operation, which will include stencil cutting, copy making and stiphing/binding, to be completed in good time. The report which is at present with Major-General Shah Nawaz Khan,

 Deputy Minister for Railways, is expected back in the course of the day. It will be handed over to the Issue Section first thing tomorrow morning. Meanwhile, the Issue Section may kindly make all necessary advance arrangements to-day so that there is no loss of time.
- being forwarded direct to the U.S. (Personnel C) Shri
 Inder Sen who may be requested for any special assistance
 required. Finally, although for the purpose of tabling
 on the 19th only about 30 stencilled copies would be
 required, there is likely to be a demand from all members
 of Parliament for an independent copy. In the circumstances it is requested that the stencils used for this
 operation should be brand new and of top quality with a
 view to ensuring the production of an additional 800 or so

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report recently received from No. Mureen Camera Dase,

addressed to U.S. (S.E.) - Shri S.N. Sheopori - who may, if necessary, be requested to co-operate in this regard.

4. S.O. (Issue Main Section) will please ensure that the original copy of the report in question, every page of which, correction or addition, has been signed or initialled by the author, is not in an way damaged during the course of the stencil cutting. After stencils have been cut, it may kindly be re-stitched/bound and genefally restored to its original condition.

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S.O. Issue Main (Shri Raghbir Saran)

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1600 hrs

The forceding Comments by Shri Shah Nawas khan were sent to me by him along with Shri Swesh Chandre Boseis discenting report. Shri Sheh Nawce blean also spoke to me on the telephone and appelled that F.S. and the Prime thin ste may like to see his note.

DS (E) he seen it.

Js(E) may knedly see the note

Devite 12, XI. St.

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PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT

vide se No (2)

I have not yet seen Suresh Chandra
Bose's report or dissentient note. There show the my

2. I enclose a letter from Shah Nawaz Khan. Apparently, he has already issued his statement to the Press.

I helm

(J. Nehru) 16.11.1956

samed with Js.

Dunk n/m

MOST IMMEDIATE.

LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT (Question Branch)

Subject: Dissenting Report of Shri Subhas Chandra Bose.

p. 25/m.

Will the Ministry of External Affairs kindly refer to their U.O.No.5576.F.F.A./56 dated 8.11.56.

As the above mentioned Report was not laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha on the 19th November, 1956, as previously intimated by them, they are requested to state the date when the Report will now be laid on the Table.

for UNDER SECRETARY.

Ministry of External Affairs. L.S.S.U.O.No.SQ.189/5.12/56-Q dated the 20th November, 1956

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e party

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs.

New Delhi, Nevember 220, 1956.

1.30/muter

Will the Lek Sabha Secretariat kindly refer to their U.O.No. Sec. 189/5.12/56 dated 20 11.56 ?

2. As already stated orally by Shri M.S. Sait,
Deputy Secretary of this Ministry to Shri A.S. Rekhi of the Lok Sabha Secretariat, the Dissenting Report of Shri Suresh Chandra Bose is at the moment with the Prime Minister for authentication. Copies are ready and as soon as the Report is authenticated, the copies will be sent to the Lok Sabha Secretariat.

A

(A.K. Mitra) Under Secretary.

Jenson Azd

The Lok Sabha Secretariat.

E.A. Ministry U.O.No. 5866-PEP 56 dated November, 21956.

of ware out well

Spoken to Shi Navanhan. IS(E) has ringup PPS to PN and the apies are expected on to be anthenticited soon. It Put upon 6.×11.56.

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Ministry of External Affairs

On the 5th November P.M. had directed that Shri Suresh Chandra Bose's dissenting report in connection with the Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee should be placed on the table of the 2 Houses of Parliament. accordance with this instruction the necessary copies have been made and checked. 2 copies are placed below for the purpose of authentication by the P.M. preparatory to being sent to Parliament. It will be appreciated/if PS to PM will kindly have them authenticated and return them to US (EA) for further action.

(M.S. Sait)
Deputy Secretary 16.11.56

PS to PM

US(EA)

P.M. has informed F.S. that this can be placed on the table of the Aouse during the next session of Parliament.

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D.S. (Shri M.S. Sair)

PM", Lever wome s/8-14589 dh T. 1256

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Mors y that the Fabled me a lafer 19.14 ou mu iz no report before Pro ja centhente catras Jar verious dans between nov 14 82)

Ministry of External Affairs.

JS(E) has directed that Copy No.10 of the Dissenting Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, non-official Member of the Netaji Enquiry Committee, be forwarded to the Prime Minister. Could P.S. to P.M. kindly take delivery of this copy?

> Dunk. (A.K. Mitra) 14.11.56.

.S. to P.M. (Shri C.R. Srinivasan).

7. S. What's being 8mm (mo Report? ?m mytt speak time about it. I helm

orfar will be placed ner the tell Me Parliament during he hext session, Please neubmiltheir

Down 7.M.56

V. S (EA)

D. 7013 - 95

1 6. 7013-95

I have since spoken to the Prime Minister. I have explained to him that we have told the Lok Sabha Secretariat twice recently that the Report will be placed on the table of Parliament during the current session. In fact one of our earlier communications said that we hoped that the Report would be placed on the table of Parliament before 19th November. In the circumstances P.M. agrees Necessary action may be taken immediately for its authentication.

(s. Dutt) 10.12.56

Phan take ett Pr 6+M for authorization winder led politication windered of the Parish of the Parish

FEA

Could P.S. to P.TT. bendly have the Copies ho. I and 2 placed below anthenticated by the Prime trivister and returned to me? I shall then inform dok Salthe Secretariat.

Herrita.

P. S. L. P.N.

P.M. Las signes.

Caliminasan

Shi A.K. Mitra

PM's Seet wom DIS-14918 dt 11. 12.56

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. (FEA SECTION).

Subject:- Dissentient report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, third Member of the Netaji Enquiry Committee.

Will the Rajya Sabha Secretariat kindly refer to this Ministry U.O.No. D.5569-FEA/56 dated the 9th November, 1956?

The dissentient report of Shri Suresh Chandra
Bose has now been authenticated by the Prime Minister.

10 copies of the report including the authenticated one
are forwarded herewith for the purpose of laying on the
table of the House on the Dec., 1956 for which
arrangements may kindly be made.

It is requested that this item may kindly be included in the list of business for Dec., 1956.

The Prime Minister will lay the report on the table of the House.

(A.K. MITRA). Under Secretary (FEA).

The Rajya Sabha Secretariat (Shri I. Krishna). E.A. Ministry U.O.No.F.24(20)-FEA/56 dated 11/12/56.

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MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FEA SECTION).

Subject:- Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, third Member of the Netaji Enquiry Committee.

Will the Lok Sabha Secretariat kindly refer to the correspondence resting with this Ministry U.O. No. D.5866-FEA/56 dated the 22nd November, 1956?

The dissentient report of Shri Suresh Chandra
Bose has now been authenticated by the Prime Minister.

13 copies of the report including the authenticated one
are forwarded herewith for the purpose of laying on the
table of the House on the Dec., 1956 for which
arrangements may kindly be made.

It is requested that this item may kindly be included in the list of business for / Dec., 1956.

The Prime Minister will lay the report on the table of the House.

(A.K. MITRA). Under Secretary (FEA).

Lok Sabha Secretariat (Shri Autor Singh Radai). E.A. Ministry U.O. No.F.24(20)-FEA/56 dated 11/12/56.

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(4) 7.6345- FE 1/56. (5) J. 6430-FEA[S] D. 6344- FEA 156 D. 6452 - FEA 156 (6) (7) for information. se mos 4 to 7 seno7. We had decided (vide H/ 11-12 aute) not to print or give publicity to this report. No corpy, Therefore can be said to the applicant. It many he talog as in the Ministry of Home Affairs and are of secret mature. It is not desirable to give any information about these to the public. .
We may nepty as in the Drift put up. v not issued 24.12.57 Para 29 F.R. is not clear to us. Nin. 4 Home Affairs my kinds see if they can throw any light , and fine LA mps to F.R. my be given efter Nin. 4 How Affairs han seen. 18694/36/2011 NEW DELHI. 2 7 nrr 1958 C. R. No7146-5

Ministry of Home Affairs. Political I Section. Para.2 of the F.R. is not clear to us also. However, F.I Section may see the E.A. Ministry's note dt.26/12/56 at prepage. 2/1/57 Kcjoani 2.1.57 we have nothing to add to. what is state of at A' on propage the writer in perhaps ander the in previous that in spublish 'aporto' ele of intelligener that wi meerice. Ase on ust award any report of the nature of mentioned in hara 2 1800. Carinduly. US(P) Ministry of Home Affairs The reply to proce 2 mig is he that c/s have not published any and report. W4 EMS7 POR 8 - 71157 (MostiNDER SINGH) Moder frey. Milin M. H. A. 40 . NO. 18694/56 foller och 8 57

Milling M. H. A. 40 . NO. 18694/56 foller och 8 57

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Note Sel 1807 + notes from prepage. Draft reply but up. 11.1.5) a M.R. I limen kining!



Correspondence

15 977-11156 Suresh C. Bose 2 Moira Street, Calcutta-16, Dated 9th. October 95 6.

The Secretary,

Ministry of External Affairs,

Dear Sir,

New Delhi.

I have pleasure in submitting my Dissentient Report, as Non-Official Member, Netaji Enquiry Committee, covering 168 Pages of typed matter and a list of Appendices from A - Z & a - d, togeth -er with the Appendices.

I hope and trust it will be given the same recognition and publicity, that has been given to the report of my colleagues and which I can legitimately lay claim to.

The delay in the submission of my report is mainly due to non-receipt of all relevant papers from the Chairman of the Committee and from the Government.

I am enclosing along with my report, Secret File 383/INA, containing Report Nos. 1126 & 1110 on Maj. M. Z. Kiani & Capt. I.J. Kiani, which I had to bring with me to Calcutta, as I could not get the opportunity of returning it to you or consider it proper to make it over to anybody while I was in Delhi.

A receipt for these may please be acknowledged.

Yours truly

2 Moirs Otreet, Coloutte-16, Suresh C. Bose Dated Sth. Cetober 95 6. I have pleasure in submitting my Dissentient Report, as Mon-Official Combon, Websji Maquing Committee, covering 168 Pages typed matter and a list of Appendices from A - Z & a - d, togeth es with the Appendices. hope and trust it will be given the same recognition and publicity, then has been given to the report of my colleagues and which I can legitimately law claim to. The delay in the substantion of my report is rainly due to ent to memited of the relevent papers from the Chairman of the Committee and from the Covernment. I am enclosing along with my report, Secret Bile 585/IMA containing Roport Fos. 1126 8 1110 on Wed. V. L. Mani & Cept. J. J. riani, which I had to bring with me to Calewita, as I could not got the opportunity of returning it to you or commider it proper to and the st over to anybody while I was in Italia. . real of service and service was real totaler . (S.C. Bose)

My attention has been drawn to a report that appeared in the Hindustan Standard on 6th of November, 1956 purporting to be the dissentient note to Netaji Enquiry Committee Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose.

I had so far ignored various insinuations and allegations that had been made by Shri Bose from time to time with a view to create confusion in the public mind. But, in this note, he has made certain allegations that cannot be allowed to go unchallenged.

Shri Bose's Report is a deliberate and dishonest distortion of truth which is particularly difficult to understand in view of the fact that as late as 2nd of July, 1956, after the return of the Committee from Japan, Shri Bose together with other members of the Committee signed an agreed list of points in which he clearly admitted that the plane-crash did take place and that Netaji had expired as a result of burn-injuries received in the plane-crash and that the ashes kept in the Renkoji temple in Tokyo could in all probability be said to be those of Netaji. This note was signed by all the three members of the Committee after a full and mature consideration of the whole evidence and a copy of it was retained by each member for record. How a man, who claims to have had some experience of judiciary, can stoop to such a volte-face passes my comprehension.

I accept Shri Bose's challenge that the people, who have taken a part in the nefarious game of exploiting Netaji's name and confusing the public mind for personal ends should be impeached. Leaving aside the fact that the majority report of the Netaji Enquiry Committee has already been accepted by supreme and sovereign body - the Parliament of India - I am prepared to place the whole evidence of Netaji Enquiry Committee before a board of three or more eminent men to be selected either by the

Calcutta Corporation or the West Bengal Assembly, and, if on the basis of this evidence, they come to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the majority of Netaji Enquiry Committee, I shall retire from public life. I am issuing this statement with full understanding of its implications, and I have no doubt that I can prove conclusively that in changing his views after signing the Preliminary Report Shri Bose was prompted by considerations other than those of honest convictions.

One of the allegations made in the Report is that he was denied access to confidential records. This statement is not only completely false and malicious but in brazen-faced lie. I can prove it to be so under Shri Bose's own signatures. These documents bear Shri Bose's signatures/initials for the days that I hope these documents were in his possession. Shri Bose will accept my suggestion and fix a date in the near future to give me an opportunity of fully exposing his game. My only condition isthat the persons selected to sit on this Board should not be persons who are interested either in the exploitation of Netaji's political fame or his personal property. I would welcome the names of men like Dr. Radha Binod Pal, Shri N.C. Chatterjee, Shri Deonath Das and Shri Naresh Nath Mukherjee, ex. Mayor of Calcutta.

Another very strange omission in Shri Bose's report is any mention of Col. Figess, who was the head of the British Intelligence Section on the staff of Gen. Gardener who was attached to Gen. MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo as the personal representative of Mr. Churchill in the year 1945-46. Col. Figess under instructions from Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme

Allied Commander in South East Asia, was responsible for initiating investigations in collaboration with the American counter Intelligence Corps into the alleged plane-crash in which Netaji was involved. Col Figess. who happened to be in Tokyo at the time of the visit of Netaji Enquiry Committee, as Military Attache in the British Embassy stated clearly that he had submitted a Report in 1945 to Lord Mountbatten and to the Military Intelligence Headquarters at Delhi stating that the plane carrying Netaji had crashed at Formosa and that he had died as a result of burn-injuries received in the crash. In his report, Shri Bose has alleged that all the official Japanese witnesses were tutored and that Col. Habib-ur-Rehman was under an oath of secrecy, but he has advanced no reason for ignoring such vital and direct evidence from XXX a disinterested party.

Shri Bose has also tried to cast aspersion on the Ministry of External Affairs in advising the Committee against visiting Formosa. All the correspondence received from the Ministry was placed before the Committee and was discussed in the presence of our Ambassador in Tokyo. Shri B.R. Sen. Shri Bose in his presence fully endorsed the suggestion of the Ministry of External Affairs. All these things make me feel that Shri Bose is the victim of family circumstances. Some members of his family appear to be labouring under the feeling that they are the custodians of Netaji's interests and honour. There are millions who love and honour him no less than they do and who have probably suffered and sacrificed much more. Such persons think it to be a crime to exploit Netaji's name for any political or material gains, and sooner Shri Suresh Chandra Bose and others give up the game of attributing dishonest motives to others the better for everybody.

*only people who are the

Shahnais & Alan

D.O.No.189/5.12/56-Q LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT Telegraphic Address: PARLIAMENT HOUSE. VIDHISABHA, New Delhi. NEW DELHI-I. Dated the Ist December, 1956. Dear Shri Mitra, Will you please refer to your U.O.No. 5866-FEA/56 dated the 22nd November, 1956 and let me know whether the Dissenting Report of Shri Suresh Chandra Bose will definitely be laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha, during the current session. You are already aware that we have a large number of questions on the subject and it is necessary to take a decision on them without any further delay. Yours sincerel To Shri A.K. Mitra, Under Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.

Extract from the debates in the Lok Sabha on 12/12/56.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE.

12.10 hours *Dissentient Report - Netaji Enquiry Committee
The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri
Jawaharlal Nehru): I beg to lay on the Table a copy
of the Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose,
member, Netaji Enquriy Committee.

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): May I ask about this matter whether in accordance with our practice or custom, Government will also lay on the Table at some future date, not now, today, a copy of the findings or comments on this Dissentient Report, whether they accept the findings or they do not.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Government have accepted the findings; there is no question about it, Government have accepted the report on the findings of the majority of this Committee. That is a long finding. I give this information to the hon. Member here and now.

Shri Kamath: May I ask whether the comments of the Government on this report will be laid on the Table? Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Government do not accept the conclusions of this report.

Shri Sadhan Gupta (Calcutta - South-East): I want to ask
whether the Government have any objection to place
the evidence before the Committee on the Table of
this House -- the evidence which was given before the
Enquriy Committee

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I have no objection, but it is rather difficult. I would be perfectly prepared to show it to Members, but I think it would be a bad precedent for me to place all the evidence on the Table of the House. If any hon. Members care to see it, they can come to the Ministry of External Affairs' office and see it; I will show it to them.



(2)

Confidential

D.O. NO. PS/DM(S)/56.

DEPUTY MINISTER,

TRANSPORT & RAILWAYS, INDIA

New Delhi, 14th November, 1956.

huy dear Candith

In his dissentient note, Shri
Suresh Chandra Bose has made some wild
allegations against me. Since this contain
insinuations against my integrity, I
cannot allow these to go unchallenged. I
am enclosing a statement which I have
issued to the press in order to call of
Shri Bose's bluff.

Yours sincerely,

Shah NAWAZ KHAN

Shri Jawaharlal Ji Nehru, Prime Minister of India, Prime Minister's Sectt., New Delhi.

Encl. As above.

debates to the Lot Saids on 187

Shri Kamath: Can it not be published?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It is not worthwhile publishing it

12.10 hours . This sentiest Taport - Setail Enguiry Committee Ind Price Minister and Minister of Substate Affects (Shri Venebariel Mehrn): I beg to lay on the Table a copy of the Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Shandra Rese, member. Matelf Enguriy Committee.

Sort Kameth (Headmanachen): New I sak about this matter whether is scordance with our practice or custom, Severnment will also lay on the Table at some friture date, not now, today, a copy of the findings or comments on this Dissentient Report, whather they scoopt the findings or they do not.

Shri Jamabarial Webra: Covernment bave accapted the findings. there is no suestion about it. Covernment bave witnesses the report on the findings of the majerity of this Conmittee. That is a long finding. I give this information to the hon. Member here and non.

Shri Manath; May I ask whether the comments of the Coldar ent no bisi of like trager with no temperators Shri Jeweharlal dehrut Covernment do not secept the conclusions of this report.

She is done I total-dated - South-East) + I want to ask shether the Covernment have any objection to place the evidence before the Committee on the Table of this House -- the ovidence which was given before the English Committee

at it ind analitables on even I tunder talvedaget test rather difficult. I would be perfectly propertd to age and birow it doi: I think it would be a bad precedent for so to rlace all the evilence on the Table of the House. If may hon, Membels care to see it, they can ocno be the State of Sxbernal . west as at words file I said one bas estite 'estalli *2.1.1

(5) 2.6430 AEA/569

PARLIAMENT OF INDIA RAJYA SABHA SECRETARIAT

PARLIAMENT HOUSE
NEW DELHI

No. RS-14/84/56-T.

The . 1.5th . Dec .. 1956 .

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject:- Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, Member, Netaji Enquiry Committee - Laying on the Table of the Rajya Sabha.

--- p.37/10tes

With reference to the Ministry of External Affairs u.o. No.F.24(20)-FEA/56, dated the 11th December, 1956, on the subject mentioned above, the undersigned is directed to state that the Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, non-official Member, Netaji Enquiry Committee, was laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha on the 12th December, 1956.

18187 December

(P.N. Krishna Mani) Under Secretary.

The Ministry of External Affairs,

ks

To

Ntw.

6) 0.6344-FEA/56 10

Extract from the Debates in the Rajya Sabha on 12.12.56.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI ANIL K. CHANDA): Sir, on behalf of Shri

Jawaharlal Nehru, I beg to lay on the Table a copy of the Dissentient Report by Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, non-official Member, Netaji Enquiry Committee.

Phone: 48-1727 Kavi Kumar Film Director & Producer : Cine-Technologist ; Inventor ; CALCUTTA-26, India. Critic-Journalist & Social Worker: Proceeding Station or Camp TEC. ADVISER & CONTROLLER, BENGAL CINETONE (1946) Res: 113, Kasundia Road, MEMBER, TROYEE (CINE GROUP): INVESTOR, ROYSON HOSIERY MILL: Howorah SECRETARY, NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PHOTOGRAPHY; GENERAL SECRETARY. THE HUMANIST. DIRECTOR, LAB. DE MONSIEAUR. Date Dec. 14, 1956. CONSLITG. PHOTOGRAPHER. Consultation: 6 A. M. to 7 A. M. Fees: Rs. 100/- per five minute. 9 P. M. to 10 P. M. No Interview : Thursday, Saturday & Sunday. The Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gout of Judia. Dear Sir, Re: Netaji Suthas Bose tete (mise). May I expect to see the report about Netzie Suthas Bose by Shri Suresh Bose. 2) Is any report against the "Foreigners" of S.D.A. Mission in India for their nefacious activities? Looking to hearing please. Jours faillifully, Kavi Kumar To-Day's Film in To-Morrow's Life.

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DEPARTMENT/OFFICE

Draft Memorandum
Telegram

Serial No.


File No.

1. Date of despatch

2. List of enclosures

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Pl. ist and set of se: No. (7)



Dans.

Shri Kavi Kumar, 113, Kasundia Road, HOWRAH (WEST BENGAL)

No. F. 24(20)-FEA/56 Dated 18 JAN 1957

Subject:- Report of Shri Suresh Chandra
Bose on Netaji Subhash Chandra
Bose and reports on activities of foreigners in India.

Sir,

To

I am directed to refer to your letter dated the 14th December, 1956, on the above subject and to say that Government have not published any such reports.

Yours faithfully,

(M.R. THADANI) U. S. (F. E. A.)

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Appendix to Comespondence

DISSENTIENT REPORT

BY

SURESH CHANDRA BOSE,

NON-OFFICIAL MEMBER,

NETAJI ENQUIRY COMMITTEE,

BK DISSENTIENT REPORT

SUHESH CHANDHA BOSE,

NON-OFFICIAL MEMBER,

METAJI ENQUIRY COMMUTEE.

HEADING.	PAGE.
1. Introduction.	1 - 2.
2. Why This Enquiry ?	2 - 4.
3. The Dissent.	4.
4. The Plan.	4 8.
5. Why Taihoku ?	8.
6. This Plan Why Proved ?	9 - 10-
7. Enquiries By Foreigners.	10 - 11.
8. Volunteer Witnesses.	11 - 14.
9. Bias.	14 - 18.
10. Enquiry By The Japanese Government ?	18 - 19.
11. Non-Official Committee vis-a-vis Official	
Committee.	19 - 22.
12. The Committee.	22 - 31.
13. The Committee's Itinerary & Work.	31 - 34.
14. Preparation For The Report.	34 - 38.
15. The Draft Report.	38 - 42.
16. The Dissent Discussed.	42 - 43.
17. Chairman's Advice For Dissenting Report.	43 - 44.
18. Harassment & Departure From Delhi	44 - 46.
19. Obstruction & Pressure.	46 - 49.
20.Netaji's Earlier Activities.	49 - 54.
21.Colleagues Accept Netaji's Plan Partly.	54 - 56.
22.Terms Of Reference.	56 - 59.
23.Circumstances.	59 - 65.
24.Departure.	65 - 87.
25. The Aircraft Accident.	87 - 106.
26. Four Photographs Produced By Col. Ralman.	106 - 109.
27.Col.Rahman's Conduct & Antecedents.	109 - 111.
28. After The Crash To Hospital.	112 - 118.
29. In Hospital & Death.	119 - 127,
30. Photograph Of Coffin & Dead Body Not Produc	ed.127 - 128.

S.C. Bon

(Contd.)

CONTENTS CONTD.

	HEADING.	PAG	E.
	31.Cremation.	128 -	132.
	32. Ashes.	132 -	133.
	33.Col.Rahman's Statements d/24.8.45 To Shri J.Murti	134 -	136.
	34. Other Statements & Excerpts From Secret Reports.	136 -	145.
~	35. Death Denied, Initially By Chairman Then By 14 Other	rs 145	- 153.
	36. Photostat Copy Of Dr. Radha Binod Pal's Letter.		153.
	37. Shri M. K. Gandhi & Russian Diplomats Believe		
	Netaji Alive.	153 -	155.
	38. Shri Harin Shah's Enquiry In 1946.	155 -	158.
	39. No Enquiry Held, States Japanese Foreign Office.	159 -	160.
	Intelligence 40.British Military Disbelieve Col. Rahman.	160 -	162.
	41. Netaji's Wrist Watch.	162 -	164.
	42.Myself, A Deserter.	164 -1	65.
	43.My Personal Note.	165 -	167.
	44. Appeal To Countrymen.	167 -	168.

5. C.Box. (S.C.Bose.)

List of Appendices.

Appendices A - Z & a - d.

169. 170 - 208.

5.C. Am (s.c. Bose). DISSENTIENT REPORT

by

SURESH CHANDRA BOSE,

NON-OFFICIAL MEMBER,

NETAJI ENQUIRY COMMITTEE.

INTRODUCTION.

I am constrained to state at the outset that I have had to carry on my duties as a Member of this Committee under great handicaps and obstructions in all possible ways, which, in my opinion, is due to the fact that I did not fall in with the opinion of my colleagues and thereby enable them to submit a unanimous report.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, was pleased to nominate me as a member of this Committee as a representative of our family. I duly accepted it, as I felt it to be my sacred duty to associate myself with an investigation into the mysteries of the alleged demise of my brother, Netaji Subhas Bose, at Taihoku in Formosa on the 18th August, 1945.

As would ordinarily be expected, I had a firm belief that this enquiry would be conducted with an impartial, just and open mind and without any preconceived or prejudiced idea or notion and without any mandate from any quarter. I regret very much to state that, in this matter, I have been sorely disappointed.

I can assure my countrymen and, incidentally, my Government, with all the sincerity I possess, that such relation—ship will not stand in any way in my impartial adjudica—tion of this matter, and, after all, as a brother, I would be more interested than anybody else in knowing exactly what the real truth is. From my limited experience of the little judicial work I did while in Government service, I can justly claim that no considerations.

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whether personal, Governmental or Political, have ever, by
the Almighty's Grade, made me deviate from the path of truth
and justice. For tunately for me, there was never any mandat
to me from the higher authorities. My experience tells me
that mandate from the Government is generally conveyed only
to those, who carry it out with unusual ardour and zeal.
I have, accordingly, played my part as a member of this
Committee to the best of my limited capabilities and
strictly in keeping with my ideas and policies, as stated
above.

As members of this Committee, there is no gain-saying the fact, that it is our bounden duty to conduct this enquiry with annual an open and unprejudiced mind and to arrive at a just and impartial finding, as the evidence would justify and not to be influenced by any consideration whatsoever. In this matter, I am aggrieved to say there has been frustration and my colleagues, both connected with the Government, have tried their utmost to secure and to manipulate the evidence, so that it could easily conform with the Prime Minister's statements in Parliament and which is evidently the opinion of his Government and that with them, loyalty to Government has been their guiding principle and "Interest" has had the better of "Duty".

WHY THIS ENQUIRY ?

It would be desirable and necessary to state in this connection that the Prime Minister, in reply to questions put in the Parliament by Shri H.V. Kamath, was pleased to state, "I have no doubt in my mind - I did not have it then" (in the Parliament on 5.3.1952) "and I have no doubt today of the fact of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's death" - "I have said that the question of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's death, is, I think, settled beyond doubt.

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There can be no enquiry about that".

The opinion of the Prime Minister and evidently that of his Government, as conveyed in these categorical statements of his, was apparently confirmed by the Chairman of this Committee as his opinion also, in his statement made to the Press in Tokyo on the night of the 4th May, 1956, immediately on our arrival at the Airport there, and which was reported in some of the Calcutta newspapers on the 6th idem, that, "his mission was mainly to interview people, who might offer in direct evidence on Shri Bose's death". So, the admission of the Chairman exists and that in an initial stage of this enquiry, that his mission was to interview only those persons, who might offer direct evidence on Netaji's death, so as to enable him to confirm his death, which was already the confirmed opinion of the Government and that he had no intention whatsoever of interviewing others, who would be expected to depose contrarily or to take the trouble to ascertain whether Netaji did not die. In view of this, it could almost be presumed that, whether the evidence recorded during the course of this enquiry, justified coming to the finding that the plane crashed or not or whether Netaji died or not, the Chairman appears to have made up his mind to conclude that the plane crashed and that Netaji died as a result of the same. As it appears that the intention of the Government mixtue for holding this enquiry was only to confirm Netaji's death, which was already the confirmed opinion of the Prime Ministrer and his Government, one fails to understand what was the necessity was for obtaining the same opinion again and for spending so much public money for it.

In view of the definite statement recorded above, that, "There can be no enquiry about that", made

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by a person of the rank and stature of the Prime Minister of India, a question would forthwith arise, "Then why was this enquiry held?" The only simple answer to this would naturally be that there must have been a pressing necessity that compelled the ordering of this enquiry. It appears that from all that has transpired during the pendency of this an enquiry, that after getting Netaji's death confirmed by this Committee, the ultimate object of the Government is to bring those "ashes" from Tokyo, for reasons best known to the sponsors of this Committee.

THE DISSENT.

I do not propose here to go into the manner in which my colleagues have manipulated the statements tendered by some of the witnesses, but it will suffice to say that inspite of their joint and concerted efforts, they have not met with success and it is my confirmed opinion, after a very careful consideration, that the evidence does not justify the finding that the plane creash took place and that Netaji died thereform. I, therefore, feel it my duty, not merely out of respect for Netaji, but in the national interest and in defence to truth and candour to record my considered verdict that he did not die in the circumstances as alleged and as found by my colleagues.

In this situation, I have no other alternative, but to record my dissent and to give my findings and reasons and arguments in support of my findings for the kind consideration of my Government and of my countrymen.

NETAJI'S BLAN.

It has been proved without the shadow of a how doubt that as early as 1944, Netaji foresaw that the Japanese nation would have to surrender and that it was

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only a question of time. As the main objection of life was to continue his struggle for the liberation of India and as he could not do the same in those countries in the East, where he was then working, as they would come under the occupation of the victorious British and American forces and as for the same purpose and for the same reason, he could not continue his work also in Japan, he considered Russia to be a convenient and suitable country for his next future activities. He, accordingly, started making contacts with the Russian Ambassador in Japan.

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When the time came for the Japanese to surrender, their Government expressed great sorrow at the failure of Netaji's mission and which they ascribed to their defeat and they then decided to "respect his last wishes," in whatever manner & it was possible for them to do under such changed circumstances. Netaji, accordingly, requested them to take him to Russian territor. request they could not comply with, because, they said, it would ambra embarrass both the Russians as well as them. - selves, as they were negotiating for surrender and treaty terms with the Anglo-Americans through the Russians. Netaji accepted this and as a next alternative, requested them to take him to Manchuria, which was still under their occupations and he told them that he would make his own arrangements for entering into the adjoining Russian territory. This plan was agreed upon and in pursuance of the same, Field Marshal Count Terauchi, the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Southern Command, who had his headquarters at Dalat, near Saigon, arranged a plant for Netaji and allowed Lt. Gen. Shidei, the Chief of Staff of the Burma Army, who had seen service in Manchuria and a renowned General in the Kwantung Army, who knew that territory well and also about Russian affairs, to

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accompany Netaji in the same plane, with directions to drop both of them at Dairen in Manchyria and that General Shidei would look after Netaji, as long as he would be there and to help him in entering Russian territory and after which, the Japanese would announce to the world that Netaji had "disappeared".

Shri S.A. Iyer, witness No. 6, who was at one time a Minister in Netaji's Cabinet, has given a detailed account of this plan and has used the word, "disappreared". This plan has been corroborated by Mr. T. Negishi, witness No. 20, who was at that time the Japanese interpreter attached to Netaji and is now the General Manager of all the branches in India and Pakistan of Messrs. Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd., one of the biggest firms in Japan with branches in all parts of the world, by Lt. Gen. S. Isoda, witness No. 35, who was the Head of the Hikari Kikan in South-East Asia, a Liaison Organisation between the Indian National Army (I.N.A) and the Provisional Government of Azad Hind on the one hand and the Japanese Mihitary Command and the Imperial Japanese Government on the other, by Mr. T. Hachiya, witness No. 32, the Japanese Minister to the Azad Hind Government, by Mr. N. Kitazawa, witness to No. 61, who was at that time Deputy to the Japanese Ambassador in Burma and now a member of the House it of Representatives, Japan and also by a few other witnesses. This plan of Netaji of going to Russia via Manchuria has been very satisfactorily proved by such eminent persons and has also been accepted by my colleagues.

General Isoda has stated that the plane arranged for Netaji was a brand new bomber and that its take-off from Saigon aerodrome was quite normal and which has also been confirmed by Messrs. T. Hachiya, T. Nagishi, Shri S.A. Iyer and others, who were present there.

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Shri Iyer has used the word, "disappeared" with reference to Netaji's departure in the plan agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji. to be considered what this word "Disappeared" could actually signify and what the correct word in this connection should be. The plan was that the Japanese would remove Netaji to a safe zone, so as to prevent his arrest! by the Anglo-Americans, who were expected to be in imminent occupation of that territory and that, after he was safe in Russian territory and out of their clutches, the Japanese would make the announcement regarding Netaji. As the Japanese were also surrendering to the same Anglo-Americans, they could, in my opinion, under no circumstances make an announcement that they had removed alive or had otherwise helped the da disappearance of their erstwhile ally, Netaji, and who was an arch enemy of the Anglo-Americans and who were naturally very keen on arresting him. So, after having removed Netaji in a plane from his theatre of activities and anarm away from his countrymen and beyond the control of the Anglo-Americans, the Japanese duly announced that Netaji had died, as the result of a plane crash. So, under such circumstances, the Japanese had no kenck other alternative but do declare that Netaji had died and there--fore, the word "disappeared" used by Shri Iyer could only be "died" and nothing else.

As Netaji was travelling in a plane, it was the easiest thing for them to announce that Netaji's death was caused by a plane crash accident and which is obviously a readily-believable story and which was actually what they had announced.

It has been stated that Police Officers, Shri H.K. Rai and Shri K.P. De, witnesses Nos. 14 and 15 respectively, that they were members of two teams, under the leadership of Messrs. Davies and Finney, that had 5.com

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been despatched by the British Indian Government to the Far East, soon after the surrender of the Japanese for arresting Netaji, against whom a case had been stated stated under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance, as they did not believe the announcement made by the Japanese that Netaji had died as the result of a plane crash and they considered that it might be a hoax.

The facts and circumstances makes narrated above, give a very clear, convincing and readily-zenze believable story that, in accordance with Netaji's final request to be taken to Manchuria, with the ultimate object of going to Russia, the Japanese Government flew him in a brand new bomber place from Bangkok to Saigon and then onwards to Dairen in Manchuria, Netaji's final destination under the auspices of the Japanese.

WHY TAIHOKU ?

It has been proved satisfactorily and accepted by my colleagues that Netaji reached Saigon from Bangkok quite safely and that the take-off, landing and flight enroute as well as the take-off from Saigon were quite normal and smooth. It may be stated that Taihoku was nearest to and only one hop from Dairen, without any Indian national there and very far from Saigon, which was practically the easternmost end of Netaji's area of activities and where a large number of Indians lived. As the Japanese could not possibly announce that Netaji's plane had met with an accident in Manchuria, so Taihoku would be the most suitable place for a plane accident, in pursuance of the plan agreed upon by them as well as by Netaji. It now remains to be considered that after the take-off from Saigon, what finding the evidence on record justifies.

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THIS PLAN WMY PROVED ?

The passengers in the plane, as it took off from Saigon, were :-

(1) Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, (2) *** Lt. General T.Shidei, (3) Col. Habibur Rahman, (4) Lt.Col. T. Sakai, (5) Lt.Col.S. Nonogaki, (6) Major T. Kono, (7) Major I. Takahashi, (8) Major Takizawa, (9) Capt. K. Arai, Radio Cperator, Radio Cperator, Radio Cperator, Colon N.C.O. Ayoagi, (11) Mr. Tominaga, (12) Sergeant Okshita, and (13) An Engineer, name not known.

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Besides Netaji and his Adjutant, Col. Rahman, the rest were all Japanese Military Officers and Crew of that military plane. In ivew of the plan of the Japanese Government to remove Netaji to a safe place and from the clutches of the Anglo-Americans and at the same time to annunce that he had died as a result of his plane meeting with an accident, the only version that could be many expected from all the Japanese witnesses, regarding Netaji's journey from Saigon onwards, would be the one that would be in keeping with the plan of their Government. My colleagues were of opinion that through these witnesses were at that time military officers and under the control of their Government, now, after a lapse of about eleven years, almost all of them, being in different walks of life as civilians and as Japan is not a totalitarian state, they are no longer under any compulsion or obligation to support their Government, I regret. I am unable to accept this view of my colleagues. These witnesses, apart from their education and respectability, are citizens of Japan, and whose unbounded patriotism is probably unique in the world. They have made statements to different authorities at different times, supporting the aforesaid, plan of their

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Government. As such, I consider it an impossibility for them to go beyond their previously recorded statements and thereby disgrace themselves as well as their own Government, who, after all, had done a magnanimous act by giving succour to their freight friend and ally, "Mr. Chandra Bose".

ENQUIRES BY FOREIGNERS.

Another very interesting aspect from quite a different angle is as follows :-

Soon after the surrender by the Japanese and

naturally the I.N.A. also, the British rulers in India sent two tems of British and Indian Officers to Netaji's scen-e of activities to arrest him. Shri H.K. Rai and Shri K.P. De, witnesses Nos. 14 and 15 respectively, who were in those two teams and Shri S. Mazumdar, witness No.11, who held a high post in the Intelligence Branch at that time, and all three of whom are still holding high posts in the Police Department, confirm this fact. These its teams were unsuccessful in their attempts to arrest Netaji, though they were very intelligently given different areas for simultaneous activities to find out Netaji for the pr purpose of arresting him. Thereafter, different British and American Intelligence parties under the commands of Lord Mountbaten, General MacArthur and others scoured that area in a vain search for Netaji and the main reason for such furjous activities was that from the time of the announcement of Netaji's death by the Japanese, they believed it to be a hoax and were under the impression that Netaji was living and was hiding somewhere. The final result of their enquiries was indefinite and it was their opinion that this was probably a cleverly-conveived master deception plan on the part of the Japanese and Netaji, In short, they failed to

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be convinced that Netaji was dead, as had been announced by the Japanese. In my opinion, much reliance and weight should be placed on the result of these enquiries, held under different auspices with different personnel and in all the areas covered by Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon and Taihoku, soon after Netaji's departure from that area and because of their keen and earnest efforts to find him out for purposes of arresting and taking action against him under the provisions of the Enemy Agents' Ordinance and also because he had been declared an International War Criminal.

The manner in which our enquiry was made, viz., "mainly to collect direct evidence on Shri Bose's death", as stated by the Chairman, would, in my opinion, be considered to be perfunctory, when compared with those enquiries mentioned above and our finding should consequently be regarded to possess a similar value.

VOLUNTEER WITNESSES.

In addition to this, the Chairman made it a point to confine his win witnesses to those, who, he expected, would support his view, but for the satisfaction of the public, he made an announcement in the papers, both here as well as in Tokyo, inviting persons to appear before him and to depose, if they knew anything about the subject matter of this Enquirix enquiry. In response to this, I believe, a fair number of applications was received, but in view of his biassed attitude and of the results of the examination of only three of them, which unfortunately proved unfavourable to him, he did not dare examine any more of them and also kept me in the dark regarding most of those applications.

Out of these applicants, the Chairman told me that he desired to examine one Mr. K. Satoh, witness No.

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No. 40. who, being a bomber mechanic attached to 136 Air Unit at Taihoku Aerodrome at that time, was expected to be an important witness about the plane crash there, Netaji's injuries, etc. He, however, gave a different version of another minor plane accident, which took place at 7 A.M. and not at about at 2-30 P.M. and that only two passengers were in that plane. That The first passenger opened the door and jumped out. He was a non-Japanese and resembled Netaji. The other was pulled out of the plane and was a Japanese. He was told by a senior Military Officer there by that that plane was carrying "Mr. Chandra Bose" and when he saw the first person come, out, he thought him to be "Mr. Chandra Bose". His version of the crash and other details is different from that of the other Japanese witnesses, who were said to have been passengers in another plane, that is alleged to have crashed. Mr. Satoh continued that neither of these passengers was injured or burnt in any way and they started talking to each other. The time of this accident has been corroborated more or less by Shri H.K. Rai, witness No. 14, which was reter rather unexpected. The deposition of Mr. K. Satch was unfortunately a set-back for the Chairman. The second such witness to be examined was Shri S.N. Sen, witness No. 49, who appeared before us and insisted on being examined. He has been in Japan for the last x twenty years and was connected with the Indian Independence League in the Far East and knew Netaji there. He deposed that Netaji was not in that plane. Then, evidently, with the expectation of making up for lost ground, the Chairman told me that he wanted to examine another person, viz., Mr. M. Miyoshi, witness No. 59, who, being a medical orderly in the same hospital at Taihoku, at that time, would be in a position to state about Netaji's injuries, treatment and subsequent death

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there and probably also about his cremation, but he was a great disappointment, as he only said that he was asked to lift a coffin from a room in the Hospital and to place it on a truck, that was waiting there, which he did with the help of three others. He had no idea as to whose body was in that coffin. Though, admittedly, a nursing orderly in that hospital and on active duty there, it is accessing exceedingly strange that he had no knowledge whatsoever that such a renowned person like "Mr. Chandra Bose" and a non-Japanese and whose introduction is stated to have here been given to and known by the hospital staff had been treated in that hospital, had died in that hospital and whose body had been kept in that hospital for two or three days, as stated by some of the officially produced Japanese witnesses.

The case of Mr. K. Satoh, witness No. 40, is a similar one. He was admittedly in the Japanese Military Air Force Staff at Taihoku Aerodrome at that time and it is exceedingly staxeta Strange as to why his version is totally different from that of the other Japanese witnesses, who were produced before us by the Japanese Fore--ign Office. Neither of these three witnesses had been examined by anybody else, before they appeared before us and so obviously, they were not bound down by any statements previously made by them. The depositions of these persons are significant and in my opinion carry much weight. If any colleagues have discussed their depositions, I am almost certain that they have done so in a superficial manner, because it is quite apparent that a proper and correct consideration of the same would go much against their findings. In any case, they must have failed to explain why these witnesses have made such statements, which are contradictory to those made by the

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witnesses

witnesses produced by the Japanese Government. There is, moreover, no suggestion anywhere that they have been sponsored by any party or by any individual to depose in such fashion or they had any ulterior motive in doing so. They read the notice published in the papers at the instance of the Committee, as stated above, and as they found that they were in a position to say something about the subject-matter of this enquiry, they came forward and valunteered themselves before the Committee in good faith to depose whatever they knew about it. The Chairman as a result of this unfavourable experience, evidently received an unexpected shock and so fought shy of the other persons, who had so volunteered and did not risk examining any more of them.

Out of such mixapplicants applicants, one
Mr. Bondai Mori, a Japanese mine-owner, requested
the Chairman for being examined, but as he was not asked
to do so, he published the fact of his disappointment in
the Calcutta newspapers on 13.5.56.

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In this connection, I consider, I will be falling in my duty, if I do not place on record certain facts, which I regret to state amount to serious allegations against the Chairman.

As this enquiry is of a semi-judicial nature, and which has been in a way expressed by the Prime Minister in his letter dated 14.4.56, in reply to a reference made by me to him my letters dated 2.4.56 and 14.4.56, it is my humble opinion, that our position is somewhat akin to that of judicial officers. I am aggrieved to state that the Chairman's attitude and conduct at times, for from maintaining a judicial approach, has been similar to that of a zealous partisan and worse than that of

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the

the most unscrupulous prosecutor. With the intention of manipulating the evidence, so as to make it easy to lead to the finding that the plane crashed and that Netaji died, to which conclusion, Shri S.A. Iyer, witness No. 6, has arrived at in his book "Unto Him, A Witness", the Chairman, considering that to be an authoritative book regarding the subject matter of this enquiry, put leading question to some witnesses from relevant portions of that book and at times allowed a few of them to peruse the book during their examination. Whenever any witness made a statement that did not fit in with his opinion, he would make a suggestion to him as to whether he remembered it definitely, as the incident took place about eleven years ago or would put other questions or suggestions to him to confuse him and to make him modify his answer or change his definite statement to a vague one. Another unimaginable conduct of his was that when a statement made by a witness did not suit his purpose, he would modify it, while dictating it to the Stenographer. Objections were invariably raised by me and at times it was a daily occurence.

The climax was reached on the 1st June, 1956 in Tokyo, when Mr. M.Miyoshi, named above, stated that Netaji's coffin was placed on one stool, which the Chairman deliberately dictated to the Stenographer as two. When I raised my objections and demanded the Chairman to inform me whether the witness had stated one stool or two stools, he and evaded a reply and eventually explained that as an eight feet long coffin, in his mps opinion, could not rest on one stool, he dictated two instead of one. As stated above, such conduct cannot be gad readily imagined. This sort of conduct on the part of the Chairman compelled me to make notes at times of the statements of the witness separately and to compare the same with the draft copy of the in statements

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statements submitted by the Stenographer. I fully realise the seriousness of these allegations, but I assure my readers that there has not been the slightest deviation from truth.

When I have been compelled to go so far, I would like to note for the information of my readers, a much less damaging statement, but probably a more interesting one in some other respect. When on the 9th June, 1956, during our sitting in Calcutta, X Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, witness No. 22, started stating about Netaji's wrist watch, the Chairman stopped him from proceeding further, on the ground that this witness was not entitled to make any statement about Netaji's wri wrist watch, as Shri S.M. Goswami, witness No. 16, had already made statements regarding that watch. As the witness was taken aback at the Chairman's objections and insisted on continuing with his deposition, our colleague, Shri S.N. Maitra, came to the Chairman's rescue and explained to him as one would do to a child, by saying, that if a red shirt was hung up against a wall, a person could state that it was so, another could say it was green and not red, a third could come and say it was white and not red and so on and so this witness should not be prevented from speaking about that wrist watch. This, I am certain is something unique in the annals of all judicial proceedings and exhibits the Chairman's colossal ignorance in the matter of holding Exper enquiries. There has not been the skighest slightest deviation from truth in this matter either. This remark of mine and the similar one at the end of the last paragraph, I have been compelled to make, as these facts cannot be readily believed.

Another point, that should be considered, is our failure in visiting Taihoka. In my first interview with

the Prime Minister on the 2nd April, 1956, along with the Chairman, I pressed this point and told him that I would not consider it to be a satisfactory enquiry, unless we visited that place, made a local inspection and examined the local people there. The Prime Minister was pleased to reply that it was not possible or necessary to do so, for the following main reasons, (1) because. no diplomatic relations existed between the Formosan and our Governments (2) because, in all probability, that aerodrome with its runway, buildings etc. no longer existed (3) because, the Hospital, being a Japanese Military one, had probably been demolished, (4) because, the Hospital and Aerodrome staff, being Japanese, were no longer there and they being at present somewhere in Japan, it would suffice, if we went and examined them there i.e. in Japan. I pressed this point in vain with our Ambassadors at Bangkok and Tokyo, Before finishing our work in Tokyo, and on my query, the Chairman told me that our visit to Taihoku could not be arranged, but he was, however, trying to bring to Tokyo, the Formosan nurse, who was said to have attended on Netaji.

On the 13th July, 1956, during our sittings in New Delhi, I was taken aback, when the Chairman told me that the Japanese Foreign office had arranged for our visit to Taihoku. On asking him, whether our Ambassador in Japan stood in the a way of our going there, he replied that it was not so, but that our Prime Minister did not approve of it. This omission on the part of the Committee to visit Taihoku in Formosa, was also stated by Shri Amiyanath Bose, when we visited the their house on 9.6.56 for inspecting the rectangular was wrist watch there, and it was to the effect that the Chairman had had told him that the Japanese Government had.....

had arranged for our visit to Taihoku. He enquired of the Chairman in our presente and hering, as to the reasons why the Commmittee did not go there and avail themselves of the opportunity thus offer to us, and said that it would be admitted on all hands that a tot local enquiry would be exceedingly beneficial for a correct adjudication of the subject matter of this angir enquiry and an ommission thereof would, on the other hand, leave a gap and void that could never be replaced. The Chairman gave no reply. It was for this and for the other statements of Shri Bose and which appeared in the newspapers on the following day, that I requested the Chairman to record the statements of Shri Bose as a witness, which he declined to do as I have stated elsewhere. I fail to understand why our visit there, to which great importance is attached and which was evidently secured after great difficulty and opposition, was not allowed. If this be correct, it may naturally lead one to suspect that such a visit would probably reveal certain intriguing points, which would tend to change the whole aspect of the findings of my colleagues. ENQUIRY BY THE JAPANESE AND NOT BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT

In reply to a question put in the Parliament by Shri H.V. Kamath, on the 29th September,1955, our Prime Minister was pleased to state, "In a matter of this kind, the only enquiry that is to say, satisfactory enquiry that can be made is by the Japanese Government. The matter is in Japan, the whole thing is there. We cannot impose ourselves or an Enquiry Committee on the Japanese Government. Of course, if they choose to enquire we will gladly co-operate and give such help as we can. But we cannot simply enquire into their territory, and more specially also, when all the possible witnesses are

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probably

probably either Japanese Government officials or others connected with that Government"...."And as I said, the initiative must come from the Japanese Government in this matter. If it comes naturally we shall given them such help as we can".

These statements are also quite clear and definite. Though the incident is alleged to have taken place in August, 1945, no enquiry was made by the Japanese Government during the last eleven years nor has any initiative or suggestion come from that quarter upto the end of September, 1955. It is really puzzling to persons who have little knowledge of international affairs, but are possessed with the usual amount of common sense, to realise that an Enquiry as to whether Netaji is dead or not, should be the duty of the Japanese Government and not of the Indian Government. But in the course of the next few months, the common sense view was eventually areps accepted in preference to the other and our Government, on its own initiative, formed a Committee for making an enquiry, which it had only recently said was not at all necessary. It imposed this Committee on the Government of Japan, by deputing it to hold its sittings in their territory and for examining their nationals there. As stated once before, a pressing necessity must have arisen for a sudden change in a long-standing plan and conviction.

NON-OFFICIAL COMMITTEE VIS-A-VIS OFFICIAL COMMITTEE.

Another very interesting point in this connection is that the Chairman announced in am a meeting of the Netaji Smarak Samiti(Memorial Committee) held in Calcutta on the 6th October, 1955, in which he was the President, that our Prime Mînister was not in favour of setting up an official Committee for purposes of this enquiry. So

it is not understood as to why an Official Committee...

Committee was formed soon after by the self-same authority.

I have gone into this matter in some details below. This change in decision was evidently also brought about by some pressing necessity.

One cannot help noticing that these are after all very curious and confusing statements and ever-changing decisions, viz.,

- 1. The question of Netaji's death, being settled beyond doubt and there can be no enquiry about that was changed to the only satisfactory enquiry that can be made, is by the Japanese Government. Therefore, the decision no enquiry gives place to an enquiry by the Japanese Government.
- 2. The decision, viz., no enquiry by the Japanese Government vanish and an enquiry by the Indian Government takes place instead.
 - 3. The opinion, viz., not in favour of setting up an official Committee disappears and soon after, an official Committee is actually formed and made to function.

The sudden change in these long-cherished ideas and plans is certainly significant and was evidently due to certain unforseen circumstances, that suddenly cropped up immediately after our Prime Minister's categorical statements made in the Parliament on the 29th September, 1955 and which apparently resulted from the initiative taken in the meeting of the Netaji Memorial Committee, stated above, for the formation of a nun-official Committee, that would soon go abroad to ascertain definitely whether Netaji was dead or not. In the Resolution passed in that meeting, there was a request to me to associate myself with the Committee, as a representative of the family and to guide its activities and accordinly, the

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President of that meeting, who happens to be the Chairman of this Committee, was authorised to meet me at Karmatar In Bihar, where I was living at that time, and to persuade me to join it, so that the Committee could go ahead with its work. The Chairman duly met me there on the 11th October, 1955, and, after handing over a copy of that Resolution, explained to me that the whole position and persuaded me to associate myself with it as its leader and thereby help it in having an enquiry made, as a rent result of which, the Indian public would know definitely whether Netaji actually existed or not, as it was high time that they did know about it. He also told me that he would report the matter to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, who, he said, was not in favour of an official Committee, but of a non-official one and he would request the Pfine Minister to use his good offices and to issue necessary instructions to the departments concerned, so that this non-official Committee could carry on its work smoothly both here and abroad. He told me further, that soon after contacting Shri Nehru, he would hold a zi bigger and more representative meeting in Calcutta of the admirers, followers and well-wishers of Netaji and in that meeting, the ramaining personnel of the Committee would be selected. He opined that necessary funds for this Committee would be readily forthcoming from private sources. After a few hours' stay with me there, he left for Delhi and promised to inform me soon about all the developments that would take place there. There was no further news from him, not even about the result of his interview with the Prime Minister, nor did he hold his promised meeting in Calcutta. So, up to this period, it is clear according to the Chairman's statements, that

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our Prime Minister had no intention of setting up an official Committee, but, was, on the other hand, good enough to promise necessary help for the proper functioning of a non-official one.

The danger of a non-official Committee, coming into the existence and functioning soon and which was expected to announce a finding that Netaji was not dead, as the Sponsors of that Committee were generally of that view, set our administrators in Delhi a-thinking. This coupled with the fact that the papers, left by the British rulers, as a result of their and the American's thorough on-the-spot enquiries soon after the alleged incident and which are in the possession of our Government, did not reveal the truth of Netaji's death as convincing. apparently made our Frime Minister change his original plan and from this Official Committee, and also because the finding of the Non-official Committee, as anticipated, would not only be a challenge to his statements in the Parliament, but may also go to the extent of disproving those statements. This was, evidently, too much for our high officials in Delhi to remain complacement and inactive any longer. They, therefore, quickly nipped the formation of a Non-Official committee in the bud and set up this three men Committee, with two of their own men as members.

THE COMMITTEE.

The Chairman of this Committee, Shri Shahnawaz
Khan, was an Indian Commissioned Officer in the British
Indian Army. He saw service in Burma during the last war
and eventually became a Prisoner-of War, when his rank
was that of a Captain. When the I.N.A. was organised,
he joined its ranks at a comparatively late stage, as

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he was pro-British, and he has admitted in his book viz., "The I.N.A. and its Netaji" that innumerable persons from their families have been in the service of the British Indian Army for the last three generations. When Netaji, as the Head of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and as Supreme Commander of the I.N.A., ordered that army to go into action against the Anglo-American forces, he moved forward with his unit and took part in military operations. Later on, when the I.N.A. was compelled to retreat and finally surrendered, he also surrendered, when his rank was that of a Colonel and not that of a Major-General, which he was compelled to admit before me, was self-imposed after the surrender of the I.N.A. He had practically no position in the administrative set-up of Netaji's Government nor any important assignment in the Military Headquarters Staff and being in the forward lines and without any decoration for any specific bravery or conduct, he had little oppor--tunity of coming in personal contact with Netaji, the last of which was in the first week of March, 1945. He is at present a member of the Parliament on behalf of the Congress and is Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport and Railways Thelique, he still continues to be a Pakistani, In Any case, all his relations, including his eldest adult son, and his property are there, but in the course of a comparatively short stay here, he has created a position for himself in Government circles and is the proprector of a mechanised farm with an area of a few hundred acres. He is one of those are rare fortune-favoured persons, who has successfully managed to retain his feet on two territories quite profitably. HIs tact and cleverness in this matter are really praiseworthy. He has been nominated as a representative

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of Netaji's Azad Hind Government.

Shri S.N. Maitra is a member of the Indian Civil Service, which he joined in 1935. He has served the Government in various capacities, mostly executive and administrative. Lastly, he was Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands before joining this Committee. He is a nominee of the Government.

In an enquiry of this nature, it is my humble opinion, that the services of a military officer were not necessary. As it was considered essential to have a representative from Netaji's Government, I may be permitted to suggest that it would have been better to choose one from his civil administration rather than one from the military. As such, Shri A.M. Sahay, witness No. 30, who is at present our Consul General at Hanoi should have been, in my opinion, the first choice. He started his political carrer in 1920, when he was a medical student at Patna and was Private Secretary to xDmxxR*jundguPru Dr. Rajendra Prosad, the present President of India. In 1922, he met Netaji, who told him that propaganda and work for India's independence should also be carried on in Japan and in other parts of the world. In 1923, he left India for Japan, where he took to journalism and politics. He joined

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Shri Rash Behari Bose and Raja Mahendra Pratap, thexesrenowned revolutionaries, in their movement for the liberation of India. When the last war broke out, he came to Burma side and after the Anglo-Americans surrendered to the Japanese in March or April, 1942, they formed a Committee of Action and organised the Indian Independence League with Shri Rash Behari Bose as the President and along with it, the Indian National Army. They then arranged with the German Embassies in Tokyo and Shanghai and with others for bringing Netaji from Germany to the Far East, which he actually did first in a German and then in a Japanese submarine. On 3.7.43, at Singapore, he met Netaji, who had reached there on the previous day. In the course of their conversation, Netaji told him that Mahatma Gandhi was just like his father and he could never think of going against him and whom, he subsequently designated in his radio broadcasts from the Far East as "Father of the Nation". Shri Sahay was then appointed Secretary General to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind with the rank of a Minister. On the 28th October, 1943, he along with Major-General Bhonsle, Major Abid Hasan and Col. Raju accompanied Netaji to Tokyo, where he went to a-ttend the Greater East Asia Conference. At the end of December, 1943, he went with Netaji to the Andamans, which the Japanese Government had handed over to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. He was a member of the Azad Hind Dal, founded by Netaji and which took over charge of the Civil administration of the areas round about Imphal, that had been liberated by the I.N.A. Later on, when Netaji was not hepeful about Japan's success in the war, he was sent to in January or February, 1945 to Japan for sounding the high officials for getting into touch

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with the Russian Ambassador there, as Netaji expected to secure the help of the Russians in his future activities for the liberation of India, because he was of opinion that, though Russia was an ally of the Anglo-Americans, they would fall out in the course of the next ten years, when he expected another world conflagration. While in Tokyo, Shri Sahay met Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, who happens to hold the same position today, and and who may be considered to be the topmost Japanese diplomats. On the 31st July, 1945, according to Netaji's instruction he reached Hanoi in North Viet-Nam, the headquarters of Dr. Ho Chi Minh's party, that could probably help Netaji in contacting the Russians or the Chinese Communists. He also knew that at the time of the surrender by the Japanese, it was Netaji's ultimate aim to remove his headquarters to Manchuria, and, so on or about the 18th August, 1945, when he learnt that Netaji was going to Tokyo, he was confident that Netaji's destination was Manchuria. He accordingly, requested the Japanese to take him by plane to Manchuria, where he expected to meet Netaji and whom he could help materially, as he had travelled widely in that area in 1938. On the 20th August, Shri Debnath Das, Col. Gulzara Singh, Col. Pritam Singh, witnesses nos. 2,3 and 5 respectively along with Major Abid Hasan and others reached Hanoi by air and informed him that Netaji with Col. Habibur Rahman had left Saigon for Tokyo. As they also knew that Netaji's destination was Manchuria, they desired to accompany him there, miss in case a plane was secured. At 6 or 7 P.M. on the date of their arrival at Hanoi, news came over the Japanese controlled radio that Netaji's plane had

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crashed at Taihoku and that Netaji was dead. This came as a great shock to them, but they could not accept it as true, as they knew about Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria and thought that it was a camouiflage for preventing his enemies from following him. In my opinion, all these activities of Shri im A.M. Sahay qualify him as the best selection from Netaji's Government.

The question of Shri Debnath Das, witness No. 2, whom Netaji made the General Secretary of the Indian Independence Headquarters of East Asia and who was one of the Advisers and a Member of the Council of Ministers and who was the only higher high-ranking person, whom Netaji had instructed at the time of his final departure from Bangkok, to carry on underground work and for which he was given money and arms, should in my opinion, be considered next. He is now in the service of the West Bengal Government.

Shri S.A. Iyer, witness No. 6, is, in my opinion, the next best candidate. He was a Minister in Netaji's Cabinet and was in charge on Information and Broadcasting from the beginning to the end and always had personal contact with him. He is now attached to the Government of Bombay.

Shri Das and Shri Iyer were two of those six trusted lieutanants, and the only two civilians, whom Netaji had selected and taken with him on his last journey from Bangkok and whom he hexist left at Saigon, when he took the plane from there on the 17th August, 1945 for an unknown destination."

I would also mention here the name of Shri

N.G. Swamy, whom Netaji gave training in Germany in

secret

secret service, submarine, parachute, etc. and brought him from there also in a submarine to the Far East, where he was the Head of the secret service and was always in close touch with Netaji.

If, however, one from the military side be considered necessary, I would humbly suggest that the first choice should go to Major-General J.K. Bhonsle, witness No. 7, who, as Chief of the Staff, had the closest and the most frequent contact with Netaji, the Supreme Commander, and who was a senior and better qualified military officer, having passed out from Sandhurst. He is at present Deputy Minister, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of India.

The ex next best selection would be Col.Gulzara Singh, witness No.3, who, like the Chairman, was also taken in Netaji's Cabinet, as a member representing the Army and who was with his regiment in the fighting line. Later on, Netaji appointed him Assistant Chief of the Staff, Supreme Headquarters, which position he held till the last. He was in Netaji's party during his last withdrawal from Burma and he was one of those six trusted followers, whom Netaji intended taking with him to Russia via Manchuria. He is at present a Captain in the Indian Army, as he was compelled to start his military carrer afresh from the lowest rank.

He should be followed by Col. Pritam Singh, witness No. 5, who, like the Chairman, was a Captain in the British Indian Army at the time of surrender, but who joined the I.N.A. in its earliest stage. He was present at the Singapore Aerodrome, when Netaji first arrived there. He took part in the Imphal operations and advanced about fifty miles behind the a enemy lines and for his bravery, he was in decorated Sardar-e-Jung by Netaji.

He was also one of those six loyal persons, stated above, whom Netaji wanted to take with him to an unknown destination to help him in his activities for the liberation of India. He is at present carrying on somehow with small farm of his.

I have intentionally emitted the names of

Col. Habibur Rahman, who was Deputy Chief of Staff and

Major-General M.Z. Kiani, a high ranking officer, who held

important assignments, whom it would have been difficult

to get from Pakistan and Major Abid Hasan, who had dis
tinguished himself in the Inx I.N.A. operations and whom

Netaji brought with him in a submarine from Germany,

because he is abroad on Indian Diplomatic service and

could not easily be at hand.

The qualification of a person selected from
Netaji's Government should be judged from the nature of
his connection therein and also personal contacts with
Netaji. In my humble opinion, the Chairman's selection
on this Committee, as a representative of Netaji's
Government, has been an improper one and injustice has
been done not only to those named above, but to many
others, who possessed better qualifications.

constituted, is not competent or weighty enough to do justice to the onerous responsibility entrusted to it, and as this matter could be considered to be of international interest. Realising this, I mentioned in my letter dated the 2nd April, 1956, (copy attached, App. A —) and spoke to the Prime Minister that the nomination of Shri Shahnawaz Khan, as Chairman of this Committee, was not appropriate and I requested him to request Dr. Radha Binode Pal, the jurist of international fame, to form a Committee and to lead it, as I felt that this enquiry would be of great interest to millions of persons.

throughout the world and whose confidence in the Committee could not be secured, unless such eminent persons constituted it. The Prime Minister, however, did not accede to my request for reasons best known to him, but Shri Shahnawaz Kah Khan later on clarified this point.

In reply to a question by Shri U.M. Thevar,
M.L.A., Madras, who was the first gentleman to appear
before the Committee on the 4th April, 1956, as to whether
there was any possibility of the inclusion in this
Committee of Dr. Radha Binode Pal, the Chairman stated.
"I had talked to the Prime Minister. There is no possibility - he was there during the war time and the Prime
Minister does not think that he could be associated with
this Committee, because he has already of formed his
opinion that the plane crash did not take place".

There may be some meaning in this, but a gentleman of Dr. Pal's position and eminent jurist, and one who had earned international reputation for his learned exposition of law and independent spirit in the historic Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, could never be imagined to possess a prejudiced mind, when sitting in judgment over any matter and especially cat, concerning a great Indian Leader.

It is, therefore, apparent, that one of the main qualifications for being entitled to be a member of this Committee is that instead of being neutral, one must preferably be expected to be of opinion that the plane crash took place and that Netaji died as a result of the same, as has been expressed by the Prime Minister in the Parliament on the 29th September, 1955 and also by the Chairman later on in Tokyo on the 4th May, 1956, when he said his mission there was mainly to collect direct evidence regarding Netaji's death. I am constrained to

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of important and relevant paper or exhibit from the record was given to me after I had disagreed from the findings of my colleagues, though I was legitimately entitled to all such papers for writing my dissentient report and had repeatedly requested the Chairman and the authorities concerned in Delhi for the same and though the Chief Minister, West Bergal was also pleased to recommend my request.

THE COMMITTEE'S ITINERARY AND WORK

finalised, the Chairman and the Under Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs informed me im Calcutta that the first sitting of the Committee would be held in New Delhi on the 29th March, 1956. Both the Chairman and I duly attended, but Shri Maitra did not do so. He joined us on the 4th April, when the examination of witnesses, who had already been waiting, was commenced. During its sittings there upto the 14th April, ten witnesses were examined. Due to some private work of the Chairman, the Committee assembled in Calcutta on the 20th April and where up to the 26th idem, thirteen gentlemen and one lady were examined, but three of them not completely.

The Committee left Calcutta the same night by air and reached Bangkok after about four hours' flight, where up to the 29th idem, four gentlemen were examined and the houses, where Netaji stayed at times, was also visited.

Leaving Bangkok by air at about 11 O'clock the following morning, the party reached Saigon the same afternoon, where up to the 3rd May, two gentlemen

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were examined and during that period, Tourane, a small town in French Indo-China, was visited, as Netaji is alleged to have spent a night there on his flight from Saigon to Taihoku. There, one gentleman was examined. At Saigon, the Committee went to see the house where Netaji stayed during his visits there, but they were informed that the house had been destroyed outright soon after Netaji had that other houses had been built on that site and which were inspected.

The party then left Saigon by plane the next morning and reached Tokyo the same night, where up to the 5th June, thirty-one gentlemen and one kmy lady were examined. On the 30th May, the Renkoji Temple, where the alleged ashes of Netaji were kept, was visited.

On the morning of the 6th June, the party left Tokyo by air, reaching Calcutta the same night. On the 8th and 9th idem, the unfinished examination of three gentlemen was concluded and one other gentleman was examined.

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wrist watch worn by Netaji, was allowed to be present there. Shri Amiyanath Bose produced two photographs of Netaji, wearing a round wrist watch. All the gentlemen present there, including the three members of the Committee, agreed that the round watches shown in both the photographs were one and the same watch and all of them, except the Chairman, also agreed that that round watch was not the same as the round one produced by Shri Amiyanath Bose.

I then requested the Chairman to have a note of inspection recorded as a result of the inspection made, by us there and, if necessary, with his sole dissenting opinion incorporated in it and also to have the state- ments of Shri Amiyanath Bose recorded, as our steno-grapher was also with us, but he declined to do so and when questioned, also declined to give his reasons for not doing so. Shri Amiyanath Bose, it appears, released a statement to the press, which appeared in the papers on the following day, expressing his surprise at the arbitrary conduct of the Chairman in deliberating to record facts, that should legitimately have been recorded.

A CAME.

Before leaving Calcutta on the night of the 9th June, the Chairman requested us to assemble at New Delhi on the 18th idem, as he had to go to his farm at Aithal. Both the Chairman and I duly met there on the 18th, but Shri Maitra joined us on the following day. Upto the 27th June, three gentlemen were examined by us.

On the 30th June, along with Shri Kundan Singh, S.c. hr witness No. 65...

witness No. 65, was inspected in the National Museum, at Rashtrapati Bhawan, the damaged materials said to have been recorded from the alleged plane crash site, as he was a personal orderly of Netaji and was expected to know about them. An Inspection Note (App. B—) in this connection was subsequently written and signed by us.

A.M.N. Sastri, witness No. 67, an Aircraft Inspector,
Accidents Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation Department, New Delhi on 27.6.56. It appears from his deposition, that excerpts of the statements of a few of the
witnesses already examined, sketches drawn by them and
photographs, totalling seventeen items, were sent to
him on 22.6.56 a All this was done without my knowledge
M and is again one of the several instances of hush-hush
policy and other tactics for keeping me in the dark,
adopted by my colleagues during the course of this
enquiry.

The total number of persons, including two ladies, examined by the Committee is sixty-seven. A list of same (App. C —) with details, showing dates and places of their examination, is attached herewith.

A written statement, said to have been obtained on from one Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is alleged to have a passenger with Netaji in that plane and who is reported to be in Formosa now and who could not be made to appear before the Committee, was obtained and a copy of which was made over to me on 27.6.56.

This concluded the oral and written statements adduced before the Committee in the course of this enquiry.

PREPARATION FOR THE REPORT.

On 23.6.56, I was taken by marpine surprise,

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when the Chairman suddenly asked me to let him know what my findings were regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry. I replied that I had not formed any such opinion at that stage and it was too early for me to do so and it would be possible for me to come to a decision. only after I had studied the evidence recorded, after I had tabulated the statements of witnesses regarding the different main issues and after I had carefully weighed the pros and cons of the same. He told me again that it was indispensibly necessary for him to know what my findings were, otherwise it would not be possible for him to start writing the draft report. I failed to understand his view-point and after explaining myself, I told him that, in my opinion, what he meant would amount to putting the cart before the horse. When we met again on 25.6.56, the Chairman put me the same question and insisted on a definite reply from me. again regretted my inability to do so, but told him that I could agree with him in toto or, partly or I could hold a wholly different opinion.

A.M.N. Sastri on 27.6.56, we assembled on 30.6.56 and started discussion as to how the draft report should be written. The Chairman started by saying that the three issues were, Netaji's death, his cremation and his ashes and that the last two would go a long way in proving the first one. On this, I suggested that, as the ashes are not identifiable articles, exceedingly stringent and unfailing proof is necessary from the time of formation of the same upto its present existence by way of containers, seals, guards, continuity of possession etc., otherwise it could not be held to be those of the individual, they are meant to be. I suggested that it would be essential

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essential to draw up a skeleton for the draft report, which should be started with Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria for continuing his activities for the independence of India in Russian territory and that the Japanese Government, agreeing to this plan, were taking him in a plane to Manchuria and had deputed Lt. Gen. Shidei, who knew that area well, to help him in crossing over into the adjoining Russian territory and that after Netaji had succeeded in doing so, the Japanese Government would announce that Netaji had died. Shri Maitra then added that Netaji had discussed this plan with his Cabinet Ministers also. I, accordingly, made a note of this point also, The next point suggested by me was to decide whether the plane actually crashed or not and I told them that if it was held that it did not crash, the recorded evidence on the subsequent events would be of not much importance. My colleagues did not agree with me and they said that w it would not be proper to drop the matter so lightly at that stage, but to consider in details the whole of the evidence that was on record on all the remaining points. The discussion continued and I kept notes in my own way and which were exclusively for my personal requirements. The Chairman kept notes also, but Shri Maitra did not do so. In my notes, I recorded the suggestions of all the members, but did not consider it necessary to specify what the suggestions of each member were, as I knew what my suggestions were and so the remaining ones would be those of my colleagues. Our discussions continued and we finished all the main points, a complete record of which I made.

Up till then, I was under the impression that

the Chairman would write the report and that we would help him in doing so and so I recorded the suggestions of all of us, so that I could arrange the evidence for the report in the light of all these suggestions, which I had made un a note of. The Chairman then suggested that Shri Maitra should write the report. I was a bit asto--nished, but agreed to it. The Chairman then enquired of Shri Maitra as to the date by which he would be able to submit his draft report, observing at the same time, that the report must be submitted to Government by 16.7.56. Shri Maitra said he could do so by 10.7.56, on which date, the Chairman said that we should assemble for assisted considering the draft report and that we must finish the discussion, correction and finalisation by 13.7.56, so as to enable submission by 16.7.56, as the Parliament was coming into session and that the Prime Minister was returning home from abroad soon. After I had noted all these points, Shri Maitra asked me whether he could peruse my note, as he had not kept any. I agreed and handed it over to him. He then had typed copies made of the same and requested me to sign on them and both of them signed on my manuscript note. I did not object to any of these requests. I am constrained to say that my colleagues and some of the high officials, both in Delhi as well as in Calcutta, tried their utmost to obstruct, influence and coax me in signing the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one, after it was decided by all three of us that I would have to write and submit a dissentient report. It is exceedingly strange and cannot easily be imagined that such high officials would stoop to such tacties for preventing the expression of honest opinion and conviction

S. C. Bose

conviction by a member of a Committee.

THE DRAFT REPORT.

On 10.7.56, Shri Maitra submitted a draft report, convering 42 typed sheets on points 2,3 and 4 of my note and on 11.7.56 and 12.7.56, he produced pages 43 to 56 and pages 58 to 71 respectively. On 13.7.56, we started considering the draft para report and we did so up to page 28, where all of us put our initials, showing that we had proceeded so far. While discussing this report. I told my colleagues that it contained only a few discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses, which Shri Maitra explained was due to lapse of time and because the witnesses were not tutored, which I said is the usual explanation given while writing judgments, but this could not be a satisfactory explanation for the innumerable discrepancies that existed in the evidence on almost all the major points some of which, however, Shri Maitra had failed to mention in his report. I reques-- ted him to give due consideration to such defective nature of evidence and to reconsider whether such evidence would justify the findings he had arrived at.

on the following day, we viz., on 14.7.56, we continued discussing the draft report, which, however, contained a larger number of discrepancies and contradictions on almost all the major points, to quote a few of which would be, the nature of injuries alleged to have been received by Netaji, the manner and the vehicle, in which he was a said to have been taken to the hospital, the place and nature of his alleged treatment there, the time of his alleged death, a telegram dated 29x2x26 28.8.45 from the Chief of the Staff, Japanese Southern Army to the effect that Netaji's body had been flown to

S. c. Box

Tokyo and lastly, the complete failure at the attempt to prove that, at about the time Netaji is alleged to have died in the hospital, Col. Habibur Rahman, witness No. 4 deposed that the attending Medical Officer, Dr. T. Yoshimi, witness No. 48, handed over to him a rectangular wrist watch, said to have been worn by Netaji at the time of his alleged death and which finally came into the possession of the late Sarat Chandra Bose, one of Netaji's elder brothers. This Medical Officer has denied all knowledge of this alleged conduct of his viz., that he had handed over the rectangular wrist watch to Col. Rahman. There has, moreover, been a complete failure in adducing even an iota of evidence that Netaji ever wore any rectangular wrist watch, nor has a single such photograph of Netaji been produced. Even h though Shri Maitra apparently omitted in his draft report several discrepancies and contradictions and tried to explain and minimise only those referred to by him, he was completely non-plussed with the evidence adduced with regard to the watch and had no other alternative but to observe pithily," The Point about the watch remains inconclu--sive ... " Another interesting point worthy of notice here is that Col. Rahman stated definitely that Netaji had a cut on his head, four inches long, which was bleeding A straight denial regarding this injury comes from the Medical Officer, who is alleged to have attended on Netaji, but who, however, makes detailed statements regarding the alleged injuries on Netaji, his treatment etc. Regarding this point, Shri Maitra has again made a very terse statement, viz., "This is a discrepancy". His resources, evidently, failed him to come forward with any explanation whatsoever, In & much another portion of his draft report, he has stated," There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to who tra-- velled in which vehicle and who arrived first, but these

these are minor points and may be overlooked." I am constrained to say that "overlooking" is the third mode of reasoning adopted by my learned colleagues for not considering and judging the discrepancies in their legitimate aspect. At another place it is recorded, "There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to who were in the same ward with Netaji!" Our wise colleague, after discussing some of the evidence regarding this point, concluded, "After a lapse of years, it would be perhaps unwise to lay too much stress on such minor discrepancies". In the blood transfusion, alleged to have been given to Netaji, his conclusion is, "There is no way of reconciling these differnt statements and they must remain as they are." This is a very clear and frank' confession of sheer helplessness on his part.

These are only a few of the many instances in whih which my learned colleagues have, in my humble opinion, failed to explain the glaring discrepancies and contradic--tions and to give due weight and consideration with a just, impartial and unprejudiced mind for coming to a correct conclusion or finding, which such evidence would legitimately demand. I cannot but record a queer incident that took place, when I was a student in College about 42 years ago. A British Professor of ours, failing on our repeated requests to explain a mathematical problem. eventually said, "Anyhow it comes to this," and then wrote the final result. I am constrained to say that I have now had the opportunity of obtaining its parallel from my learned colleagues, viz., "anyhow"it comes to this. that the plane carrying Netaji crashed, he died. he was cremated and his ashes are now in Renkoji Temple in Tokyo.

I cannot but bring it to the notice of my countrymen

that though the draft report of my learned colleagues contains only a few discrepancies, they, in my opinion, have thought it wise not to make a correct estimation of the whole of the evidence, which contains a"multitude of discrepancies" and to come a to a thi legitimate conclusion for the following reasons, so wisely suggested by them, viz., because, (1) the incident took place about eleven years ago, (2) the witnesses were not tutored, (3) the point about the watch remained inconclusive, (4) there was no way of reconciling the different statements regarding blood transfusion, alleged to have been given to Netaji, (5) the inability to explain the contradictory statements about a four inches long bleeding injury on Netaji's head and, lastly, as a trump card, they appealed to their magnanimous readers in and wisdom h to use their good sense) not to lay too much stress on such discrepancies and finally to "overlook" the same and to agree with their findings.

Under such circumstances, I believe, my readers
will agree with me that I have some amount of justifica-tion in observing, as I have done above, that my colleagues
have come to their findings on the sole basis and reasoning of "anyhow", that has suggested itself to me and that,
evidence or no evidence, my loyal cobleagues were determined to put down on paper such findings of theirs.

After I take up the evidence on record and discuss and
consider the same, I am almost certain that our Government
and our countrymen will be pleased to agree with me that
the findings and conclusions arrived at by my learned
colleagues cannot at all be a correct and proper assessment of the evidence recorded and as such, they will
also be pleased to agree with me, that with my colleagues,
"anyhow" was the only weapon in their armoury, which they

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had to wield for a arriving at their findings.

Though out of regard and pity, we did not persue the matter further with our helpless Professor, I do hope and pray that our just and benign Government and our inquisitive countrymen, on whose initiative this enquiry has been made, will in due course be pleased to consider the evidence very carefully in an impartial and unprejudiced mind and draw their own conclusions therefrom.

From all that has been stated above, from the reports that have appeared in the newspapers from time to time, from the correspondence that has been exchanged between some of high officials in Delhi and me, from my interviews and xp conversation over the telephone with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who has also taken the trouble of speaking to a few of my nearest relations. it is evident that it is the intention of my energetic colleagues to have those ashes brought very soon, for reasons best known to them and also to our Government, from the Renkoji Temple in Tokyo to India, they say that the Japanese nation is belittling the Indian nation for not honouring the ashes of such a renowned Indian leader, who, however, they believe, was mostly instrumental in expediting the departure of the British rulers from India.

THE DISSENT. DIS CUSSED.

Returning to our consideration of the draft report, when we came to the portion at Page 42, viz., "They all point to the fact that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose died at Taihoku Military Hospital on the night of the 18th August, 1945. The Committee accepts this conclusion," I immediately and firmly told my colleagues that I

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regretted my inability to subscribe to this opinion of theirs. It is rather strange that the statements immediately preceeding these are in a different and contra--dictory tone, though, however, with some sort of an explanation. They are "In fact, as will be seen, different witnesses, have given different storeds, which would disprove any suggestion of 'Prompting'. So, notwith-- standing discrepancies and variations, which are too likely after this papee of so many years, the statements of witnesses must be taken as worthy of credit" . There--upon, I suggested to my colleagues, that in view of such innumerable glaring discrepancies and contradictions and which in some instances, Shri Maitra had admittedly failed to explain, whether they would not make up their minds to change their findings me and to agree with me that such evidence would reasonably justify coming to the only conclusion that the plane crash did not take place and that Netaji did not died. It is left to my reasders to form their own opinion as to how much justification there could possibly be for drawing such conclusions from such admittedly defective and flimsy evidence.

CHAIRMAN'S ADVICE FOR DISSENTING REPORT.

There was silence. I then requested the Chairman to let me know what my next move should be. He replied that I would have to write a separate dissenting report.

I, accordingly, requested him to give me the remaining partial portion of their draft report and copies of all relevant papers, including exhibits, photographs, etc., which Shri Maitra promised to do. As the day's work was over, we all fleft together with the understanding that we would meet on the morning of Monday next, the 16th instant as usual, which we did as arranged, when the Chairman told me that I could no longer sit with them, when they continued further consideration of their

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HARASSMENT AND DEPARTURE FROM DELHI.

I, therefore, requested him to put me in touch with the officer, whom he had, on my request, referred to on the 13th instant for arranging accommodation for my stay in Delhi. I duly took leave of my colleagues and met Shri S.K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, External Affairs accordingly. I may mention here that when Shri R.S. Chavan, Under Secretary, External Affairs, informed me in his letter dated 16.3.56, that the first sitting of our Committee would be held in Delhi on 29.3.56, he enquired of me at the same time about arranging accommo--dation for me in Delhi. As during the whole of my 48 days' stay in Delhi, I haved with my daughter in her quarters, arrangement and consequent expenditure by the Government on that score was not necessary, but as on 12.7.56, she had to vacate her quarters suddenly, I had to shift from there at about xxxxxxxx 10.10 o'clock that night and a freig friend of mine was kind enough to come to my rescue and to give me shelter. On the morning of the following day, I requested the Chairman to have accommodation arranged for me and regarding which, he was good enough to take action. We were informed & the next day, that rooms in Kotah House and had been secured and all three of us went to inspect the same. We were, however, disappointed, as rooms in the hutment and not in the main building had been arranged. I objected to staying in the hutment and told the Chairman that I took this as an insult. I then requested him to arrange for rooms for the me in the Imperial Hotel, to which I could legitimately lay claim, as, apart from other consideration. I had lived at the Maidens Hotel on my own, only a few years

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ago, after having failed to get rooms in the Imperial.

The Chairman said that nothing could be done that day,
as it was about 1.45 PM., and as it was a Saturday.

I told him that the matter was a very urgent one, as
I was inconveniencing both my generous friend as well as
myself and as Government had maintained telephones
in the residences of officers, it is expected that urgent
work should be managed therefrom beyond office hours.

When we met on the morning of the 16th instant, I learnt from the Chairman that nothing had been done. I told him that this was the fourth day that we were experiencing inconvenience and so more interest and quick action should be taken in this matter. After that, I met Shri S.K. Roy, as stated above, and explained the whole situation to him. He was pleased to reserve rooms provisionally for me in the Imperial Hotel and said he would confirm the same before I PM. and inform me accordingly. On my way back to my friend's room, I dropped in at the Imperial Hotel, where I received confirmation of the above fact. As there was no news from Shri Roy, I phoned him at about 2.45 P.M. He met me soon after and told me that he would meet me definitely before 4 P.M. and inform me that he had fixed up rooms for me. I told him distinctly that if he failed to do so by that time, I would be compelled to leave Delhi, as I could no longer inconvenience my friend as well as myself and as there is a limit to our endurance. He did not turn up as promised nor was there any news from him. When the driver of the External Affairs staff car came to enquire from me at what it time he would have to come the next day for taking me to the Imperial Hotel, I enquired of him whether he had ma any message, written or verbal, from the External Affairs Department or

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from Shri S.K. Roy. He replied in the negative.

Under such circumstances, and with such indifference and with we callousness on the part of officers concerned and without any assurance that accommodation would be arranged for me in the near future, also the Chairman had told me that I could no longer sit with them and as he had not told me that he had arranged any place, where I could sit a separately for writing my dissentient report, I was left with no other alternative but to leave Delhi for Calcutta.

OBSTRUCTION AND PRESSURE.
On reaching the latter place on the morning of the 18th instant, I sent a telegram to the Chairman, which reads as follows: - "Unavoidable circumstances compelled immediate departure from Delhi please send immediately remaining portion draft report five interrogations requisitioned by me and all connected papers." On the 21st idem, I received his telegraphic reply, viz., " Your telegram eighteenth stop surprised you left Delhi without informing me stop submission on report to Government overdue stop please intimate immediately when you will return Delhi to enable final/ finalise report and submit to Government". I immediately sent my reply, viz., "Your telegram informed you both fourteenth my disagreement with your finding Netaji died plane crash whereupon you suggested my writing dissentient report stop on sixteenth you both decided submitting joint report and undertook sending me remaining portion your draft report after perusing which I should start writing dissentient report stop reiterate legitimate demands conveyed my telegram eighteenth please note non-compliance whereof holds you not me responsible for delay submission my report to you." There was no news from the Chairman for the next seven or eight days. In the meantime and since the date of my arrival

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would be unable to submit a dissenting report and they would would then state we before the people that I neglected in submitting my report and that their report was the only report of the Committee. I leave it to my countrymen, for whose knowledge and consideration, this enquiry was held, to judge this matter.

On 9.8.56, a sensational piece of news (App. \mathbb{D} -) appeared in the papers with big and bold headlines, viz., "NETAJI DIED IN A FORMOSA HOSPITAL DURING LAST WAR-ENQUIRY FINDINGS : REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TOMORROW". As this contained a few incorrect and distorted news and as there were some allegations against me and as the Chairman's name was was mentioned therein, I wrote a reply, (App. E -) to the Chairman regarding that newspaper report and forwarded copies of the same to the Prime Minister of India and to the Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. The Prime Minister was pleased to send me a reply on 13.8.56, (App F -), which I received on the following day. Ø I sent my reply, (App G ---) to him on 15.8.56 and on which date in the morning, the Chief Minister of West Bengal was pleased to phone me and to request me to meet him in his office at 4 P.M. the same day, which I did. He started by coaxing me in several ways to make me agree with the findings of my colleagues and to sign their report, so as to make ti it a unan unam jous one. I regretted my inability to do so and gave him a few reasons for the same. Having failed to in his intention, he then enquired of me as to why I was not submitting my report. I explained to him that it was not possible for me to do so, as the Chairman was not sending me the papers necessary for writing the report and to which I was

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legitimately entitled and which they promised to send me. He then asked me that if he helped me in getting those papers, how many days it would take me to complete my report. I told him that I had already written some portion and that I expected to do so wh within another ten days from the date of receipt of those papers. He appeared to be rather a satisfied with this reply of mine and was pleased to dictate a reply to the Prime Minister's letter, he had received in this connection, and in which he requested the latter to arrange to send me those papers soon and that I would be in a position to submit my report by 30-8-56. In the meantime, our Chief Minister and also another Minister took the trouble of influencing and persuading me to agree to sign the report of my colleagues through a few of my nearest relations.

I cannot but repeat that for want of the requisite papers. it has been exceedingly difficult for me to make headway with my report and its completion will naturally take much more time than what it would ordinarily have taken. I am still at a loss to make out what could really be the cause for such attitude on the part of the Chairman and how could the Government face the public with a report signed by only two members of the Committee, when there was a third member on it and on a matter, which would be considered to have more than an All-India interest, and in which there exists great inquisitiveness.

As certain reports were published in the papers relating to this enquiry and some conflicting reports regarding me, I considered it necessary to send a statement (AppH) to the Press on 17-8-56.

NETAJI'S EARLIER ACTIVITIES.
Before I take up for consideration the evidence on record, I consider it necessary to give an introduction to my countrymen of the here of this drama, to facilitate a better and easier understanding of his outlook, ideas, capabilities and work. His.....

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His religious tendency and service to the poor and down-trodden were apparent, when he was about twelve years of age. They had a small Ashram for this purpose and held schools for "harijan" boys. They helped the poor and needy and nursed and gave medical aid to the sick and diseased. He had the opportunity of living in the same house at Puri, Orissa with Swami Bhramananda, President, Ramkrishna Mission and his brother Swamijis on a few occasions and in some respects Swami Vivakananda was his ideal. He started Durgah Pujah in a mess, in which some of his schoolmates lived at Cuttack, Orissa, and he was instrumental in introducing the same in almost all the jails in India and Burma, where he was incarcerat-- ed at times against the vehement opposition of the British administrators. When cholera was raging fiercely in a remote part of the district of Cuttack, he took training in its treatment under Dr. Debendra Nath Mukherji, who was similarly inclined. As his parents were away from Cuttack and as hisguardian did not permit him to go to the cholera-affected area, he was not found in the house the next morning. As both he and his ashramites were of a secretive nature, two strong young men were despatched to bring him back forcibly and who, after wandering about a lot, managed to trace him in an out-of-the-place cholerainfected village, but they were unable to bring him back. He returned later on of his own accord, after he had finished his work there.

When he was a student of the Presidency College, Calcutta, he went to the flood-stricken areas of North Bengal and did relief work there under the guidence of the renowned Professor and Philanthrophist Dr.P.C.Ray. Again at about that time, he left his Calcutta residence, without informing anybody, not even his mother and there was no news from him for about a month. He returned home suddenly in a bad state of health and it transpired that

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he was in search of a Guru, (religious preceptor) and makehad trekked widely and in some portions of the Himalayan regions. Whatever he did was without any fuss or publicity and some of his activities were of a secretive nature.

As he grew up, politice, mainly liberation of

India from British yoke, was added to his existing mental outlook and this was practically the only goal of his life thereafter. To this end, he resigned from the Indian Civil Service and on his return to India, his first duty was to meet Shri M.K. Gandhi and to place himself under his command. On reaching Calcutta, he became the right-hand man of Shri C.R.Das, who had sacrificed his extensive lucrative practice as a Barrister-at-Law in the High Court and had started working for the independence of India. During the course of such activities, Netaji suffered himiliation at the hands of the British rulers and their stooges and was imprisoned several times for prolonged periods, generally under Regulation III of 1818. Though it was said, that he had connection with revolutionary activities, he was not hauled up any such specific charge, probably due to his intensive secretive nature of work. For gaining experience in this line, he underwent military training in the Calcutta University Corps and carrying this into practice, he gave similar training to the Indian National Congress volunteers. It was unique in the annals of the Congress, when in 1928, he arranged a mile-long procession for the President Pandit Notilal Nehru on his arrival in Calcutta and led his volunteers on horseback, as General Officer Commanding, in military formation through the streets of Calcutta.

> He was intensely patriotic and could never brook any dishonour to his country or to his countrymen. In this connection, he was said to have been implicated in an affair against a British Professor, for which he was

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rusticated by the University. Two other outstanding achievements of his, among others, were the complete boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit to Calcutta and in getting rid of the Britishers from the administration and from the contracts in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and in running the same on purely nationalistic lines.

It is also well known how in January, 1941, he gave the slip to the British rulers, whose about 250 Police staff kept a day and night watch over him, and, after travelling through the whole of northern India, entered Afghanistan, with Germany as his destination. This was planned and executed in an exceedingly secret manner and his only confidents were probably only one of his brothers, three nephews and a niece, who were under strict oaths of secrecy to him. His aged mother, who was occupying an adjoining room, and all others, including members of his family and his political associates, had no knowledge of this. As pre-arranged, the public as well as the other members of his family, came to know that he had left home, only when his confidents broke the news after about ten days of his actual departure and after he was reported to have crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afghanistan safely.

His secret and hazardous mission and dare-devil enterprise in coming all the way to the Far East from Germany in 1943 to hasten his work for the independence of India, first in a German and subsequently in a Japaness submarine, risking the Allied naval blockade and mines, is too well known as also the fact that during his military operations against them in Burma, he was quite oblivious to aerial bombing by them and took shelter on rare occasion

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only when compelled to do so by his followers and that after he had seen that all others had been safely lodged.

He was an arch secret service man, with a dogged determination in carrying out his plans, always unmindful of the difficulties and consequences that they would entail. In such matters, he confided in the minimum few, devised his plans and movements secretly and in the furtherance of or in the execution of the same, there was nothing in the world, including his own self, that he could not risk or sacrifice.

All these characteristics of his were revealed to the world in greater prominence in his activities in the Far East during the years 1943 to 1945 and for which, the people there of all nationalities had the highest admiration and regard for him. For this, credit is due to his countrymen there for their intense and all-out sacrifice, to the Japanese Government and that great nation for their unstinted help to and co-operation with him in his struggle for the liberation of India from foreign yoke and to the Heads of all the States there and their citizens for the facilities and help rendered by them. It is my humble opinion, that it is mainly due to them that his achievement there could be so brilliant.

This is the person, who inspired his countrymen, living in foreign lands in East Asia, into volunteering their wealth and even their lives for fighting with arms against the British rulers for the independence of their country, who, with such support and sacrifice, inaugurated the Provisional Government of Azad Hind with all the usual requisites and paraphernalia of a Government, that was recognised by no less than nine freez nations of the world,

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who organised the Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army), manned, trained and officered by his countrymen and who led that army as a separate entity against the British rulers with the great and mighty Japanese army by his side, Though physically unsuccessful in the end against them, final victory was his, as his demand for the independence of India, by force against force, permeated the ranks of the British Indian Army, Navy and Air Force Services and which expedited the departure of the British rulers from India.

COLLEAGUES ACCEPT NETAJI'S PLAN PARTLY.

Undaunted by superior enemy forces, he was determin
-ed to carry on his struggle for the liberation of India and

not depressed by failure in his pilgrimage to Delhi via.

Imphal and Kohima, he closed that chapter there, and secretly

planned his next move, viz., that the "Next road to Delhi

would be via. Moscow".

In furtherance of this new plan, he was fortunate enough in securing the whole-hearted support of the Japanese Government, who, inspite of utter depression and confusion in their ranks, due to their surrender to the Anglo-Americans, were magnamimous enough in taking him away from the clutches of their common enemy.

Regarding this new plan, some details of which I have given earlier, the Japanese Government were giving protection to their friend and ally and were removing him to a safe zone, as the Anglo-Americans were naturally expected to wreak their vengeance on him. While removing him in a brand-new bomber plane, from his centre of activities, with only one of his trusted followers, viz., Col. Habibur Rahman, and whom, probably, they were reluctant to

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allow and who, therefore, was probably allowed to travel only up to a portion of the journey, his plane is alleged to have met with an accident, resulting in his dealth.

I have stated above, that not only in my opinion, but also in that of my colleagues, this plan, agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, was prearranged and the last and the most significant portion of it was, that after Netaji and found himself in a safe place, the Japanese Government would announce that he had died and that is actually what they subsequently did. This was just in keeping with what he had previously planned in Calcutta in January, 1941, and what his there collaborating nephews actually did viz., that they announced after reports had been received that he had safely crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afghanistan that Netaji had left the house and which consequently was about ten days after his actual departure from Calcutta. I fully realised that this, however, does not take away the possibility of a plane crash, as, after all, an accident is an accident and is in most cases beyond human control.

Saigon and his subsequent boarding the planes there for an "unknown destination", which has been stated by many eminent persons, there has been more or less unanimity of opinion among all the three members of the Committee.

Events immediately following this, are of vital importance and the evidence on record has, therefore, got to be considered very carefully and the conclusions should be arrived at after mature deliberation and irrespective of any consideration whatscever, especially when these conclusions are not only eagerly awaited by our countrymen, but are of exceptional interest to millions of persons of

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different nationalities throughout the world.

It may be considered by the most critical and sceptic reader that the foregoing pages may have been written with some bias or prejudice on my part and which, unfortunately for me, may have suggested itself to him from the fact that I happen to be a very close relation of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, but I assure him with all sincerity, that it is not so. On the other hand, I take this as an opportunity to place before him for his most careful consideration that the facts, circumstances and manipulations, some of, which have lately gained so much in volume as to have overflown the normal bounds and found expression in newspaper reports, correspondence and interviews with some of the highest officials of the land, would go to show that the findings arrived at by my learned colleagues were preconceived and prearranged and for being in accordance with the confirmed opinion of the Prime Minister and of his Government. Instead of prejudic--ing him by telling him what the correct finding of the evidence on record should be, I would in all earnestness. request him, my Government and my countrymen to peruse not only the conflicting reports submitted by the members of the Committee, but also the evidence on which reports submitted by the committee have been based and thereby from their respective individual opinion regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry.

TERMS of REFERENCE.

Now to come to the subject-matter of this enquiry, it would be necessary, in the first instance, to consider the <u>TERMS of REFERENCE</u>, which are as follows:-

"To enquire into and to report to the Government of India on the circumstances concerning the departure of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose from Bangkok about the 16th.

August, 1945, his alleged death as result of an aircraft

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accident and subsequent developments connected therewith",

The points necessary to be considered may, therefore, be classified as follows :-

- 1. <u>CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING THE DEPARTURE</u>, which may be subdivided into,
 - (a) CIRCUMSTANCES and (b) DEPARTURE.
- II. ALLEGED DEATH AS A RESULT OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT.

In this connection, it may be said that the wording of the "Terms of Reference" is such as to give the impression that the aircraft accident has been accepted as a settled fact. In my humble opinion, it should not be so, as the truth or otherwise of this point is an important subjectmatter for decision in this enquiry. The points that may arise subsequent to this alleged accident, hinge to a great extent, on the finding on this point. So, before making a decision on this crucial point, it would be indispensably necessary to consider carefully, the whole of the evidence on all the other connected points. If after such careful consideration, the finding be that the aircraft accident did not take place, then only would that finding be a very definite, conclusive and irrevocable one. With such a finding, the remaining subject-matter of this enquiry would automatically simplify itself considerably. Therefore, it has got to decided first, (a) as to whether the aircraft accident took place or not, and then, (b) if it be held, that such accident did not take place, whether the remaining evidence on record whild justify and confirm that finding, and (c) that if it be held, on the contrary, that such accident didt take place, then it has got to be decided further whether, (d) death took place, or, (e), death did not take place.

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III. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

The points to be considered here, depend, mainly, on the findings on points II(a),(b),(c),(d) & (e) above.

If according to point II(b), the definite finding be that the aircraft accident did not take place, then it would automatically follow that Netaji did not die. The subsequently developments arising therefrom would, therefore, be as to where Netaji went after leaving Saigon. As no steps were taken for making enquiries on these lines, it would suffice to say here, that, as it has been held that the aircraft accident did not take place, so Netaji did not die and there is no knowledge of his subsequent whereabouts.

If, however, according to II(c), it be held that the aircraft accident took place, then such accident may or may not have caused death to Netaji, and so, the next finding we would be in accordance with either II(d) or II(e). If the finding be in accordance with II(B), viz., that Netaji did not die, then the subsequent developments arising therefore from, would, more or less, be similar to those of II(b) stated above.

If, however, the finding be in accordance with II(d), viz., that Netaji died as a result of that aircraft accident, then the subsequent developments would not only be as to how his body was disposed of, but it would also be very important and necessary to account for the baggage, including treasure, he was carrying, the dress he was wearing, the articles he was wearing or carrying on his person, e.g., his wrist watch, his spectacles, his rings, fountain pen, cigarette case, cigarette lighter, religious books, Gita & Chandi, purse, magnifying glass, insignia as Supreme Commander, I.N.A. & II I.I.L. badges, etc. and as stated by Shri Das, witness No.2, his revolver also.

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As regards treasure, it is my humble opinion, that so much of the evidence on record regarding it, as is necessary for the correct decision of the subject-matter of this enquiry, as embodied in the TERMS of REFERENCE and its clarification noted above, may only be taken into consideration for the purposes of this enquiry and as by itself, it is a very important and complicated matter, it should, if considered necessary, from the subject-matter of a separate enquiry, which should go into full details, commencing from the various sources from and the different descriptions in which they were obtained and ending with the small fraction of the same now in deposit in the National Museum, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi and after considering carefully all the intermediate stages.

I. (a). CIRCUMSTANCES.

It has been discussed, considered and held under the heading, "NETAJI'S PLAN", recorded above, that due to the surrender of the Japanese nation and consequently that of the Indian National Army, formed and organised by Netaji in the Far East, that a plan was agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, that the Japanese would move Netaji to a safe zone, viz., Manchuria, where the Anglo-Amricans would no longer be able to arrest him, with the ultime -mate object of entering Russian territory, where he would continue his struggle for the liberation of India and am in pursuance of that plan, Netaji left Bangkok on the morning of 17-8-45 and Saigon the same afternoon with Manchuria, as his destination under the auspices of the Japanese. With regard to this plan and up to Netaji's departure by a Japanese plane from Saigon on 17-8-45, I believe, there has been more or less unanimity of opinion among all the three members of the Committee. It is, unfortunately, not possible

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for me to make a definite statement on this matter, as inspite of repeated requests, I was not furnished with the complete report of my colleagues and all other important and relevant papers, exhibits, photographs, etc., that are on the record and which I am legitimately entitled to be in possession of for purposes of writing this dissentient report.

All of Netaji's associates in the Far East, who have been examined before us, have stated about Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria, when he parted company from them in a plane from Saigon on 17-8-45 for an "unknown" destination". Though Col. Habbur Rahman had admittedly more secret consultations with Netaji than the rest of his Indian brethren there and though he was the only Indian to proceed with him beyond Saigon, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Col. Rahman definitely knew that Netaji's destination was Dairen in Manchuria and he also knew more of Netaji's secrets than any of the others. The fact that Col. Rahman states that Netaji's destination was Tokyo with intention to return to Singapore soon and that he does not state Dairen or Manchuria or Russia is enough to suggest, as stated by Shri Dwijendranath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, withnesses No. 22 & 24 respectively, that he did so intentionally, on the lines he was tutored by Netaji, and not to mention the names of these places, but Tokyo instead, so as to give a wrong scent about Netaji's whereabouts and also to save the Japanese Government from embarrassment and also to narrate the story of the plane crash etc., as was announced by the Japanese inconsultation with Netaji and which he did to the best of his abilities. Both of them state that Col. Rahman must have been under strict oath of secrecy to Netaji not

nephews of Netaji and two out of his only five confidants, who helped him to get out of Calcutta secretly in January, 1941 and who were also instructed by him to make such statements, which he had tutored them to say and who were also under similar oaths of secrecy to him regarding his escape from Calcutta.

Netaji started contacting the Russian Ambassador as early as 1944, because he was under the impression at that time that the Japanese whould lose the war and he along with them and because he considered Russia to be a suitable country for carrying on his future struggle for the independence of India. With the gradual lapse of time, this took more definite shape, Shri A.M. Sahay, witness No. 30 and some others have stated that Netaji made attempts at contacting the Chinese Communists through Mr. Ho Chi Minh's party and also the Russians through Mr. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister of Japan and others. Shri Debnath Das, witness No. 2, also stated that one of Netaji's plans was to go to Yenan, the headquarters of Mr. Mao Tse Tung and that Netaji had asked Shri Iyer, witness No. 6, his Minister for Information & Broadcasting in May, 1945 to write to Mr. Shigemitsu and enquire whether the Japanese Government would contact the Russians on his behalf and provide other facilities to him and to a few members of his staff for going to Russia. A reply to this was received from the Japanese Government in June, 1945. Shri Das further stated that on more than one occasion, Netaji requested General Isoda, witness No. 35, to continue letting him know the position of the Japanese in Manchuria and Noth China. Witness No. 5, Col. Pritam Singh, deposed that Netaji had told him

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that he (Netaji) had contacted the Russians through
Mr. Shigemitsu and he wished that he and some of his
party should move to Russian territory and operate
from there and he also ke said that the ideology of
the Russians was to different from that of the AngloAmericans, that sooper or later and in about ten years
time, they would come to a clash, when it would be
an opportune moment for them to go into action again
for the independence of India.

All these would go a long way to show and prove that Netaji's plan of going to Russia via Manchuria, after his failure in his armed struggle against the Anglo-Americans in South-East Asia, was not a cursory suggestion, but was a carefully-thought-of well-matured plan, which, as a matter of fact, was the only alter--native left to him, as he did not want to surrender himself to the Anglo-Americans and thereby be instrumental in not only finishing himself, but also bring--ing to an end, his only cherished goal in life, viz., the independence of his mother country. He was natu-- rally very sincere in having his plan executed. is also proved that though the Japanese Government, were in utter distress and confusion, due to their surrender to the Anglo-Americans, they were magnanimous enougha "in respecting.Mr. Chandra Bose's last wishes" and were also, with all sincerity, giving effect to same plan, by taking him in a plane to Manchuria and had deputed one of their topmost and renowned generals, who knew that territory well and who, according to Mr. T. Negishi, witness No. 20, was considered to be a key man for negotiations with Russia, with instructions to remain with him there and to help him in crossing over into the adjoining Russian territory. The Japanese Government were keen for the quick execution of their

plan and their instructions were, that the plane should make a detour to Dairen in Manchuria, and after dropping only Netaji and General Shidei there, the plane would then come back to Japan and alight the remaining passengers there. The keeness and sincerity on the part of both the Japanese as well as Netaji for the proper and prompt exems execution of the plan, naturally gives additional importance to it and as the main ddea underlying it, was to remove Netaji to a safe place, so that the Anglo-Americans would not be in a position to get hold of him, it would be a natural sequence for the Japanese to announce that Netaji had died, after they were see sure that Netaji was safely lodged in a place that was not under the control of the Anglo-Americans. It will be of interest to mention here, that, according to the statements of Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, witnesses Nos. 22 and 24 respectively, a similar announcement was made by them, when Netaji secretly left Calcutta in January, 1941 and it was made teh days after his actual departure from Calcutta and after __information had been received that he had crossed the Indian frontier and was safe in Afghanistan and beyond the clutches of the British rulers of India.

From the evidence on record on this point and which is practically free from discrepancies, though the statements have been made by persons of different maticalities, it can, therefore, definitely be said that the aforesaid plan has been proved very convincingly and without the shadow of a doubt.

It has been stated earlier that both the British as well as the Americans had made thorough and on-the-spot enquiries under different auspices soon after

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the surrender of the Japanese and had also tried to arrest Netaji under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance and also as he was considered to be an "International War Criminal" and because they doubted the truth of the announcement made by the Japanese that Netaji had died in a plane crash accident and as they considered it to be a hoax and believed that he was alive and was hiding somewhere. Being the victorious party, they had all the facilities and opportunities of making thorough enquiries in all the areas, where they thought Netaji could possibly have been living or hiding.

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In one of their reports, it transpires that Netaji wanted to shift a nucleus of his Government to Yunan Province in China and through the Communists there, to get into touch with Soviet Russia. Another report states that in July, 1945, Netaji sought permission to enter U.S. S.R. fiz.via Manchuria, with a few selected members of his movement, but the same source contends that there was no need for the Japanese to ask the Russians for Netaji's entry, because he wanted to go to Manchuria, from where he thought he would be able to get into touch with the Russian forces. The same report also states that it is beyond doubt that Netaji had plans to go underground together with a number of his selected friends. This report contains the final conclusion arrived at as a result of the enquiry and it is to the effect that in the absence of substantial proof, it is still difficult to state conclusively the fate of Bose. This finding, to say the least, carries great weight and, having been made by contrary to the expectations of the Anglo-Americans, maximum efforts must have been made by

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them to find out Netaji's whereabouts and also to arrest him for purposes of taking action against him, as he was not only an arch enemy of theirs, because, being a British Indian subject, he waged war against his King and Emperor, but was also a top-ranking "International War Criminal", against which persons, after the last war, the maximum penalty was generally inflicted. It must have been with great reluctance and sorrow that the British and American enquiring offi--cers were compelled to come to the finding that it was difficult to state conclusively the fate of Netaji Bose, which finding, however, should be considered to carry great weight. As stated by me above, our enquiry should be considered to be a very perfunctory one, when compared with the numerous all-round careful enquiries made by them and whereas, the intention of my colleagues appears to have been to come to the conclusion anyhow that Netaji had died and the places in the Far East visited by the Committee were the bare minimum and had been arranged accordingly, the main intention of the Britishers and the Americans must have been to find him out by all possible means and after getting hold of him, to wreak their vengeance on him.

I (b) DEPARTURE.

In the TERMS OF REFERENCE the departure from Bangkok has been stated to be about 16.8.45. To be definite, it should be on the following day, viz., 17.8.45 and which has been stated without there any ambiguity by a large number of witnesses, viz., Shri Debnath Das, Capt. Gulzara Singh, Col. Habibur Rahman, Col Pritam Singh, Shri S.A. Iyer, Mr. M. Kunizuka, Mr. T. Negishi, Mr.T. Hachiya, General S. Isoda and others.

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Netaji arrived at Bangkok on 16.8.45 from

Singapore in a bomber plane specially chartered for him

with Mr. Negishi, Col.Rahman, Shri Iyer and Col. Pritam

Singh and after having had repeated consultations with

his associates and some of the highranking Japanese

Officers and after working the whole of the night, left

Bangkok the next morning, viz., 17.8.45 for Saigon with

another three of his followers, viz., Shri Debnath Das,

Co. Gulzara Singh and Major Abid Hasan, all six of

whom, he intended taking with him to Russia viz. Manchuria

for continuing his activities for the liberation of India.

AT SAIGON

The party reached Saigon in the forencon and here difficulty was experienced by Netaji in securing accommodation for all his six associates for their forward flight to Manchuria, where the Japanese had agreed to take him.

The conduct of the Japanese authorities, who had decided to "respect Netaji's last wishes" in offering only one seat for Netaji alone, though his request for only six more for his trusted and loyal followers was decidedly a very meagre one, has been construed by some of the witnesses to have some serious significance and weight. It is well known and it is on record that the Japanese nation had not only a very high regard and admiration for Netaji, but their Government had recognised the Government he had formed there and had all along given him due honour and respect as the Head of a State, had presented him with an aeroplane, in which he always went about, flying the flag and insignia of his State, had handed over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to his Government, had supplied him with war Materials and all other equipment

to the best of their resources and had rendered him help and facilities in all possible ways. It is on record that though the Japanese had surrendered, they were ordered by their victors to ground their planes at about the end of that month or the early part of the next month, viz., September and that their planes were flying in the meantime. On 20.8.45, four of Netaji's associates, whom he was compelled for want of accommodation, with him, to leave behind at Saigon, were flown to Hanoi and the fifth one, Shri Iyer, was flown to Tokyo along with other Japanese. A few days later, Dr. Ba Maw, the Prime Minister of Burma and a few others were also flown to Tokyo.

Shri Iyer has deposed that when he was informed by Staff Officer, Col. Tada, that Netaji's plane had crashed at Taihoku and that Netaji had died there, he told the Colonel bluntly that neither the Indians in East Asia nor those in India would be prepared to believe that many story, unless positive proof was forthcoming and he, therefore, pressed the Colonel to see that the plane in which he was offered a seat, for going to Tokyo, took him to Tgihoku, so that he could get a chance of seeing Netaji's body with him his own eyes and be of some service to Col. Rahman in his precarious condition there. Though Col. Tada promised him that he would be taken to Taihoku, the plane did not land there, but did so at a nearby aerodrome at Taichu, fixfox for reasons best known to them. It has been proved by quite a number of witnesses that the usual route for planes from Saigon to Tokyo is via Taihoku and not Taichu. An additional suspiscion arises here, because the usual route was not followed in this case and no explanation was given as to why it was not followed.

Col. Pritam Singh, witness No. 5, has clarified this well-founded suspicion into a believable story, when he deposed that, "At the Saigon aerodrome, I learnt that the Japanese were of the opinion that it would be difficult to conceal such a big party. The interf inference I drew from this was that the Japanese wished to take Netaji alone to some unknown destination. But Netaji was of opinion that it was not for the purpose of going into hiding that he was going to some unknown destination . His primary object in doing so was to continue the struggle for India's freedom, for which it was essential that he should be accompanied by a number of his officers. Netaji discussed all these points with the two Japanese Officers, General & Isoda and Mr. Hachiya, who had accompanied us from Bangkok. After consultations with Netaji at the aerodrome, the two Japanese officers left by plane for the Headquarters of Field Marshal Count Terauchi at Dalat" -- "to have consultations with the Field Marshal, who was the Supereme Commander of the Japanese Forces in South-East Asia". Later on, he states, "On arrival at Netaji's bunglow, I saw ---General Isoda and Mr. Hachiya seated in one sex commerce corner." --- "Netaji told us that the Japanese had informed him that they would like to take him away alone". As these statements have not been challenged in any way, they must be accepted as correct and a/s such, it explains, why, instead of a separate plane for Netaji and his six followers, which would ordinarily have been expected from the Japanese, who expressed, an an only solace, "to respect Netaji's last wishes," five of them were not accommodated in the plane, in which Netaji and Col. Rahman were taken.

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It is, therefore, evident that though Netaji ex--plained to those two high-ranking Japanese officers, his reasons for taking six of his associates with him to Manchuria, the Japanese authorities there, on the other hand, whese intention was to remove Netaji secretly, would, from their own standpoint, carry out the preserve plan as secretly as possible and thereby not expose themselves unnecessarily to the wrath of the victorious Anglo-Americans. This would, therefore, readily explain why only one seat was offered by the Japanese and that out of regard for Netaji, only one more seat was subsequently made available on his further request and that probably with great reluctance. Netaji asked two more of his associates to carry their kit with them, so that they could also accompany him, in case he could persuade the Japanese at the aerodrome to provide him with two more seats. In view of the intention of the Japanese and the risk they were taking for removing Netaji to a safe zone, it would be agreed that they could not possibly accede to Netaji's further request for more seats.

Dalat and arrangements for seats for Netaji and his party, as stated above, naturally took some time, the plane could not take off from Saigon till late in the afternoon for the onward flight. After Netaji's treasure boxes had been deposited inside the plane, and which will be considered later, he took leave of his associates and his Japanese freends present there and after embracing them, emplaned for "an unknown destination", so kindly arranged by the magnanimous Japanese Government.

As stated earlier under the heading," THIS PLAN WHY
PROVED? ", the total number of passengers in the plane,
including the crew, as stated by some of the passengers,
alleged to have been in the plane, would be thirteen.

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Col. Rahman...

Col.Rahman has shown twelve in the sketch drawn by him, a fair copy of which, reproduced by a draughtsman, is attached herewith, (App. I-). Col. Nonogaki has stated it to be thirteen and has shown the same number in the & sketch drawn by him, a copy of which is attached, (App. J-). Major Kono has given the number as fourteen, which is also shown in the sketch drawn by him, copy attached, (App. K -) Capt. Arai has shown thirteen in his sketch, copy of which is attached (App. L -) and according to the statement of Major Takahashi, the number would be between twelve and fourteen. Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is reported to have sent a written statement from Formosa, has made no mention of the number of inmates in that plane. The Sketch, copy attached (App. M) accompanying the report of the Japanese Exymenteria Government, shows the number to be twelve. Taking the view of the majority, the correct number could be accepted as thirteen.

As stated by these witnesses, the plane took off from Saigon aerodrome between 1.30 P.M. and 5.20 P.M. with this complement of passengers, including the crew—and Netaji's five trusted followers, who could not accompany him, returned home with a heavy heart.

Those outside the plane had no idea as to where the inmates inside the plane were seated.

AT TOURANE.

According to the statements of the witnesses, who travelled in that plane, it landed at Tourane between 5 and 7 P.M. and the take-off from Saigon and the landing at Tourane were quite normal and the flight enroute was quite smooth.

Col. Rahman stated that after reaching the aerodrome at Tourane, Netaji's and his baggage were placed

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in a car and in the company of some Japanese Officers, they came to a hotel, where they spent the night and that about sunrise of the next day, they were taken in a Japanese car to the aerodrome, where he found all the passengers waiting for them there. The state--ments made by Capt. Arai are that all the persons on board the plane put up in the largest hotel there and all of them had dinner together and at the dinner table, Netaji, General Shidei and he took part in a conversation regarding the future of Asia and Europe and that the next day, they proceeded to the plane at about beak break of dawn. Major Takahashi deposed that though all of them stayed for the night in the hotel, he did not see Netaji there and had differ dinner separately and that they left the hotel at about 5.30 mm the A.M. the next day for the aerodrome. Col. Nongaki stated that all of them stayed in the biggest hotel there and had diffex dinner together and that Netaji and General Shidei talked to each other in German. which however, does not tally with the statement of Capt. Arai. They left early next morning for the aerodrome and having realised there that the plane was overloaded, they took down from the plane all the surplus things, viz., a machine-gun, its ammunition and an anti-air craft gun, which were still fixed to the pak plane and they then took off from there, when the sun was rising. The Colonel has introduced a new story here, which has not been stated by the other witnesses. Major Kono has given another different version, viz., that as their plane had to traverse the whole length of the runway, about 20,00 metres long

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at Saigon aerodrome, before it could take off, he formed the impression that the plane was overloaded and so he made up his mind to reduce the load on the plane, when they reached the next halt and that after they landed at Tourane, Major Takizawa and he according--ly stayed behind at the aerodrome and in the same evening, they took down no less than twelve anti-air craft machine guns and all the ammunition and also some baggage, which they found on the bomb rack, and thereby reduced the load on the plane by anout 600 kgs. They then attended to the maintenance of the aeroplane and after satisfactying themselves that EXMERYX everything was correct, they went to the hotel, which they reached at about 8. 30 P.M. Both of them had differ separately from that of the first party. Next morning, they went to the aerodrome before 5 AM. and after testing the engines, they tooky their seats in the plane, which took off at 5 AM, and as it was such lighter than what it was on the previous day, the take off was perfectly normal. Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is reported to have sent a written statement, from Formosa narrates another new story, . viz., that they reached Thurne Tourane Airfield at 5 or 6 P.M. and stayed overnight at the Supply Base Billet there and so could not state anything about staying at the Hotel which has, however, been stated by all the other witnesses. It is strange that these win witnesses have given somewhat different versions, some of which cannot be reconciled in any way.

THE SEXTING.

From the seats occupied by the passengers and the crew, and the relative position of the petrol tank inside the plane, the general impression obtained from the evidence on record is that as Netaji was

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seated

seated near this petrol tank and as petrol had, therefore, splashed on his dress, it caught fire easily. In the sketch drawn by Col. Rahman and which was reproduced clearly by a draughtsman of the Civil Aviation Department, a copy of which is attached herewith (App I) and which has been compared with the Colonel's drawing and certified to be correct by the Chairman on 14.4.56, it will be seen that Netaji's seat is Shown at No. 6, whereas the petrol rakyrank tank is shown much lower down. The Pilot is shown at No. 5 in front of Netaji, to whose right, No. 4, is shown General Shidei and behind Netaji, at No. 7 is his (Col. Rahman's) seat and nobody is shown to xxxxxx the right of either Netaji or Col. Rahman. In Capt. Arai's sketch (App L), General Shidei and Lt. Col. Sakai are shown to the right of Netaji and Coxix Col. Rahman respectively, In Col. Nonogaki's sketch (App. J), Mojor Kono is shown in front of Netaji and in front of Major Kono is the Pilot, evidently, N.C.O. Ayoagi, because to the right of this Pilot is shown the other Pilot, Major Takizawa, whose name has been written there. To the right of Myn Major Kono is shown General Shidei and to the right and a little below it, is shown the part petroltank. Col. Rahman (Asstt) is shown along the centre line of the plane and not exactly behind Netaji. In Major Kono's sketch (App K -), the position of the two Pilots tally with that shown in Col. Nonogaki's sketch, but behind the Pilots on the left viz., N.C.O. Ayoagi, is shown the Engineer, behind whom, is shown Major Kono and behind whom and a little to the right * is shown Netaji. Behind Netaji and a little to the right is shown Col. Rahman, above whom is shown as petrol tank, which is also above and behind Netajik. Another petrol tank is shown to the right and on the front side of

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Netaji. The

The position of Lt. Col. Sakai has been shown to be quite different from that shown in Capt. Arai's sketch, (App L). The actual position shown in the respective sketches drawn by them vary and cannot be reconciled. There is also variation in their sketches regarding the seating arrangement of the other inmates of the plane.

In my ham humble opinion, there can be no explanation whatsoever for such marked variation in the statements of the different witnesses, each of whom has stated in his own way. This variation should not have arisen, especially, because all of them stated that the same seating arrangement was adhered to by all of them during all the different stages of the flight from Bangkok to Saigon, thence to Tourane and from there to Taihoku and lastly on the flight from Taihokn. The seating arrangement, therefore, given by each of them, should have tallied and should not have been so divergent. In view of all these discrepant and contradictory statements made by these witnesses and the difference in the seating arrangements shown in the sketches drawn by them, I am constrained to state that little reliance could be placed on such evidence. There is, however, only one statement common to all of them and it is, that the seating arrangement was the sa same throughout the different stages of the flight and which, therefore, appears to me to have been tutored one.

TO TAIHOKU

Now to proceed onward with the journey, the plane, according to Col. Rahman, was ready to take off from Tourane Airport, when Netaji and he arrived there. The crew were already inside the plane. All the others entered the plane and the seating arrangement was the same as before.

Netaji wore a bush shirt-coat, khaki drill trousers, all cotton, a warm serge cap, it I.N.A and it I.I.L. badges and shoes. Their luggage was placed in the rear part of the

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plane and below the turret and not near them, as stated and shown by Col. NONOGAKI in his sketch (App. J). He did not see anybody check-up the plane or take out the cartificate for its air-worthiness. This has, however, been contradicted by Major Kono, who was an Air Force Officer and a Pilot, and who stated that he along with Major Takizawa and an Engineer, who was also in that plane, tested and tried the engines and after certifying them to be alright, took out the certificate for its air-worthiness. Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto), witness No. 51, who was the Ground Engineer attached to Taihoku Aerodrome, deposed that Major Takizawa, Pilot Aoki (Aoyagi) and he tested the engines and after all of them were satisfied that the engines were functioning properly, the plane was allowed to take off. He, however, does not mention the name of Major Kono in having taken part in this job. Col. Rahman proceeded with his story and said that the take-off was quite normal and there was no trouble with the engines during the flight to Taikoku, where they touched down in a normal manner at 2 P.M. They were asked to have a light lunch, during which period the plane would be refuelled. The runway was in flat country with mountains at a distance of 8 to 10 miles off. As he felt cold, he changed into warm uniform, viz., bush shirt-coat, (full Sleeves), breeches and top long boots. Netaji declined to change his dress, but he handed over a warm pull-over to Netaji. They finished their light lunch and after a total stay of half an hour there, they emplaned. The sitting order in the plane was the same as before the plane took off just about 2-35 P.M.

Capt. Arai stated that after finishing an early breakfast in the hotel, they proceeded to Tourane Airport at break of dawn and the paper plane took off soon after. The seating arrangement was the same as before and as shown in his sketch, (App L). The take-off was smooth and the landing at Taihoku at about noon and not at 2 P.M., as stated by Col. Rahman, was also normal. Here he heard Netaji telling Col.

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Rahman that his intention was to go to Mukden, the capital of Manchur-ia, which however, is a new place not named by any other witness, and as it was more distant than Japan, more gasolene was taken in, with the result that the plane became overloaded. The mar plane took off after about an hour of its arrival there, i.e., at about 1 P.M.

Major Takahashi's deposition is that they reached Tourane aerodrome from the hotel at about 7 A.M. and took off soon after, reaching Taihoku at about 11 A.M. As he was seated right back towards the tail, he could not see the seating arrangement of the others in front, but Ltm. Col. T. Sakai was seated in the rear next to him, but which is absolutely different from Capt. Arai's sketch (App L), in which Lt. Col. Sakai is shown as seated in front. After finishing their lunch and taking rest in a tent, the plane took off between 12-30 and 1P.M.

Col. Nonogaki has stated that the take off from

Tourane, when the sun was rising, was quite normal and the
seating was the same as before. As during the flight, they a
got information that enemy planes were near Swatan in South
China, their plane made a detour and flew further east.

Though their next stop was Heito, they did not land there,
but flew on, as the weather was favourable and covered more
distance, landing quite normally at Taihoku a little before
noon. Here they had their lunch and the plane was refuelled,
As the plane was scheduled to carry Gen. Shidei to Manchuria, Netaji also agreed to go with him to Dairen in
Manchuria. There was, therefore, no change in the scheduled
flight of the plane. They took their seats in the same
order as before and the plane started after about two
hours' stay there.

Maor Kono had deposed that after Tourane, the next stop was to be Heito, but when it was sighted at about 11 A.M., they received information over the Radio that Russian forces had occupied Port Arthur in Manchuria and so

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after consultation with Gen. Shidei, Col. Nonogaki and Major Takizawa, they decided that they should rush to Dairen as quickly as possible and reach it before the Russians occupied it and so instead of landing at Heito, they should push on to Taihoku and after a brief halt there, a should leave for Dairen. This is quite a different story from that of Col. Nonogaki, who is alleged to have taken part in this decision. According to this witness, the weather was perfect, the flight was smooth and the engines were running very well. They landed at Taihoku at about noon and after filling up the petrol tanks, they decided to leave at about 2 P.M., which, however, is not a short stay, though that Col. Rahman stated that they stopped there only for half an hour. They had their lunch in a tent there, where Netaji put on a woollen sweater over his cotton uniform, which consisted of trousers and shoes and not topboots. As there were no chairs in the plane, all of them were seated on the floor. Before 2 P.M., Major Takizawa tested the engines from inside and he tested them from outside. As he noticed that the left engine was not functioning properly, he went inside the plane and after examining the engine from inside, found it to be working alright. An engineer, who was also in the plane and whose name he could not recollect, also tested the engine and certified to its air-worthiness. The plane took off exactly at 2 P.M. and there was no change in the seating order.

In the written statement, alleged to have been sent to by Lt. Col. T. Sakai, it is recorded that they reached

Taihoku at about noon and left at about 1 P.M., and that
there was no change in the seating arrangement.

Col. Nonogaki and Major Kono have narrated two stories, different from each other, the formar that enemy planes were near Swatan in South China and so they had to make a detour and fly eastward and the latter that as the Russians had occupied Port Arthur, they should rush to

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Dairen before they occupied it.

This concludes the evidence in this point of the six person, who were alleged to have been in that plane.

Another person, who stated about the plane at Taihoku on or about 18.8.45, is Capt. M. Nakamura, (Yamamoto), witness No. 51, He was at that tiem the Ground Engineer and the Airforce Officer in charge of the Maintenance Unit at Taihoku Aerodrome. He stated that a serious accident took place there on 17-8 or 18-8-45, in which Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, Gen. Shidei and others were involved. He then stated that he was 90% sure that it could not be on 18-8-45, as on that day, about thirty Americans planes arrived there from the Phillipines and many other Japanese planes came and left on that day and he attended to all of them. As this date, viz., 17-8-45 did not fit in with what the Chairman wanted, he started manipulations, which I have mentioned earlier in this report and eventually succeeded in getting from the witness that the American planes did not come on 18-8-45 and succeeded only partially, when the witness said that the airaccident took place either on the 17th, 18th or the 19th. of August, 1945. Capt. Nakamura continued that when he reached the aerodrome from the city at 11-50 A.M., he found the plane standing in front of the building shown by him at position A of the sketch I, drawn by him, copy attached, (App N). He then went to the tent shown at B in the same sketch. All the persons then got into the plane, when it was at position A, from where the plane taxied all the distance to position C on the runway. It would appear that the place marked A and the tent shown at B by this Capt, as well as the sketch of the runway and its surroundings are absolutely different from the corresponding ones shown by Col. Nonogaki in his sketches, B. (App 0) and C, (App P). The arrowheads in the sketches of both these witnesses show from which place the plane was brought to the runway for the final take off from there and these are also shown as different.

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Captain, who was the Ground Engineer attached to the aerodrame there, stated the runway there was 890 metres long and as the tail of a heavy bomber normally gets lifted half way down it, the logical inference is that the runway is sufficiently long. Major Kono, however, who is also an Airforce Officer as well as a Pilot, stated that though the runway there was 1600 metres along, it was short, regard Netaji's dress, the Captain stated that he was wearing topboots and evidently breeches, which has been denied by all the other witnesses, who have distinctly stated trousers and shoes. He has added another new story, viz., that before the plane was allowed to take off, Major Takizawa and Pilot Aoyagi entered the plane and tested it and he stood in front of it. After the engines were started, he found the left engine to be defective and accordingly drew the Major's attention to it, who immediately replied that it was a brand new a engine that had been replaced by them at Saigon. This shows that the plane was an old one and that its old engine had been replaced by a new engine. Col. Nonogaki has stated that though it was a 97 K.V. Heavy Bomber, it was being used as a transport plane, as it had become old and that the newest types of planes were being used as bombers, to which, a direct lie has been given by Gen. Isoda, who has stated definitely that it was a brand-new plane. Capt. Nakamura continued that after Major Takizawa had adjusted the engine twice, both of them agreed that there was nothing wrong with it. The engines were then speeded up and the plane was then allowed to run on the runway. The statements of Major Kono are absolutely

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different from those of Capt. Nakamura and it is rather strange that though each of them claims to have taken a part in the testing of the engines, neither of them states that the other took part in it or admits the other's presence

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there. The other witnesses, some of whom are Airforce
Officers, are absolutely silent on this point. The reasonable inference that would be drawn from such evidence is
that the testing of the engines, as alleged, did not take
place at all. It is strange that the only point common
in the statements of Major Kono and Capt. Nakamura is the
left engine and it is to all intents and purposes so, as
that engine will be brought into prominence later on.

Another statement of Capt. Nakamura is that when he met Gen. Shidei in the tent, the General told him that he would fly to Tokyo immediately. This is not borne out by the evidence on record, as it has been definitely stated by all the witnesses that the General was going to Manchuria and not to Tokyo and that the scheduled route of the plane was first to Dairen in Manchur-ia, where the General would alight and then the plane would come to Tokyo.

Being the Head of the Kikari Kikan, the function of which organisation has been explained earlier, Gen. Isoda had to handle important and secret diplomatic and military matters between the Imperial Japanese and Netaji's Governments. He deposed that in May, 1945, he received a wireless message direct from the Imperial General Headquarters, Tokyo that his Government had accepted Netaji's plane of contacting Russia, as the military situation was deterioat-- ing rapidly and that he immediately communicated the same to Netaji. He stated further that when Netaji reached Bangkok from Singapore on 16-8-45, Netaji told him that he wanted to go to Russia, on which he promised Netaji all the necessary help for that purpose. The General also confirmed that Lt. Col. Tada, Staff Officer of F.M. Count Terauchi's Headquarters, informed Netaji and also the others as asoon as theylanded at Saigon Airport that only

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one seat had been arranged for Netaji and who should, therefore, travel without any of his associates, though Netaji desired that all six of them should accompany him. The General also stated that Netaji had told him that he wanted to go to Russia via Dairen and to Dairen via Taihoku and that before emplaning, when Netaji bid him good-bye with a shake of hands, he wished Netaji a happy journey, safe arrival at his des--tination and success in his mission for securing India's freedom. These words of the General are significant and Lold the high position stated above, he was in a position to know precisely that the plan of his Government and of Netaji was that Netaji was to be taken to Manchuria, where with the help of Gen. Shidei, who was deputed to accompany him, he would enter Soviet Russia and that his Government was carrying out that plan, by giving the necessary transport facilities to that great Indian leader, their ally, and as they had already surrendered, it would naturally be done as secretly as possible and with the minimum risk of being exposed by their victors, the Anglo-Americans.

To supplement the evidence that has been adduced by Netaji's associates and those who were alleged to have been with him in that plane, regarding Netaji's stay at Saigon and at Tourane from local persons, it would appear that only one person at each of these two places could be secured and their depositions will now be considered.

Shri Ramnao Goswami, witness No.29, said to be watchman of the firm of Chotirmal, in one of whose houses, Netaji stayed during his visits to Saigon, has stated that about a week after the surrender of the

Japanese, Netaji came to that house accompanied by two Japanese Officers and enquired about Chatterji, Sahay and Iyer, who, he told Netaji, had left only two days previous to that date. As a matter of fact, Shri Iyer was with Netaji at Saigon on that date and had been in Netaji's company for a few days previous to that. So this alleged enquiry by Netaji regarding Shri Iyer does not arise at all. With regard to the subject matter of this enquiry, the deposition of this witness is useless, especially, when the little he has stated, is not borne out by the statements of the other witnesses; on the other hand, they have been contradicted by some of them.

The other person, Shri Mir Ghulam Dastgir, witness No.31, who states to have been at Tourane for the last 14 years, has deposed that sometime in 1945, he was asked by Mr. Suziko, the Japanese Administrator of Tourane, to meet Netaji, who, he said, had arrived there; that inspite of his best efforts, he was unable to do so, due to continuous air raids. It is quite clear that the deposition of this witness has absolutely no bearing on the fact that has been attempted to be established that Netaji stopped on the night of 17.8.45 at the biggest hotel there. It is for the exclusive purpose of establi--shing this fact, which is definitely considered to be an important point in this enquiry that all the three members of the Committee visited Tourane on 2.5.1956 in the company and under the guidance of Shri Kutti, our Consul-General at Saigon and though all of us stopped at the biggest hotel there for some time and made serious attempts to get evidence everywhere, including the hotel staff about Netaji's alleged stay at Tourane, such attempts on our part ended in miserable failure. Far from obtaining any evidence, no clue about Netaji's alleged stay there was secured and the only person we could get hold of there

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was Shri Dastgir, whose worthless nature of evidence has been stated above. Such being the result of our efforts, a reasonable suspicion would naturally arise about Netaji's alleged stay at Tourane, which has been stated only by the six persons, who allege to have been with him in that plane.

It is necessary for me to state here that

Netaji's name and fame in the Far East was immense. If
he had come to the small town of Tourane and stayed in
the biggest hotel there, its staff and the people round
about there would surely have known about it and we would
surely have got several persons of good standing and
position, who would have known about Netaji's stay there,
than the solitary Shri Dastgir, especially, when we had
gone there with our Gonsul-General with the express purpose of confirming Netaji's stay there on the night of
17.3.45 from the local people. The evidence, therefore,
on this point has remained uncorroborated by local persons,
though sincere efforts were made to obtain it locally.
The inference from this would, accordingly, have some
significance.

The point which is now being taken up requires careful consideration. The conduct of the Japanese in offering only one seat to Netaji could reasonably be surmised to be the outcome of theirs and Netaji's agreed plan of removing him as secretly as possible and with the minimum of publicity, so that their conduct would not be exposed to the Anglo-Americans to whom they had surrendered and not really due to their inability to provide seats for only six of his trusted followers, whom he had selected to take with him to Russia for carrying on his activities for the independence of India. The standpoint of the Japanese Government was quite different from that

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of Netaji. They were taking a great risk and it involved great danger to themselves, if their plan was found out by their victors. As stated earlier, Col. Pritam Singh inferred from the conversation of some of the Japanese at the Saigon Aerodrome that they wanted to take Netaji alone and which Netaji is reported to have told him subsequently there. In this connection, very important and significant statements have been made by Col. M. Yano, witness No.44, who was at that time, the Chief of Airforce Section No.2 of the Southern Army Headquarters under the Supreme Command of F.M. Count Terauchi at Dalat and they are, (1) that Gen. Isoda had sent a telegram to Gen. Numata, the Chief of Staff, Southern Army, "that Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose wished to make contact either with China or with Russia to continue his struggle for India's independence in view of the fact that the Japa-- nese were retreating away from India and were not in a position to help him very much", and (2) "the plan was to move Mr. Bose alone to Tokyo. Mr. Bose had desired to go to Russia. F.M. Count Terauchi decided that, in the first instance, Mr. Bose should visit Tokyo and discuss the matter with the Government of Japan and then proceed onwards. The arrangements for Mr. Bose to be flown to Tokyo were made by our Headquarters. ----The arrangements for aeroplane were made by the Air-- staff Officer attached to the Headquarters at Dalat". Though this Officer states that it was decided that Netaji should go first to Tokyo, it has been proved quite satisfactorily, that at Saigon aerodrome in the presence of Gen. Isoda and others and before the plane took off from there, that the plane would go to Dairen in Manchuria first and after dropping, according to plan, Netaji and Gen. Shidei there, it would then come

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Tokyo. As Gen. Isoda had contacted the Field Marshall at Dalat, when he had gone there for making transport arrangements for Netaji for his onward flight from Saigon, it must obviously have been decided by these two high-ranking officers that Netaji and Gen. Shidei would be dropped at Dairen first and before the plane flew to Tokyo and according to this decision, the route of the plane was scheduled to be from Saigon to Taihoku, then to Dairen and finally to Tokyo, and which has been stated by several witnesses. This is a valuable piace of information and the more so, as it comes from the source of its origin.

Now to summarise the point about Netaji's departure from Bangkok on the morning of 17.8.45 and subsequent departure from Saigon the same afternoon, the underlying policy behind it, according to the plan agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, was that to comply with Netaji's desire not to fall into the hands of the victorious Anglo-Americans, who would thereby wreak their vengenance on him under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance or as a War Criminal, for having waged war against his King and Emperor, the Japanese Govern--ment, being exceedingly sorry for Netaji's failure in his mission to bring about the independence of India, which they ascribed to their losing the war, decided "to respect Netaji's last wishes", and in pursuance of the same, made necessary arrangements for removing Netaji to a safe zone, viz., Manchuria, from where Netaji said he would make his own arrangements for going into the adjoining Russian territory. For helping Netaji to do so, the Japanese Government were generous enough, though there was distress and utter confusion in their ranks, due to their having surrendered, to depute one of

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their top-ranking military officers, viz., Lt. Gen. Shidei, who knew Manchuria well and who was reported to be a keyman for negotiations with Russia. As there was difficulty for the Japanese in arranging transport for Netaji's party, primarily consisting of more than 100 persons, Netaji finally selected only six of his trusted and loyal followers to accompany him to Russia and accordingly requested the Japanese to arrange transport facilities for only seven of them.

As Netaji was an arch enemy of the Anglo-Americans, to whom they had also surrendered, it is quite clear that the Japanese could not under any circumstances openly remove Netaji to a safe zone and out of the clutches of the victorious Anglo-Americans. They had, therefore, to do so secretly and without the least chance of being found out. As stated by Col. Pritam Singh, the Japanese were talking among themselves at Saigon aerodrome that it would be difficult to conceal such a big party, which, however, consisted of only seven persons and so they decided to take away Netaji alone. In removing Netaji to a safe place, the primary consideration of the Japanese would naturally be to do so with the minimum chance of being detected by their victors. The question of Netaji having six associates along with him in his new sphere of activities would surely be of little consideration with them. They could in no case embarrass themselves and get themselves dis--graced and punished, if detected. It should be very clearly understood, that it was under such circumstances that the Japanese Government had decided toremove Netaji alone to Mancharia.

After a very careful consideration of the

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evidence recorded on this point, I am of opinion that it is fairly satisfactory only from the time of Netaji's departure from Bangkok and subsequent departure from Saigon. Discrepancies worth considering started commencing after that and as the alleged flight continued, discrepancies, contradictions and different versions continued to be on the increase. It cannot but be mentioned here that inspite of the best and sincere efforts on our part and on that of our Consul--General at Saigon, we were unable to secure even a single person at Tourane, who was in a position to state that Netaji was there on the night of 17.8.45, especially when it has not been stated by any of his alleged fellow passengers that there was secrecy about his stay or his movements there. This point should be considered to have some significance. Moreover, apart from the single statement that Netaji stopped at Tourane for the night, the detailed statements made by the different witnesses are generally discrepant. Taking all these into consideration, it would be difficult to conclude that Netaji came to Tourane along with these witnesses, as alleged by them.

II(a) THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

According to Col. Rahman, the plane after taking off, circled over the airfield at Taihoku at a height of a few hundred feet, which he later on stated, would be 1,000 feet or more. It then turned to the north or north-east and while it was still gaining height, he suddenly heard a deafening hoise, as if some cannon shell from a enemy plane had hit the starboard side of their plane, which immediately started wobbling and made a nose-dive which is confirmed by another statement

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of his, that while the plane was nose-diving, their heads were downwards. That the plane nose-dived has been stated by all the other witnesses, though the maximum altitude said by them to have been attained by the plane falls far short of and is nowhere near 1,000 feet stated by Col. Rahman, who then stated that within a few seconds, the plane crashed on the ground. Shri Sastri, witness No.67, an Aircraft Inspector, Accidents Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation Department, Government of India, who was requested to give his opinion as an Expert, has stated that it takes about 8 seconds to fall down from a height of 1,000 feet and which confirms Col. Rahman's statement. Although Major Kono stated that as soon as the plane had attained a maximum altitude of approximately 30 meters, which is equal to about 100 feet, which however, is quite different from what has been stated by Col. Rahman, the plane started falling and it descended rapidly. He failed to switch off the ignition switch, as he could not maintain his balance and proceed for-_ward, but he saw the Chief Pilot Major Takizawa and N.C.O. Ayoagi struggling hard to control the plane, which then crashed on the ground. According to Shri Sastri, it would take the plane 3 seconds to dash against the ground from a height of 150 feet and if it crashed from that height, a "Major" accident would be expected. Taking Col. Rahman's version that the plane crashed from a height of 1,000 feet and as stated by Major Kono that the pilots failed to control the plane, though they struggled very hard to do so and as no witness has suggested that the pilots had succeeded in doing so and as it takes only 8 seconds to crash on

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the ground from a height of 1,000 feet, the nature of the accident due to the downward mounting momentum of the plane could reasonably be expected to be something very horrible and shocking and beyond all imagination and nothing near what has been stated by the witnesses. This altitude of 1,000 feet, as stated by him, is also explained and made believable from another statement of his that the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes. It could be said that it was not quite possible for the Colonel to form a more or less correct idea of the height the plane had attained from inside the plane, but being an educated and respectable person, he was not expected to make a statement unless he could vouch for its correctness. The other inmates of the plane were also in a position to give the height attained by the plane according to their respective estimates, which, however, are absolutely different from that given by Col. Rahman. Therefore, it could be stated definitely that Col. Rahman knew that the plane had reached a height of 1,000 feet or more. Moreover, his statement that the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes was made with the belief that it was or less correct, because persons do form an idea of time even without consulting a watch. Similar is the case with his definite statement that the plane crashed at a distance of 1 to 2 miles from the airfield and he could have made no mistake about it either. Another definite statement made by him is that after the plane was 5 or 6 minutes in the air and was still gaining height, he suddenly heard a deafening noise, as if cannon shell had hit the starboard side of the plane and his immediate reaction was that some enemy plane carrying cannon had fired on their plane and had hit it and as soon

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as he heard the noise, the plane started wobbling and it nose-dived, and within a few seconds, it crahsed on the ground. According to the Colonel, this was the reason that brought about the accident to the plane. It is exceedingly curious and at the same time inexplicable as to why this reason given by Col. Rahman for the plane crash has not been stated by any other witness or inmate of the plane. The version of the majority of them is that there were two or more loud noises and bangs and, from inside the plane, they knew that the propeller of the left engine and also the left engine, as stated by some of them had dropped off the plane and which, therefore, is totally different from the reason given by the Colonel, for which there can be no explanation whatsoever.

These few statements made by the Colonel fit in with one another and, therefore, give the impression that it could be a probable story. That the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes could reasonably prove that it had attained an altitude of 1,000 feet and that it could have flown to a distance of 1 to 2 miles from the airport, that a shell from a cannon from an enemy plane after hitting their plane could cause damage to it, resulting in its wobbling, nose-diving and finally crashing to the ground. In my opinion, by no stretch of reasoning or arguments, could it be explained why not even any of these few but important statements has been supported in any the least manner by any of the other inmates of the plane and the other witnesses. As these statements of Col. Rahman have not been corroborated by any of the other witnesses, I regret, it is not possible to accept them as correct. From this, however, it does not necessarily follow that the statements made by the other witnesses would be accepted as

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correct either. They have to be judged on their own merits.

To continue with the further statements made by the Colonel, he is definite that as it was a bom-- ber plane, there were no seats in it. This has also been stated by the other witnesses, except Col. Nonogaki, who has shown only two seats in his sketch, (App J) and which he stated were occupied by the two pilots. The evidence on record is that as there were no seats, all of them, including Netaji, squatted on the floor. As such, it would be probable and reasonable to expect that when the plane nose-dived, it would not be possible for any of them to retain their seats and they would have all dashed headlong into the cockpit or against any obstruction in the front portion of the plane. In any case, when the plane dashed against the ground on its nose, they must have been hurled forward with the heavy and sudden impact and injured fairly severely also in the process, unless they were hanging like bats from any part of the plane, which they may have held firmly but even in that case, they would have had in all probability lost their grip. For doing this, it would be evident that they would not have got the time, opportunity or presence of mind. Moreover, if the plane had crashed from a height of about 1,000 feet with the pilots unable to control it, the impact would be more than enough to finish all the inmates and that beyond all recognition. It does not require an expert to come th this opinion, though Shri Sastri has stated that a crash from a height of only about 150 feet is sufficient to cause a "Major" accident. So one would shudder to imagine what the result would have been if the plane had crahsed from a height of 1,000 feet. S.c. ba

As regards the place where the plane is alleged to have crashed, Col. Rahman has stated that it
was 1½ or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airport,
and on being questioned, he stated that it crashed on
"Plain Open Land". During the last part of the Colonel's examination, he replied to a question put by
the Chairman that though he had some photographs, he
did not bring any of them with him. He stated further
that he had four photographs, two of the crashed plane,
one of the coffin and in the fourth, he is shown as
sitting beside the coffin.

It appears from newspaper reports recently pub-- lished, containing the gist of my colleages' report submitted to the Government, that they have relied on one of those photographs of the crashed plane, which was given very good publicity in the front page of the newspaper. It is, therefore, evident that Col. Rahman sent those four photographs to the Committee. I regret very much to state that I had absolutely no knowledge of the same, till I could surmise this now from the newspaper reports. It is sickening to report that though these photographs and all other relevant papers were sent to Shri Sastri for his opinion as an expert, and which have evidently been referred to and rebied upon by my colleagues in their report to Government, they have intentionally been withheld from me, the third member of the Committee, and to whom those photographs and all other papers are equally necessary for writing his dissentient report and that, inspite of requests, verbal, by letters and by telegrams, starting from 14.7.56 to 30.8.56 to the Chairman of the Committee, the Prime Minister of India and the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. It is with deep regret

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that I am constrained to state that the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who was requested by some high official in New Delhi, to get me round to sign the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one, and who tried his utmost to do so, by influencing, persuading and coaxing me not only by contacting me personally and over the phone, but also through some of my nearest relations and friends, failed to have his high position and prestige maintained. Having fai--led in his attempt, he heard | what I had to say in reply and he was good enough to request the Prime Minister by a letter in a reply to a letter he had received from him in my presence on 15.8.56, requesting him to arrange to send me all the papers, I had requested them several times, so as to enable me to complete my dis--sentient report. I naturally expected that our Chief Minister's efforts in coming to my aid would meet with success and I was expecting the necessary papers from the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs everyday soon after that. I was sorely dissapointed, when he informed me over the phone on 28.8.56, that there was no likelihood of my getting any of those papers from Delhi. He advised at the same time, to write my report by making use of the personal notes I had maintained regarding some of the important statements made by some of the witnesses. In this connection, I consider I will be failing in my duty, if I do not make it clear the circumstances, which compelled me to keep these notes as well as the nature of those notes. I have made some mention of this in an earlier part of the report and I consider it necessary to point out here that the Chairman had decidedly a biased, prejudiced and preconceived opinion that Netaji

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was dead and which he in a way, openly expressed to the Pressman in Tokyo on 5.5.56, immediately on our arrival at the airport there and which was also the confirmed opinion of the Prime Minister and which he also openly expressed in the Parliament on 29.9.55. This appears to have moulded the opinion of the Chairman in such a manner as to get those statements of the witnesses, that were not favourable towards his opinion, recorded in such a manner as would be least detrimental to his opinion. To guard against this, as much as I possibly could, I was compelled to keep notes to the best of my abilities and with the least % inconvenience to the work of the Commiteee. As I have stated earlier, I had to check the draft statements of some of the witnesses recorded by our stenographer with these notes of mine and had on a few occasions, got them corrected after reference to and with the permission of my colleagues. This "Pri--vate Noting", as was styled by colleague Shri Maitra was evidently a hindrance to them and on a few occasions, he remarked that my "Private Noting" had no value and that I would not be allowed to take up the time of the Committee, to which I invariably replied immediately that in doing so, I had never wasted a minute of their time nor did I ever ask them for time for doing so. Whenever I put any question to any witness or listened to his answer, it was not possible for me to keep notes of them same. Besides this, I kept notes only when I felt inclined or thought it necessary to do so and they were accordingly kept in a haphazard manner. I had not the faintest idea at that time, that such notes of mine would be considered so valuable by the highest officials of our Government as to cast aside all

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evidence that had come to be placed on the record during the course of our enquiry and for which so much time and money had been spent both here as well as in foreign lands and to be ordered to be made the basis of my report to the Government. Later on, the Joint Secretary was pleased to inform me that he regretted his inability to send me the papers I had asked for and requested me to rely on the notes I had kept and write to my report accordingly. In this matter, the climax was reached, when on 28.8.56, our Chief Minister advised me over the phone to depend on my memory also in writing my report. This is decidedly the limit. It is exceedingly unfortunate for me, as a non-- official member of the Committee, to have been the victim of such injustice and oppression and the only guilt that I can make out is that I dissented from my colleagues and did not see my way to agree with their finding that the aircraft accident took place. I regret very much that I am compelled to state that this sort of partiality, obs--truction and injustice on the part of some of the highest officials, paid from the exchequer of a Government, that is claimed to be a civilised and a democratic one, in withholding relevant papers that are filed on the record, from the non-official member of the Committee, with the apparent intention of making it impossible for him to write and submit his report to the Government, because his opinion happens to go against the min opinion of the Government, is something really amazing and probably unique in the annals of any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and it will not at all be surprising, if it goes down to historyas such.

Now to return to the four photographs, which, I believe, were sent by Col. Rahman and which along with all other papers were not sent to me, as already stated by me, I have to state that I have just managed after great difficulty, resourcefulness and expenditure to get hold

some of them. hold of As regards the Photograph, (AppQ), showing the plane alleged to have crashed along with the place where it is shown to have crashed, different versions have been given by different witnesses. Col. Rahman stated that the photograph was given to him by the Japanese with the report that it was the identical plane, in which Netaji, he and others were alleged to have travelled and which subsequently crashed. The details shown in the photograph should have, therefore, more or less tallied with the statements of the witnesses, without which, it cannot be considered to have any evidential value. It will be seen that it does not show the "Flat Country" or "Plain Open Land", stated by Col.Rahmann, nor does at show the airfield or the runway, stated by the other witnesses. It is absolutely different and it clearly shows hilly area. It is common knowledge that a Photogra--phic print correctly shows what really exists and nothing different from that. The discrepant, contradictory and irreconcilable statements of the witnesses, therefore, show that the aircraft accident, as alleged by them, cannot be said to have been proved and this finding is confirmed by this photograph. In my humble opinion, there can be no other conclusion.

As regards the other three photographs, copies attached, (App.R.A.T), I regret I am not in a position to state definitely whether they are the identical three sent by Col. Rahman. Considering the one, (App.R.), which is likely to have been sent by him, it gives a view of the place, where the plane is alleged to have crashed. It is nowhere like what all the witnesses have said, but is similar to the first Photograph, (App.Q.) already discussed. The other two photographs, (App.S.T) will be considered at the proper place.

Regarding the aircraft accident, Capt. Arai stated that in a few minutes after taking off, the plane attained a height of about 500 metres, equivalent to about 1,600 feet, when he heard two loud noises and the plane immediately started to dive towards the earth. Except him and Col. Rahman, all the other witnesses stated that the accident took place soon after the plane became airborne and when the altitude attained was low and very much less than 1,000 feet or 1,600 feet stated by Col. Rahman and him respectively. The Captain learnt later that the first noise was due to one of the propellers falling off and the second was due to one of the engines dropping off. After crashing on the ground, the plane broke into two pieces from near the middle, as shown by him in red pencil in his sketch, (App L). This contradicts Col. Rahman's statement, the opinion of Sri Sastri and the photograph, (App Q) that the tail and wings were attached to the remaining part of the plane. He has also stated that the accident was due to overloading, but Shri Sastri is definitely of opinion that the propeller could not drop off due to overloading. Besides, Col. Nonogaki and Major Kono have said, that as they considered that the plane was overloaded, at Tourane, they relieved the load off the plane and the Major Stated that he did so to the extent of about 600 kgs., which is even more than half a ton. It is curious, that the statements of the witnesses are, that up to Tourane, when the plane is alleged by some of them to have been overloaded, the take off, landing and flight enroute were quite normal and smooth. The opinion of Shri Sastri, after considering the overall evidence on

record, including the photographs, sketches etc., is that the plane attained a maximum height of about 120 feet and then crashed near the runway and which, even in that case, it would be expected to result in a "major" accident. So anyone could easily imagine what the nature of accident would have been, if the plane had crashed from a height of 1,000 or 1,600 feet, as stated by Col. Rahman and or Capt. Arainspectively.

Major Takahashi had deposed that when the plane had just become airborne, there was an explosion and the plane tilted to the left side and crashed on the ground in front of and outside the runway and then came back to its normal position, which he has shown clearly in his sketch, (App U) and which is absolutely different from what is seen in the photograph sent by Col. Rahman, in which the tail is shown as pointing upwards and the place of crash, a hilly country. According to Major's statements and sketch, which are to the effect that there was no breakage or damage to the plane, it could safely be said that the plane had "belly-landed" after striking the ground and that there was no crash,

Col. Nonogaki, on the other hand, had introduced a novel story, which is again different from the three different versions given by the three witnesses named above. He has stated that shortly after he felt that the plane was airborne, and had attained a height of about 20 metres equal to about 60 feet, he heared an explosion and saw the plane nose-diving towards the ground. He also heard 3 of 4 bangs coming from the side of the engine, which he learnt later was due to the left propeller having blown off. The plane crashed on the ground and broke into two pieces, which he has shown in red

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pencil in his sketch, marked A, (App J), which was near about the turret. In his sketch marked C, (App P), he has shown on the runway in blue pencil, the X (cross) mark, from where the plane became airborne and the X (cross) mark in red pencil, where the plane crashed on the same runway. The rear portion of the plane broke off and flew away on the runway in the direc-- tion indicated in blue dots and the main body of the plane dragged itself to a distance of 20 to 30 metres from where it had crashed and came to a stop on the runway, after striking against a pile of stones and sand that had been collected at the edge of the runway and which were meant for filling up craters formed on the runway due to aerial bombing by the enemy. According to him, the complete drama of the alleged plane crash was enacted on the runway and nowhere else. It is impossible for anybody to explain this definite statement that the crash and breakage of the plane took place wholly on the runway with the definite statement of Col. Rahman that all this took place 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield or those of the other witnesses that it took place elsewhere.

According to Major Kono, the plane took off and after reaching a height of about 30 metres, equivalent to about 100 feet, there was a single loud explosion and the plane tilted to the right side, because the propeller and the engine on the left side had dropped off. The plane then crashedon its right side and the right wing was completed smashed, which is an absolutely diffe--rent version from those of the other witnesses, who have definitely maintained that it was the left side. The Major has confirmed his statement that the right wing was completely smashed, in his sketch marked B(II),

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(AppV), in which all the main parts of the plane are shown intact except the right wing. In his sketch, marked B(I), (AppW), he has shown that the damage was caused at two places, shown at (a) & (b) of the same sketch and in his sketch, B(II), in addition to the broken and blown off right wing, he showed at the portion marked (a), that the tail had broken off and at the portion marked (b), he showed and stated verbally that at that joint, the plane had bent inwards, which is his special, but uncorroborated, story of the damage to the plane.

In the written statement said to have been sent by Lt. Col. T. Sakai, it appears that "shortly after taking off, the plane inclined to right. Thinking that this was not normal, I looked out through the Machine--gun cage. At that time the plane had corrected its banking. But it went down lower and lower rapidly from the height of about 50 metres. From my position, I could see only the direction of the sides and rear; when the plane came over the end of the airfield, which was waste land, I saw the rear wheel flew off backward in the left side drawing an arc in the air. The moment I noticed it, I fell unconscious". It will be seen that in these statements, there no mention about an explosion or a loud noise or bang, or the propeller or the engine of the left side falling off, or of damage to any part of the plane, or of the plane having crashed at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield, or of having crashed and being left damaged on the runway itself or anywhere near it. In short, the statements of this military officer are unique by themselves and have remained uncorroborated by any of the five other alleged inmates of the plane, whose depositions have

been considered above. I am, therefore, definite,
that not a single person with a fair and unbiased
mind, reading the depositions of these six persons
and perusing the photographs, sketches and papers
on record, would agree with the findings of my col-leagues, that the plane crash took place, as alleged.

According to Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto), witness No.51, who was the Ground Engineer at Taihoku Aerodrome, all the passengers boarded the plane, when it was at position Ap shown in his sketch marked I (App N), after the Pilot Major Takizawa agreed with him that these was nothing wrong with the engine. This position A, however, is quite different from that shown by Col. Nonogaki in his sketch C, (App P). The Captain then stated that the plane was taxied to the position marked C on the runway and shown on the same sketch, where the engines were speeded up and then slowed down, as is usually done, and after he had satisfied himself that they were correct, they were speeded up again and the plane was allowed to run on the runway and it took off at a point about 50 metres from the end of the runway, and immediately a-fter taking off, it made a steep ascent and then tilted to the left, when he saw something falling down from the plane, which he later discovered to be a propeller. In his opinion, the maximum height attained by the plane would be 30 to 40 metres or something slightly higher than that and that the plane crashed at point G, marked in his sketch I, (App N), which was a little more than 100 metres from the end of the runway. He is definite that the whole of the plane was intact and that no

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with the sketch of the plane at point G, shows that the plane had "Belly-landed" and without any damage whatsoever to it. He has, however, not stated that the left engine decopped off the plane, as has been stated by some of the other witnesses. He stated that he saw all this, when he was standing at point F, shown in his sketch, marked I, (AppN) and was only about 30 metres or about 100 feet from the runway. Almost all the statements of the Captain are so different from those made by all the other witnesses and as those statements have been very clearly expressed, it is considered unnecessary to point out the discrepancy in each of them separately with those of all the other witnesses.

It must be very amusing for any reader to peruse how each of these seven witnesses have made seven different statements, not agreeing with one another on the single point as to how the aircraft accident took place.

colleague Shri Maitra, which I had the opportunity to read and discuss with them and from the newspaper reports recently published, giving a gist of the report they have submitted to Government, it appears that they have accepted the opinion of Shri Sastri that the plane attained a maximum height of 30 or 40 metres and that it crashed somewhere near the runway and that they have disbelieved the statement of Col.Rahman, who stated that the plane attained a height of more than 1,000 feet and had crashed at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the

in the last portion of his deposition and in reply to a que-stion put to him by the Chairman and is as follows; -"Chairman;
In the event of there being discrepancies between the statements of some witnesses, could you say from the statements and other evidence placed before you, which statement or statements you

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consider the most reasonable from your point of view as an Air Expert? Ans: Taking a general view of the entire picture, except for the latter portion of the statement of Major Kono, relating to the way in which the aircraft fell down to the ground, I consider Major Kono's and Capt. Nakamura alias Yamamoto's statements to be reasonable".

Before going in to the question of Shri'Sastri's opinion refered to above, I consider it very important to refer to the opinion and statement expressed by me earlier that the intention of the Chairman was "Anyhow" to come to the finding that the plane actually crashed and that Netaji died as a result therefrom and that in the pursuance of this intention of his, he regulated his conduct to the best of his abilities. In an earlier part of this report, I expressed my opinion as follows:-"I am aggrieved to state that the Chairman's attitude and conduct at times, far from maintaining a judicial approach, has been similar to that of a zealous partisan and worse than that of the most unscrupulous prosecutor". I consider myself fortunate that the Chairman's question itself clearly exposes himself that he continued calling for new witnesses and examining them not with the intention of arriving at the truth, but to fill up the gaps in the evidence and for explaining and reconciling dis--crepant and contradictory statements that stood in the way of his coming to the conclusion that the plane had crashed and that Netaji had died.

Now to proceed with the opinion by Shri Sastri, it appears that he has considered the statement of Capt.Nakamura (Yamamota) to be a reasonable one and has also accepted only a portion of Major Kono's statement, but, as stated by him, after discarding, "the latter portion of the statement of Major Kono, relating to the way in which the aircraft fell down to the ground." I am constrained to state that this is a funny manner of bel-ieving only one portion and disbelieving the remaining portion...

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portion of the statement of a witness relating entirely to the same simple point, viz., the manner in which the plane crashed to the ground.

In this connection, I feel it incumbent on me to refer to certain statements made by Shri Sastri. I may state here that when he first appeared before us, I requested him to make his statements after due thought and consideration, because, being examined as an expert, his opinion would be considered to be very weighty and could not possibly be challenged very easily and therefore would have to be accepted by us.

I have mentioned earlier, that the Chairman, finding himself unable to explain or reconcile the glaring discrepant statements of all the witnesses regarding the plane crash, got hold of this Aircraft Accidents Investigation Inspector to help with an expert opinion for tiding ever his difficulty and which is plainly evident from his last question to him, as has been stated above.

Except for the statements of Shri Sastin stated below, I have nothing much to comment on his other statements, but it is quite clear from his conduct that he came prepared to state that the maximum height attained by the plane was about 40 metres and that it crashed not on the runway, but further ahead somewhere on the airfield, as stated by Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto) and which appears to have been accepted by my coll--eagues. It is not understood as to why he did not state that the maximum height that could have been attained by the plane would be less than 40 metres equal to about 120 feet, if the plane took off from the runway and crashed a little ahead on the same runway, which was shown to him in sketch 13, (App.P), evidently skich C, drawn by Col. Nonogaki and why he prevaricated in stating that though it could not be 1,000 feet he was not in a position to say whether it could be 500 feet or even 300 feet, which is decidedly and impossibility, unless the plane shot up vertically

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like a rocket. He has also rejected the altitude of 1,000 feet or 1,600 feet and also the place of crash as 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield or at that boundary, as has been stated by Col.Rahman and by Capt. Arai respectively, without assigning any reason for the same. Later on, when he was questioned as to what would be the crew, he said he had no idea, though he admitted that in 1945 such a plane did not fly without a crew. He declined to give a reply, though several questions were put to him, but he eventually said about the crew both of heavy as well as light bombers. Shri Sastri's rejection of Col.Rahman's version and my colleagues' acceptance of Shri Sastri's opinion obviously challenges Col.Rahman's veracity.

While considering only these few, but crucial, points in the evidence on record, Viz., the maximum height attained by the plane, the period the plane was in the air, the cause for the accident to the plane, resulting in its crashing to the ground, the condition of the plane after it had crashed, the place where it had crashed, and the nature of the place where it had crashed, considered with the same points as shown in the Photograph, (AppQ), produced by Col.Rahman, saying that it was given to him by the Japanese with the report that it was of . the identical crashed plane, it stands out very prominently that the statements of Col. Rahman are absolutely different from those made by all the other witnesses. It is exceedingly puzzling why quite a different version has been given by him and why not even a single statement of his is in common with those of the others. In my humble opinion, and I am convinced about it, x that it could be ascribed to his intense devotion and loyalty to his "Beloved Leader", as Netaji has been designated by my colleagues.

It is unfortunate that I was not given a copy of the ENTREMENT AND report of my colleagues and so I am not in a position to know exactly the contents of the same. The little

that I have been able to glean from the newspaper reports recently published, regarding their points or findings, I have noticed that at once place, where Col.Rhman and also some of the Japan--ese witnesses claimed to have individually removed Netaji's burning clothes, my chlleagues disbelieved the statements of the Japanese witnesses, who stated to have volunteered their services for that great Indian leader, for whom they had the highest admiration and discarding the same, accepted that of Col. Rahman on the sole ground that it must be he, who was most likely to do so for his "Beloved Leader". Although I do not accept this to be the correct and sole argument for accepting the Colonel's conduct, and for disbelieving what the others had said and done, I would accept Netaji, not only as the Colonel's "Beloved Leader", but also as his "Reverential Master" who believing and relying on the Colonel's unswerving loyalty confided his secrets, with the hope that he would never be let down under any circumstances. I would, therefore, state that this loyal and devoted follower, dutifully proclaimed to the world under an "Oath of Secrecy", the secret instructions, he had received from his "Beloved Leader" and "Reverential Master", as has been suggested by Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, who were also under similar "Caths of Secrecy" to him at the time of his secret departure from Cal--cutta in January, 1941.

With regard to the four Photographs brought by Col.Rahman to India after his return from the Far East and about which he stated in the last part of his deposition, in reply to a question put by the Chairman and which he evidently set to the Committee later on and regarding which, I was not informed by the Chairman at any stage, he stated that two of them were of the crashed plane, the third was that of the coffin and in the last one, he is shown sitting beside the coffin.

I am in a position to assert, that due to the fear that these four Photographs would easily upset the findings of my

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colleagues and which was at also the confirmed opinion of the Government, they thought it wise not to send them or even show them to me.

As regards the first Photograph of the crashed plane, (AppQ), which tallies with what was published in the newspapers and evidently also along with the report of my colleagues, I have already held that by itself, it falsifies the story of the plane crash, as stated by all the Witnesses, including Col. Rahman. As I have not beeen furnished with my colleagues' report either, I am not in a position to know in what manner they have discussed the details shown in the photograph with the statements of all the witnesses, but I am almost positive they have not dared doing so. I believe they accepted the truth of the plane crash and, in support of the same, simply produced a photograph, alleged to be that of the crashed plane.

After a lot of difficulty and expenditure, I have managed to secure prints of three more photographs, but I am not sure whether they are the same as those sent by Col.Rahman and the same three on which my colleagues have relied upon. As they may be the same, I shall consider them one by one.

The second Photograph, (AppR) shows a landscape, but though the Colonel has said that it is of the crashed plane. no plane is seen in it. There is, however, a similarity in the panoramic view shown in it with the same shown in the first Photograph, (AppQ), but neither of them shows the "Flat Country" or "The plain open land" stated by Col.Rahman or the airfield or the runway stated by the remaining witnesses. Instead of these. they show rugged, hilly, undulating country. In my opinion, the second (Photograph, (AppR) also goes definitely against the findings of my colleagues.

The third Photograph, (AppS) does not whow any coffin whatsoever, as stated by the Colonel. It shows a white background, which, I regret, I am unable to understand what it could possibly signify. If this photograph has been relied upon by my colleagues, in coming to their finding, I would humbly state that it is absured ..

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absurd.

In the fourth Photograph, (AppT), there is no coffin either and if the person shown sitting on the chair, be said to be Col.Rahman, I would not protest against it, as I have the not been able to recognise him. In my opinion again, this photograph does and cannot support the findings of my colleagues.

If these be the sole photographic records to prove the story of the plane crash or of Netaji's death, I am definitely of opinion that not only has there been a miserable failure, but it goes much further and proves that both the plane crash and Netaji's death are false. The Japanese are alleged to have made over all these four photographs to Col. Rahman. If the plane did crash, as stated by the witnesses, though in a highly discrepant and contradictory manner, the two photographs, (AppQaR) should have shown something that would tally with the statements of the witnesses and not something totally different. If Netaji had received injuries and burns, as a result of that plane crash and had been treated in a hospital and if he had actually died there and if his dead body had been cremated, the Japanese Government, for warding off any calumny or treachery, that may have been suggested against them, if not for anything else, would have decidedly taken pains to maintain correct and detailed photographic records of the true incident for the satisfaction of the Indian people, for the Japanese nation and for the world at large and would have thereby prevented any indignity or slander to themselves or to their Government, with regard to the gruesome tragedy, alleged to have be-fallen a great Indian Leader and Revolutionary, An International Figure and their Most Esteemed Friend and Ally, while under their care and com-- panionship and as Mr.M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister of Japan, was pleased to remark during our first interview with him in early May last, soon after our arrival in Tokyo, as the "Greatest Asiatic Hero of the Age". I am definitely of opinion that no

better photographs than these four could be available to the Japanese Government, as a plane crashing with Netaji in it, as Netaji with injuries and burns near a crashed plane, as Netaji being treated in a hospital for those injuries and burns, as a dead Netaji in a hospital, as the dead body of Netaji being placed in a coffin and as the dead body of Netaji being cremated and being put inside a furnace of a crematorium were not available to the Japanese Government for being photographed and therefore, it was not possible for them to obtain these photographs. If, on the other hand, it was possi--ble for them to get such an opportunity, they would decidedly have taken, preserved and proclaimed the same, in support of the truth of Netaji's death, if it had actually taken place. In the absence of any such photograph or any reliable evidence, my firm conviction is that the aircraft accident did not take place and therefore, Netaji did not die, as alleged. COL. RAHMAN'S CONDUCT & ANTECEDENTS.
As has been stated earlier, my colleagues appear to

have accepted the opinion of Shri Sastri and the deposition of Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto) that the plane, soon after taking off, attained a maximum height of about 40 metres and immedia--tly hit the ground near about the runway and without any damage to itself, came back to its normal position, or in other words, "Belly-landed". They consequently disbelieved the story of the other witnesses and also the version of Col. Rahman, Wiz., that after being 5 or 6 minutes in the air, and after the plane had attained a height of more than 1,000 feet and while it was still gaining height, he heared a deafening noise as if a cannon shell from an enemy plane had hit the starboard side of their plane, when it started wobbling, then nose-dived and crashed on plain open land at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield. As I have not been given the report of my colleagues, I am not in a position to know the reasons given by them for disbelieving the Colonel or whether they have stated the reasons or the circumstances, which compelled the Colonel to make such statements. In any

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case, they have challenged his veracity, or in plain language, branded him as a liar, obviously, without offering any explanation for the same.

In my humble opinion, the statements made by the Colonel, whatever they are, are in accordance with the instructions, which, I am convined, he had secretly received from and with the sole intention of protecting his "Beloved Leader" in his excape to a safe zone, which was beyond the reach of the victorious Anglo-Americans and the Colonel had, therefore, amply justified the confidence and trust his leader had placed in him.

Col.Rahman was selected by Netaji from the last six of his trusted and loyal followers, whom he desired to take with him to Russia via Manchuria for helping him in his work there for the independence of India. In a way, he was Netaji's first choice from the whole of his administration, both civil and military. It, therefore, naturally follows that Netaji considered to be his most reliable follower, in whom he could repose his trust, confidence and secrets, who would not disclose them under all trials and tribulations, who would implicately obey all his commands and instructions and who would ever remain loyal to him.

His family connections are exceedingly good. He be belongs to an aristocratic family; his father was Raja Mansur Ahmed Khan. They belong to the famous military clan of Chib Rajputs and from his great grandfather downwards, have loyally served in the British Indian Army, with whom he was in the last Burma Campaign. When they surrendered to the Japanese There in early 1942, his rank was that of a Captain. He duly joined the I.N.A. and his first appointment in it was commandant, Officers' Training School, which gives an idea of his worth. His work appears to have been appreciated by Netaji, who made

him Deputy Chief of Staff in early 1944 and which post he held till 15.8.45, when Netaji brought him away to accompany him to an "Unknown Destination". He was always in close touch with Netaji and had accompanied him in his visits to Tokyo and to other places. In the British and American Intelligence Reports, it appears that he was praised for his bravery, resourcefulness and loyalty as a British Indian Army Officer. It also transpires from these reports, that he was interrogated several times by different enquiring officers soon after Netaji's failure in his military campaign against the Anglo-Americans, as he was expec--ted to give the maximum information regarding Netaji, being the only Indian to have accompanied him the farthest, and as they were not getting the requisite information from him they had expected of him and which they believed he knew. The main trend of their enquiry was to get some clue regarding Netaji's whereabouts, as their reports show that they were not convinced that Netaji had died, as had been announced by the Japanese and that they believed that it was a hoax and that Netaji was living and hiding somewhere. Eventually they compelled to confess, that this officer, due to his attachment p to his leader, had not disclosed truthfully all that he knew, that he had intentionally withheld certain facts, he was in a position to know and that he had intentionally made certain statements, which appeared to them not to be correct. I am, therefore, convinced that Col. Habibur Rahman would state only what he was ordered by Netaji to state and that he could not under any circumstances state any thing that would go against the interest of his beloved and respected leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.

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AFTER THE CRASH TO HOSPITAL.
A careful consideration of the evidence on record, from
the very beginning up to the crashing of the plane, has resulted
in the definite conclusion that the Aircraft Accident did not
take place.

It is now to be seen what conclusion could be arrived at from an examination of the remaining evidence that has been adduced and it would commence with what took place immediately after the crash. I have already held that as there were no seats in the plane and as all the passengers had squatted on the floor. all of them together with the baggage would have been hurled headlong into the cockpit or against any other obstruction in the front portion of the plane, during the period when the plane was nose-diving and decidedly after the sudden impact due to the plane crashing on the ground with disastrous consequences also to the inmates themselves. However, Col. Rahman, remains slightly injured to continue his story, that even after the crash, all of them were still pinned up to their seats on the floor and the baggage also remained midway in the plane to jain the only door and exit of the plane, where there was no fire, and so he advised Netaji to get out of the plane through the fire in front, as the tail and wings, all being attached to the plane left no opening in the rear. Netaji accordingly got out of the plane through a split that had been caused in the front and through fire and he also did so in a similar manner. On getting out of the plane, he saw Netaji standing about ten yards ahead of him with his clothes on fire and he experienced great difficulty in unfastening Netaji's Bush-shirt belt, as he was not wearing a woollen sweater, but, as his trousers were not so much on fire, it was not necessary to take them off. He laid Netaji on the ground, when he noticed a very deep cut on Netaji's head, about 4" long, bleeding profusely and whose face was scorched by heat and whose hair, had also caught fire and was singed. Netaji then told him that he would not survive

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and so gave the Colonel a message for his countrymen. This version has not only not been corroborated by the other witnesses but they have also given new stories, also different from each other. Considering the nature of injuries received by Netaji, barring the deep profusely-bleeding cut on his head, which has not been stated by the other witnesses, or, surprisingly so, also not by the 2 Doctors, who alleged to have taken all possible measures for no less than 6 hours to save his life, the nature of his injuries would reduce themselves only to burns, the nature of which, as stated by the Colonel could not surely bring about death and who that within the space of about 6 hours. He then laid down by Netaji's side and after 15 on 20 minutes, an ambulance and lorry arrived with a few Japanese nurses. Both of them were then laid on the floor of the lorry and were the first to be rushed to the nearest Air-force Emergency Hospital.

Capt. ARAI has stated that after the plane crashed, he was tossed out of the plane and became almost senseless. Soon after he saw Lt.Col. T.Sakai running round the wrecked plane, shouting "Shedei! Shedei! " He was the first tobe taken to the Hospital in a motor vehicle.

Major TAKAHASHI also stated to have lost consciousness after the plane had crashed, but, after regaining the same, he found himself lying on the ground near the plane and as he was injured in his ankle, he could not walk and so crawled up to Col. NONOGAKI, where he was told that both Netaji and Gen. Shidei were still in the plane. After some time, he saw Netaji get out from the left front portion of the plane with his clothes on fire and trying to take off his coat, when he went up and caught hold of Netaji's legs with a request to be dedown and roll on the ground, in which manner, they put out the fire on his clothes, which remained on him, as only patches of the clothes on the upper part of his body were burnt and as his trousers were slightly burnt. A military truck came

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and carried away Mr. Bose. He was the last to be taken from the place of accident to the Hospital in a lorry. As the plane had crashed on its nose, Gen. Shidei and all the members of the crew were killed inside the plane.

Col. NONOGAKI stated that he was thrown and of the plane and he took cover behind a pile of stones and sand, against which the damaged plane came to a halt. He first saw Netaji standing near the left wing of the plane, with his clothes on fire and Col. Rahman taking off Netaji's coat, but who was finding difficulty in taking off Netaji's woolle-n Sweater, & which as stated by the Colonel and other witnesses, Netaji did not wear. Netaji was stripped of all his clothes in the aerodrome and when he w saw Netajimmi arrived at the Hospital, he was absolutely naked and had nothing on him. The Colonel then went to a car waiting there, where he saw Major Kono and both of them were the first to be taken to the Hospital in it. He saw other lorries and cars arrive at the scene of accident in quick succession. After both of them had arrived at the Hospital, he saw Netaji arrive there in a peculiar vehicle known as "SHIDOSHA", which is used for starting the aeroplane propeller.

Major KONO has narrated a new story, Viz., that after the plane crashed, he broke open the plastic cover on the top of the plane and escaped through it and that the tail had broken off from the plane. Petrol sphashed on him, when he was getting out of the plane and as his clothes caught fire, he rolled on the ground and put it out. After a fe-w minutes, he saw Mr. Bose standing erect and completely naked near the plane. He was about 30 minut metres from the plane, when Col.Nonogaki asked him to get away from the plane as far as he could, as the ammunition in the plane might explode. He then saw 4 or 5 lorries, 1 or 2 cars and a "SHIDOSHA" arrive and attack that some of the aerodrome staff lifted

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him up bodily into the "SHIDOSHA" and took him away to the Hospital.

In his written statement, Lt. Col. T. SAKAT has been very brief, viz., that "A rescue group from the Airfield carried us in a truck to the Army Hospital". Even this short statement is different from those made by the other witnesses. The Ground Engineer, Capt. NAKAMURA, who had certified that the plane was quite alright and had allowed to take off, was standing close by. According to him, the plane crashed, immediately after taking off. He at once jumped on to the "SHIDOSHA" waiting near him and rushed to the place of crash and was followed by 30 of his men, who were also there. They could not go near the plane, as ammunition inside it was going off. He is definite that the whole of the plane was intact and that no part of it was broken and as the front portion of the plane was on fire, they rescued the passengers through a normal Boor of the plane, which he showed as A in his Sketch II (App X) and all his men were concentrated in front of that door. Mr. Bose was the last person to come and he did so by walking out of the plane. The Engineer continued that when Mr. Bose was a few yerds off from the plane, Col.Rahman shouted "Bose Kakka," (meaning Excellency) "Bose Kakka," and he then saw that Mr. Bose was within the reach of the flames and as his clothes had been splashed with petrol, they caught fire. Mr. Bose then lay on the ground, where the Engineer and 3 of his men took off his coat and stripped him of all his clothing. He then had a blanket brought from a sentry doing duty there and wrepping up Mr. Bose, had all the injured persons, including Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman sent to the Hospital in one Army Truck, but as Mr. Bose was severely burnt, he was not laid on the floor of the truck, but he lay stretched out of the thinghs of three of his men, who squatted on the floor of the truck. He also stated that Mr. Bose was not bleeding from any part of his body, but as he was very severely burnt, the skin was falling out, but the hair on his head was not burnt, 5. C. 18m

as he had his cap on. As regards the "SHIDOSHA", he is definitete that it was not taken to the Hospital and it must have
been taken by one of his mento the depot. He is also definite
that only 5 injured persons, viz., Mr. Bose, Col. Rahman,
Lt. Col. Nonogaki, Lt. Col. Sakai an Sergeant Ckhita were
taken to the Hospital in the same truck, This is a nice,
detailed story, making interesting reading, containing a few
improbabilities and absolutely different from the stories
narrated by all the other witnesses.

Another new story, different in some main points from those of others, has been given by Major K. Sakai, who was the Battalion Commender, in charge of the Taihoku Aerodro-- me Defence. According to him, the plane crashed at about 10a.m. i.e., two hours before noon at not at about 2.30 P.M. He saw that the plane had been completely burnt, the left engine buried in the ground, the left wing of the plane broken and lying away from the plane, but the rightwing in tact, He also saw that the tail had also broken and was lying seperated from the plane and that the plane had also broken into two at the place marked 2 or his sketch A(App. Y) and that we the wrecked and broken plane was lying at a distance of 20 to 30 metres from the end of the runway. When he reached the aerodrome at about noon he meet Capt. Nakamura there and who told him that Gen. Shidei and the Pilot were killed inside the plane, but he did not find their dead bodies or remains there and he belived that they were sent to the Hospital with the injured persons.

It is exceedingly strange that all these 8 witnesses, all military officers and educated and respectable gentlemen, should give different versions, regarding the simple questions as to the manner in which Netaji came out of the plane and how he went to the Hospital from the aerodrome. The only conclusion, that could possibly be drawn from this, is, that, as it did not actually take place, each of them stated whatever came upper most in his mind. This, therefore, supports the conclusion arrived at above that the Aircraft Accident did not take place.

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Except Capt. Nakamura and Major K.Sakai, all the other six persons named above state to have gone to the Hospital for treatment of their injuries or burns.

Their statements in this connection may now be considered.

Col.Rahman statted by stating that about 3 P.M.. after he and Netaji reached the hospital, Netaji was taken to the Operation theatre room, where the Doctor gave him a white transfusion of camphor and which he believed was not blood transfusion. The doctor is repor--ted to have told him that Netaji had a very deep injury and his heart was affected. The Colonel then continued that after Netaji was brought from the Operation Theatre to the general ward, he did not talk much and was not fully conscious and after about an hour, he fell into a complete coma and that about 9 P.M., he expired in the presence of Capt. Ayogi, who, he stated, was the doctor, some Japanese nurses, and English-speaking Japanese civi--lian and himself and not in the presence of the other inmates of the plane, viz., Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Col. Nanogaki, Major Kono and Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who had also been taken to the Hospital for treatment of their injuries.

Hospital gate, from where he walked inside the Hospital and he is definite and has repeated several times that Gen. Shidei was also brought to the Hospital, which has been demied by all the other witnesses, who stated that the General could not get out of the plane and was burnt inside it. The Captain also stated that he was in separate was Kept and he heard from the me muses at about 10 P.M. that Notein from that in which Netaji had expired. He had no personal knowledge about it, nor did he see Netaji's dead body or Netaji at all in the hospital. According to Col. Nonogaki, however Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Major Kono and Lt. Col.T.Sakai along with himself were

Capt. Arai has stated that he was left at the

taken to another hospital at six the same evening, where and they heard about Netaji's death. Major Konok Lt. Col. T. Sakai support this statement also.

Major Takahashi's statements are different, viz., Netaji was first brought to a room, where he and 6 or 7 others were Kept and was then removed somewhere else, that he did not see Netaji's dead body, nor had he personal knowledge about his death. He only heard about it from Col.Nonogaki, who as well as Major Kono and Lt. Col.T. Sakai stated that all of them were removed the same evening to a different Hospital, where they learnt about Netaji's death.

The statements of Col. Nonogaki are again otherwise and to the effect, that he alone was taken to one
room, whereas all the others, including Netaji were taken
to a different room and also that about 6 the same evening,
he, Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Major Kono and Lt. Col.
Sakai were taken to another hospital, where he heard about
Netaji's death.

Major Kono's version is that on reaching the hospital, he was helped by 2 persons and he walked to the ward, where he learnt that Mr. Bose was in the next room, that about 8, the same night, he was taken to another hospital along with others about 20 kilometres or 12 miles off, where he heard about Netaji's death, either on the first or on the second day of his stay there.

It appears from Lt. Col.T.Sakai's written statement that Mr. Bose was lying on a bed opposite to his in the same room of the hospital, that he and some others, who had received slight injuries, were sent to a branch hospital the same evening, where he learnt afterwards that Mr. Bose had died.

IN HOSPITAL AND DEATH.

These are the six persons, who are alleged to have received injuries along with Netaji, and who were also taken along with him to the same hospital for treatment. It is unique that except Col. Rahman, none off the five others had any personal knowledge of Netaji's death, nor had any of them even seen has dead body, though he is said to have died in the same hospital. So, regarding Netaji's death, Col. Rahman's statement remained absolutely uncorroborated, though it could have easily been corroborated by all these five persons.uniess these Under these circumstances, Netaji's death cannot be accepted to have been proved. Moreover, that, though a high-ranking military officer, Lt. Gen. T. Shidei, along with 2 Pilots are alleged to have died instantaneously in that plane crash and though Netaji, the Head of a State recognised by the Japanese Government and also their ally, is alleged to have died only six hours later, as a result of the same crash, no enquiry was made by the Japanese Government nor by any Japanese Officer, as has also been stated by Gert. H. Isayama, witness No. 57, Chief of Staff Formosan Army, which creates a good deal of reasonable suspicion about this alleged incident.

The evidence of the two Japanese doctors and the two nursing orderlies, attached to that many hespital and who have been examined by us, may now be considered. Dr. T. Yoshimi, witness No. 48, is said to have been the Medical Officer in Charge of the Nanmon Military Hospital, where Dr. T. Tsuruta, witness No. 39, was one of the Medical Officers, and Messrs. M. Mitsuikazuo and M. Miyoshi were two Medical Orderlies, witnesses Nos. 54 and and 59 respectively. Stating

Dr. Yoshimi started that at about 2.30 P.M. on 18.8.45, a 'Shidosha', carrying Mr. Bose alone, arrived

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at the Hospital, followed by oc car occupied only by a staff officer of the Military Headquarters in Formosa and then by a lorry carrying 12 or 13 injuried persons and that Mr. Bose, who was lying absolutely naked on a bed in the 'Shidosha', was brought into the Hospital on a stretcher. Where he examined Mr. Bose in the Dressing Room and not in the Operation Theatre, he found that Mr. Bose's burns were of the severest, third degree. type, but there was no injury in any part of his body, from which blood came out. With He had high fever and his heart was weak. Dr. Tsuruta applied white ointment on the burns, which were all over his body and bandaged them and while this was being done, he gave him one after the other, for his heart, four injections of vitacamphor, two injections of Digitamine and three injections of Ringer's solution. He also let out about 200 c.c. of blood and transfused about \$ 400 c.c. of blood, which he obtained from a Japanese soldier there. He was then given Sulfanomide injection to prevent infection. He then went to attend to the other injured persons, leaving Dr. Tsuruta in charge of Mr. Bose, during whose treatment and even later, the following persons were present, fiz., Mr. Nakamura, witness No. 55, the Chief Nurse and another nurse, both Japanese and Col. Rahman. As he did not consider Mr. Bose's case to be satisfactory, he instructed Dr. Tsuruta to give him Vita-Camphor injections every half an hour. During this period, he paid occa--ssional visits to Mr. Bose, whom he found talking in a low tone to Col. Rahman. At 7 or 7.30 P.M., Dr. Tsuruta informed him that Mr. Bose's condition had deteriorated and his pulse was very weak. He immediately started giving him injections of Vita-Camphor and Digitamine, but to no effect and shortly after 8 P.M., Mr. Bose breathed his last. He then tried artificial respiration, but that was also of no use. At the time of his death, he, Dr.

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Dr. Tsuruta, Mr. Nakamura, those two Japanese nurses, Col Rahman, one Military Policeman and Col. Nonogaki were present. He then conveyed the said news over the phone to the formosan Army Military Headquarters, from where two staff officers, the Adjutant to the Commander--in-Chief, several other ap persons and a platoon of military guard arrifed the same night. Mr. Bose's dead body was then removed to a corner of the same room and a screen was put in front of the body. He also stated that the Assistant Pilot, sub-officer Aoyagi and the Pilot, the condition of both of whom was serious, were also brought to his hop hsopital, where after being treated for about 3 days, they were sent to another hospital, where, he heard, they died, but this his been contradicted by almost all the other witness, who stated that both of them died inside the plane.

The statements of Dr. Tsuruta are different one some important points, According to him, on 18.8.45 at about 3 P.M., about a dozenin injured persons, including Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman, arrived the hospital in a truck and all of them were carried to the Dressing Room and they were attended to there, while they were lying on their stretchers and after having been dressed, all the Japanese were removed to one room and Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman were sent to another room and for privacy, a screen was put round Mr. Bose's bed. When Mr. Bose was first brought to the Dressing room, both the doctors attended on him and his burns, which were of the severest type, were smeared with white ointment and were then bandaged. Later on, he was removed to the Ward, where an injection of Ringer's solution and after that, injections of ar Cardiotonica and Sulfonamide were given him. To the best of his recollection, no other injection or blood transfusion was given him, nor was his blood let

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out. A Japanese Military Police soldier was put on as a guard over him, He was present all the time in Netaji's room and Dr. Yoshimi paid occasional visits and there was no whole time nurse on duty in his room. At about 7 P.M., his condition sudden ly took a turn for the worse, when they gave him injections for the heart, but to no effect and he experied between 7 and 8 P.M., when both the doctors, Col. Rahman, Mr. Nakamura, the Military Police guard and two nurses were present. The Chief nurse, a Japanese and two other nurses from Okinawa and not from Formosa, occasionally attended on him. His body remained on his bed and at the same place for the whole of the night.

Medical Orderly, Mr. M. Kazuo, gives another ver--sion, viz., that all the injurted persons arrived at about 2 P.M. at the hospital in a military truck and in a car, called 'Joyosha' in Japanese. He rang the alarm bell and 20 medical orderlies collected near the vehicles with 4 or 5 stretchers. The *first injured person taken to the hospital was Major Kono, whom he carried on his back, because he was not so seriously injured, though it was seen to have been so. When he returned to the vehicles, he saw a great big man, non-Japanese, evidently, Mr. Bose, lying on a stretcher, wearing the full uniform of a light brown colour, resembling that of an Airforce Officer, which wholly contradicts the statements of the other witnesses, who stated that he was absolutely naked. The buttoms of his tunic were open and the front portion of his trousers was ki slit open with a pair of scissors to expose the burns on his legs. His clothes were taken off and he was made to wear hospital uniform. Dro Dr. Yoshimi applied white ointment on his burns and bandaged them and he only helped in bringing the medicines etc. He had no other injury except burns and he had no

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no hair on his head. On reaching the Hospital, Mr. Bose, Col. Rahman, Lt. Col Sakai, Major Kono, Sub-Officer Aoyagi and Sergeant Okita were taken straight from the vechicles to their beds in the ward, where he alone was posted on day and night duty and after their injuries had been attended to, no other orderly or nurse was in that room. Dr. Yoshimi visited Mr. Bose every half an hour and he saw Dr. Tsuruta come to the ward with the other doctor, but did not see him again. So, according to this witness, Dr. Tsuruta did not attend on Mr. Bose at all. Later on, the witness stated that out of the 3 or 4 nurses, who were present, when Mr. Bose was dressed in the first instance, one of them was from Formosa. Mr. Nakamura talked to Mr. Bose at times. The doctor gave Mr. Bose a number of injections. At about 9 P.M., the doctor noticed that his pulse had become very weak and he expired at 9.30 P.M., when he, Dr. Yoshima, Miss Ctake, a Japanese purse, Col. Rahman and Mr. Nakamura were present. It is strange that this witness gives a story quite different from those of the others and none of them states about the 4" long deep cut, profusely--bleeding injury on Netaji's head, as kix has been stated by Col. Rahman.

The other Medical Orderly Mr. M. Miyoshi, though on duty at the Hospital at that time, has stated nothing that has been stated by the two doctors or by the other Medical Orderly. It has not been explained either, as to how this could happen. His deposition has been dealt with in an early part of this report under the heading, "Volunteer Witnesses".

Mr. J.Nakamura deposed that on the evening of 18.8.45, he was taken to the Hospital, as he knew English and had to interpret into Japanese to the Hospital staff, what Mr. Bose said or wanted. He was brought to

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a large room, where he saw Mr. Bose, bandaged all over and lying on a bed, which was screened off and with Col. Rahman and 3 other Japanese officers lying on their respective beds and all of whom, he was told, were injured in a plane crash. When he came near Mr. Bose's bed, he heard him speak to Col. Rahman in a low voice, asking him to take care of his men, who were following him to Formosa. After about an hour, he asked the Colonel about Gen. Shidei and after half an hour or so, he said that books blood was rushing to his head from his waist. Soon after 9 or 9.30 P.M., Netaji's last words were "I want to sleep". He then started snoring and after ten minutes or a little more', "his head fell forward towards the chest and that was the last" and at that time, he, Dr. Yoshimi, Col. Rahman and 6 or 7 soldiers, including Medical Orderlies were present. There was no nurse or anybody else in that room at that time. After Netaji's death, all the Japanese stood up and saluted and Col. Rahman knelt by Netaji's bed and prayed twice. After he prayed for about quarter of an hour, he left for home. It will thus be seen that a fresh witness narrates a new story and which, appears to have been the rule, rather than the exception.

Another person, who is in a position to say something in this connection, is Shri Harin Shah, witness No.9, a journalist with several high connections in his line. He stated that in November, 1945, he went to China as a War Correspondent on behalf of the Free Press of India News Agency of Bombay. In August, 1946, the Chinese Government at Nanking requested him and a number of prominent foreign correspondents to visit Formosa, which they had taken over from the surrendering Japanese authorities. While they were at Shanghai, on their way to Formosa, two Indian businessmen asked him whether he would enquire about the reported death of Netaji there. This idea

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stuck him and he made up his mind to do so. They accordingly reached Taihoku on 30.8.46 and after contacting the local high officials there, came approacross sister Tsan Pi Sha, a Formosan nurse, who told him that she had attended on 'Mr. Chandra Bose' in the Military Hospital at Taihoku on 18.8.45. Excerpts from her story to Shri Shah are as follows . "She wated worked in Operation Theatre. Netaji was treated in the medical ward. He was brought to the hospital about noon of August 18 and at 11 in the same night he stayed about 11 hours in the hospital there was an A.D.C. with Netaji, tall man with beard three other men (Japanese Officers) were burnt and admitted with Netaji. These three Japanese Officers died after 3 days details about the injuries to Netaji were not known to her. After the Netaji's death, the body was put in a wooden box and put in a truck, There is a house, called a temple, inside the Hospital compound, where dead bodies are taken for rites. Netaji's body was taken to that house After the death, Netaji's body was taken to the & temple, stated above and kept there for 3 days according to the Japanese Budhirst Customs, after being removed from the Hospital he had a military uniform only, nothing else. Netaji was placed in the medical ward, which was converted for surgical purpose. She is a Surgical nurse and took care of Netaji till he died Netaji was burnt all over the body, only olive oil was applied he was unconscious As he was very severely burnt, there was no place where injections could be given. Just before death he seemed to groan and seemed to her to say 'quiet death' Netaji's bed was kept in a corner of the room and Habibur Rahman's bed was close to Netaji's bed. There were three beds; Netaji's bed, was kept in Habibur Rahman's bed and third bed was for the Nurse".

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The Chairman tried to bring this mass nurse to Tokyo, but having failed to do so, he tried to get her written statement, I regret in I have no knowledge whether he met with success or not. In any case, this piece of evidence from a nurse, who states to have attended on Netaji and taken care of him till he died, is also enough to furnish an additional confirmation of my finding that Netaji did not die, as alleged by the witnesses.

Witness No. 21, Col. H.L. Chopra, who held an important position in the I.N.A. has stated that at Bangkok on the afternoon of 18.8.45, Major Ran Singh also of the I.N.A. informed him that a message had been received that Netaji had been killed in an air crash, though the evidence generally on record is that death took place between 8 and 9 P.M. but Major S. Nagatomo witness No. 50 has stated that, as second Adjutant in the Army Headquarters at Taihoku, he received a series of telephone message from the aerodrome and subsequently from the Hospital about the plane crash, injuries to Netaji, his treatment in the Hospital and subsequent death, which news he received at about 3 P.M., after which the Army Commander Gen. Ando went to the hospital and saw Netaji's dead body within 4 P.M. and he saw the dead body also within 5 P.M.

In my opinion, the evidence, regarding Netaji's injuries, his treatment in the hospital and his death there, as obtained also from the two Medical Officers, one nursing Orderly and a Formosan nurse, all said to have been attached to that hospital and who are alleged to have attended on Netaji, is so discrepant and contradictory, that no reliance can be placed on the same and what they stated has been fabricated and because narration of a true incident, even after a lapse of ten

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As the injuries alleged to have been received by Netaji an alleged plane crash, and also his alleged death as a result of as a result of those alleged injuries have not been woulden established in any way and as such evidence only proves that those alleged incidents did not take place, but they which were concocted to support the secret plan of the Japanese as well as of Netaji to announce that Netaji had died. I am convinced that these are additional confirmations of my finding, already arrived at, that the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place.

There is a very interesting feature about the photograph, which Col. Rahman stated was taken by a Photographer sent by the Military Headquarters at Taihoku on the morning of 20.8.45. No explanation has been given anywhere why the photographer was not sent on 18.8.45 or 19.8.45. He admitted that the lid of the coffin was removed, the body was uncovered, the face was expen and he could recognise the face, and a photo of the body inside the coffin, but excluding the face, was taken along with him sitting by the side of that coffin. asked the photographer to exclude the face, as it was distingu disfigured and which was evidently done. would mean that the photograph of the whole of the coffin was not taken. If the photograph of the face was not taken, it is not understood with what intention or idea or utility the face was excluded in the photograph. Then again, the Colonel stated that he sent a copy of this photograph to the Committee, but as they have not sent me that photograph, or as a matter of fact, any other photograph or sketch or other relevent papers, it is not within my knowledge whether the Chairman actually received that photograph or not. The newspapers have not published any such photograph. What I have seen, is one in which Col. Rahman is said to be sitting S, C. Im

on a chair with some parts of his body in bandages and in front of something said to be an urn. In my opinion, the real necessity for this photograph would be to prove that Netaji was dead and that his dead body would be sown shown inside a coffin. As I can in no way be satisfied for the exclusion of Netaji's face in that photograph, the fact of its exclusion makes me believe that the body shounin the photograph was not that of Netaji and it would at the same time confirm my conviction that as Netaji did not die, his dead body was not available for being photographed. The Japanese proclaimed to the World that Netaji was dead. If they had any intention of confirming the truth of what they had proclaimed, a photographic print of Netaji's dead body would have been the best unfailing proof of the same, and which could not possibly have been challenged and so they would decidedly have taken a photograph of Netajils dead body and shown it to the world. Col. Rahman stated that they took a photograph of his dead body, but the exclusion of his face in it, which is something very ridiculous, would convince anybody that, as Netaji was notex not dead, his dead body could not possibly be available for being photographed and if a photograph had been taken of a dead body without a face, it could have been somebody else's body or nobody at all. This also goes to confirm my opinion that Netaji did not die, as alleged.

The next important stage in the evidence would be the cremetion. As the evidence on record regarding the aircraft accident, the injuries received by Netaji, his treatment in the hospital and his death therente have been such as to come to the only conclusion that they are all concocted and false, the evidence regarding cremetion should be considered very carefully and a conclusion arrived at accordingly.

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According to Col. Rahman, the coffin was put in a Military lorry or ambulance on 20.8.45 and in front of which was a car occupied by Japanese Officers and behind the coffin, were two lorries full of Japanese soldiers and hospital staff, followed by their cars, carring officers. Mr. J. Nakamura stated that 20.8.45 coffin was carried in an ambulance, which was accompanied by only 2 or 3 cars, containing # 5 or 6 civilians and military officers and which was deliberately done, to keep the news of Netaji's death a secret and to keep it confined only to high ranking military officers. Major Nagatomo, the second Adjutant in the Army Headquarters at Taihoku, stated that he was put in charge of making arrangements for the cremation. As has been rule, as stated before, he has come forward with ax new story and starting with it, he has given the date as 19.8.45 and not 20.8.45 as stated by the other two witnesses, when, soon after mid-day, after paying due respects to Netaji's Body inside the coffin he closed the lid, nailed it and had it placed in the middle of a military truck with 12 soldiers all around it. Col. Rahman, Mr. Nakamura and he got into a car and went direct to the crematorium with the truck following them. There were 3 furnaces or incinerators in the crematorium, as shown in his sketch A, (App Z) and after opening the door of furnace no. I, which was in the middle, the sliding plate was pulled out and the coffin, containing the dead body was placed on it and pushed back into the furnace, because it is customary with the Japanese to cremate xxx the body in the coffin. They then went behind the furnace and lit the fire, after which, he came to the front and after locking the furnace door, he took the key with him and all three of them went away in the same car. Next day, at about 8 A.M., all three of them came to the crematorium and after unlocking the furnace door with

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plate and according to Buddhist Custom, he picked up first the throat bone with a pair of chop sticks and placed it inside a wooden box, 8" cube, which he had taken with him. He then picked a bone from every portion of the body and placed them in that box. Col. Rahman then did the same and after the whole of that box was filled up, the lid was nailed and after wrapping it in white cloth, it was hung from neck of Col. Rahman and all three of them went in the car to Nishi(West) Honganji Tample, for depositing the same there, after due ceremony.

According to Col. Rahman, however, after they had reached the crematorium, coffin was unloaded from the lorry by the Japanese soldiers and excert and placed outside the entrance to the crematorium, where the body was taken out of the coffin by the Japanese and taken inside, where there were 12 to 14 in cinerators in two rows and the body, taken out of the coffin already, was placed inside the chamber just near passage, As the fire was burning under neath, he locked furnace door and kept the key over--night with him and left for the hospital. Next morning, viz., on 21.8.45 and not on 20.8.45, he went to the Crematorium with Mr. Nakamura and 1 or 2 other Japanese and opened the lock of the furnace door with the key was with him and they collected some ashes from the headside, nearest to the door and placed them in the urn and this included a piece of gold, which, he said was the filling of eur Netaji's teeth. They then went to a Japanese Temple outside Taihoku town, where they deposited the urn and where Japanese priests were praying, according to arrangements that had been fixed up earlier.

Mr. Nakamura has marrated a fairly lengthy story, viz., that when he reached the crematorium, he found about 15 Japanese soldiers already there, who unloaded the coffin

from the ambulance and taking it inside, placed it, viz., the coffin, inside the only furnace in the crematorium, which he has shown in his sketch B(App a) and not 3 or 12 or 14 furnaces, as has been stated by the other two witnesses. The soldiers there, returned outside the crematorium, where he, Col. Rahman and the others were waiting and reported to them what they had done. Then, all five of them, led by Col. Rahman, entered the crematorium and stood in front of the furnace door and saluted and paid their respects to the dead body. They then went behind the furnace, where a priest was standing with burning incense sticks in his hand, one of which he offered to the Colonel, who could not catch, with his fingers, as they were bandaged. He took it and made the wir Colonel hold it between the edge of his palms and helped him in placing it in the hole at the rear of the furnace. He and the others also put in burning incense sticks through the same hole. All of them came out of crematorium and he went home in a sepe-- rate car. On the following day, (21.8.45), he arrived at the crematorium at about hoon and found Col. Rahman already there with 15 soldiers and some high ranking Officers. A crematorium employer asked them to come in, which they did, Col. Rahman leading them. The employee open the furnace door, pulled out sliding tray. A priest brought chop sticks and as the Colonel could not hold the same, he did so and picked up first the throat bone, then the lower jaw bone and after that, other bones & placed them inside on urn & Col. Rahman touched the upper part of the chop sticks held by him only twice. A Japanese Military Officer then picked up bones and ashes and after the urn was filled up, he carried the urn from sling hung round his neck, as the Colonel's neck was burnt and bandaged. Both of them and nobody else, then went to Nishi(West) Hogganji Temple, which was near the hospital and handed over

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the urn to the head priest there. There he saw another urn, which the priest told him contained the ashes of Gen. Shidei. He then went home and the Colonel returned to the hospital.

It will thus be seen that these 3 witnesses have given 3 versions, different from one another on many salient points and which all go to slow and confirm that the story of cremation narated by them is a myth and did not take place at all. Therefore, after a careful consideration of the evidence that has been discussed above, I am fully satisfied that the aircraft accident and all the incidents, subsequent to it, viz., the injuries to Netaji resembling therefrom, his treatment in the hospital, his death there and the cremation of his dead body, as stated by the witnesses, did not take place and are decidedly false and vice-versa, due to these incidents not having taken place, the evidence adduced is necessarily contradictory and highly discrepant and of a nature which are rarely comes across.

The ashes now held at Rankoji temple in Tokyo, cannot, therefore, be those of Netaji and it is for the same reason that the evidence regarding the same from its transfer from a Temple in or near Taihoku to its final destination in Tokyo after passing through the same from hands and through different channels, is also so discrepant and therefore that evidence is unbelievable and unreliable.

It has come to my knowledge from reports publi-shed, that my colleagues have held that those ashes are
those of Netaji and they have recommended that the they
be brought to India with due pomp and ceremony, so that
suitable memorials may be held throughout the country
over the same. I would assert in the strongest terms

that I am firmly convinced that the evidence on record would lead to the only conclusion that the Aircraft Accident and the incidents subsequent to that, as stated above, did not take place and that the evidence adduced thereon is concocted and false and I am confident that any person without any bias or prejudice will also come to the same conclusion. I would accordingly state that there is no justification whatsoever for holding that these ashes are of Netaji and, therefore, www our Government should refrain from taking any step that would help in bringing those ashes to India, as Netaji's ashes. I would humbly suggest that if our Government is so very eager to spend ding money for erecting memorials in Netaji's name through--out the country, they could do so in various ways, including constructive ones, that would materially help our poor and deserving countrymen. I am constrained to say that it is shameful on the part of a Government to commemorate Netaji's name now, by spending money over what they believe to be his ashes, when up till now, they have given him practically no recognition even in ways, that would not have cost them even a copper.

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COL. RAHMAN'S STATEMENTS d/24.8.45 TO SHRI J.MURTI.

Before concluding this report, it would be necessary to refer certain points which are fairly important, but, at the same time, rather interesting.

Some of the statements made by Col. Habibur Rahman to different persons, at different places and at different times are being considered, first, and they may be compared with this statements before the Committee and which have already been discussed in this report. Excepts from the statements made by him at Taihoku on 24.8.45 and which he left with Shri Jaya Murti, witness no 36, at Tokyo, are, as follows:

"....At 14.35 hrs. the plane took off. It. had not yet gained much height and was within the outskirts of the air--field when a loud report like that of an explosion was heard from the front. In actual fact, one of the propellers of the aeroplane had broken. Immediately the plane crashed on the ground and it caught fire both in the front and in the rear. At the time of the accident Netaji's position in the aeroplane was as follows On his immediate right was the petrol tank Netaji got out of the plame from the left side from the front As soon as I got out I saw that Netaji's clothes were on fire, from head to foot he had sustained severe burns on his body in addition to serious head injuries within 15 minutes we were rushed to the nearest Nippon Army Hospital, but he unfortunately expired at 21.00 hrs.(T.T.)prior to his death he was in his senses prior to his death he asked me to convey a message from him to our countrymen to the following effect :- "I have fought to the last for India's Independence and now am giving my life in the same attempt. Countrymen ! continue the Independence fight. Before long India will be free. Long live Azad Hind. the body was cremeted on 22.8.45 at Taihoku Taihoku, Taiwan, 24.8.45 Sd. Habibur Rahman, Colonel. "

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Then in the evening of 8.9.45, at the house of Mrs. A.M. Sahay in Tokyo, Col. Rahman narrated to Mrs. Sahay and Shri S.A. Iyer, a story, which has been recorded in Shri Tyer's book "Unto him a witness" in pages 112 to 114, excerpts of which, are :- "..... It was 2.35 P.M. when the plane took off. We had just cleared the runway and gained two or three hundred feet. We were on the outskirts of the aerodrome. We had been up in the air only a minute or two. Then a sudden deafening noise Actually there was no Exeming enemy plane about. I learnt later that one of the propellers of the port Engine had broken. The port Engine is out of action We are losing height pretty fast And in less than a few seconds the plane crashed on its nose and then everything went dark for a while. When I recovered consciousness after a few seconds, I realised that all the luggage had crashed on top of me and a fire had started in front of me Netaji was injured in the head but he had strugg --ledg to his feet and was about to get out of the plane through the rear So I said to him ' Aagese nikliya Netaji ' (Please get out through the front, Netaji) Wath both his hands he fought his way through the fire. He got out and stood there about ten to fifteen feet away an--xiously looking out for me So he stood with his clothes burning and himself making desperate attempts to unbrickle the belts of his bushcoat and round his waist. I dashed up to him and tried to help him remove the belts my heart nearly stopped when I saw his face, battered by iron and burnt by fire. A few minutes leter he collapsed and lay on the ground I too was exhausted and went and lay down next to him The next thing I knew was that I was lying on a hospital bed next to Netaji Netaji lost consciousness almost immediately after reaching the hospital. He revived a little later and relapsed again into a state of coma The Japanese made superhuman efforts to save Netaji. But it was all in vain, Six hours after he

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was brought into the hospital, i.e., at 9-0 P.M. on 18th
August, Netaji's end came peacefully A few moments
before his end came, he said to me: 'Habib, my end is
coming very soon, I have fought all my life for my country's
freedom. I am dying for my contry's freedom. Go and tell
my countrymen to continue the fight for Indias's freedom.
India will be free and before long '..... The funeral
service with full military honours was held in the Shrine
attached to the hospital and the cremation took place on
the 20th. "

OTHER STATEMENTS & EXCERPTS FROM SECRET REPORTS.
Soon after the surender of the Japanese on 15.3.45
and Netaji's departure from Saigon two days leter, the
British Indian Government, sent Police Officers Shri H. K.
Roy & Shri K.P.Dey, witnesses Nos.14 & 15 respectively, and
others to the Far East for arresting Netaji under the Enemy
Agents' Ordinance. Having failed in their mission, they made
thorough enquiries about his whereabouts and so did the
British and American Military Intelligence Departments Officers.
Extracts from one of those reports, viz., by the Counter
Intelligence Corps, G.H.Q. AFPAC on death of Subhas Chandra
Bose, dated 29th September, 1945 (Tokyo) are:-

-tances of the death of Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Indian National Army, was obtained on 24th September, 1945 through interview of Habib-ur-Rahman, former Deputy Chief of Staff and Aide-de-Camp to Bose, at the Tokyo residence of Ram Murti...... According to Rahman the plane had not gained much altitude after the take-off from Taihoku, when he heard a terrific explosion and felt the plane vibrating violently and the plane crashed at the end of airfield. Rahman stated that he was not rendered unconscious and noticed immediately after the crash that the interior of the plane broke into

flames at the nose and tail. Due to the terrific crash the canopy overhead was broken and it was through this by or instantly killed to opening that those not too seriously injured) escaped from the burning plane. He revealed that he had no know--ledge of how Bose escaped or was removed from the plane. He stated that upon alighting from the plane he noticed his own coat afire. He removed it immediately and then saw Bose lying by the plane with his clothing afire He added that the seat Bose occupied in the aircraft was beside a petrol tank It was later determined that Bose received severe injuries about the head and neck in addition to his severe burns According to Rahman, Bose recovered sufficiently to carry on a conversation and complained of pain in his head Rahman declared at approximately 21.00 hours, 18th August 1945 Bose died of the injuries received in the plane crash..... On 20th August 1945 Bose was removed from the Hospital and his remains were placed in a box provided by the Japanese ... Major (FNU) Nagatome, a Japanese Staff Officer, informed Rahman on 21st August 1945 that the body be cremeted, and Rahman, after careful consideration, agreed. On 22nd August 1945 the ashes were removed by Nakamura and Major Nagatome According to Rahman, photos were taken at the scene of the crash and also at the hospital after the death of Bose. These photos are at present in possession of the "Japanese Waar Office" in Tokyo

It will thus be seen that the first statement was written by Col. Rahman at Taihoku on 24.8.45 i.e., only after 6 days the alleged plane crash, the second was what he personally told Shri S.A. Iyer on 8.9.45 at Tokyo, which was just at the end of the third week after that alleged incident and his third one is contained in the Top Secret Report dated 29.9.45 of the combined

British and American Intelligence Officers, as a result of the information they secured from the Colonel on 24.9.45 at Tokyo. On an examination of these three statements, it would appear there are some discrepancies in them and the impression he has given in them is that the dane was only a minute or two in the air and had not gained much altitude, after which it crashed within the airfield, whereas his statements before the Committee are that the plane reached an altitude of more than 1,000 feet, after being in the air for 5 or 6 minutes and it crahsed at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield. Here, he is reported to have stated that he had no knowledge as to how Netaji escaped or was removed from the plane, whereas, elsewhere, he stated definitely that Netaji rushed out of the plane through fire and he immediately followed him also through the same fire. Here he introduced a new story that his coat was afire, but all his other statements are that his uniform remained untarnished and he admitted having worn the same in that condition for several years after his return to India. As stated here, he saw Netaji lying in the ground with his clothes on fire, but all the other statements of his are that Netaji was standing and after he succeeded in putting out the fire, he made Netaji lie down on the ground. His sketch (App clearly shows that the petrol tank was much below and away from Netaji's seat in the plane and not by his side, as he has stated here. The dates of the alleged cremation of Netaji as stated here and elsewhere are also different.

The information, contained in the Secret Headquarters, Main File 10/Misc/I.N.A., 273/I.N.A.-Subject:-Subhas Chandra Bose, (Extracts bearing on his alleged death) Pages 1 to 40, is worth considering and discloses

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quite a number of facts of varying interests. As it was a very thorough investigation, they started with Netaji's plan of going to Russia and ended with his ashes deposited in Tokyo. I quote below certain extracts from this report.

At Page 10 - Reference B2 dated 5/10/45, it is written "..... Bose had been trying to persuade the Japanese to allow him to go to Manchuria since October, 44. When he told them that they had no chance nd that accordingly of invading India through Burma, and thet accordingly he would prepare to try another road to Delhi via Moscow. Reference should be made to Hikari's telegram at the time Bose arrived in Saigon. Isoda was also there and this fact may be significant that there was any plan on the part of the Hikari - Kikan to allow Bose to escape and to publish a false story regarding his death. This would have been the ideal place for Isoda to put into opera--tion any such plan. If they are part of a colXo--ssal and well executed deception manoeuvere, this file of telegrams along with numerous other documents must have been purposely left for the British to find them. Although at this stage one cannot rule out the possibility of Bose being still alive." This file of telegrams contains four, and the most important one, which gives an idea of the plan "to allow Bose to escape and to publish a false story regarding his death" is as follows :-

"2.0To O.C. Kikap, From: Chief of Staff Southern Army, Souuthern Army Staff II Signal 66, 20th Aug. 'Top Secret' - 'T', while on his way to the capital, as a result of an accident to this aircraft at Taihoku at 14.00 hours on the 18th, was seriously injured, and died at midnight on the same date. His body has been flown to Tokyo by the Formosan Army." It should be stated here

that Netaji was referred to as 'T' in all their secret communications regarding him. As it is difficult to challenge the correctness of the statements, made in this telegram sent by such a high-ranking military officer, regarding such an important person and about his alleged death, viz., that the death took place at midnight and the dead body was flown to Tokyo, it cannot be understood why the evidence adduced before the Committee is in general that death took place at about 9 P.M. and the body was cremated at Taihoku after 2 or 3 days. As regards the statements made by Col. Rahman at different places, this report has said at Page 5, No.C-5, Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi, 19/5/46 that "Habib-ur-Rahman's report is unsatisfactory. The multitude of discrepancies in accounts of the actual aircrash as given first to Ci6" (Combined Intelligence Corps, which I have referred to above) "in Tokyo and later, CSDIC is being taken up. You will understand out pressing anxiety to get the truth of whether Bose is actually and permanently dead. Government wants to know where they stand in the matter in view of the sayings by Gandhi and others in India that he is still alive. Our examination so far only permits us to say unless there was a very cleverly contrieved and executed deception plot, in involving a veryfew of the higherst Japanese Officials, Bose is almost certainly dead."

Shri Dwijendranath Bose and Shri Arobindu Bose have stated before us that, though they helped Nataji in leaving Calcutta secretly on 16/1/41, they declared his departure on 26/1/41, after they received information that he had crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afganisthan and this was in accordance with the instructions Netaji had left with them. They also stated that the

Japanese Government had also done the same and which is borne out by the entries at Page 8 noted below :-

"Extract from Allied Land Forces S.E.A., No. 57 for week ending 2 November 1945. The first news of of the alleged death of Bose was contained in a **Dome**i message from Tokyo dated 23 August 1945. It is stated that he was treated in a hospital in Japan where he succumbed to injuries at midnight on 18/19 August." The death is alleged to have taken place on 18/8/45 and so the reason for the delay in the announcement of the same may agree with that given by the two witnesses named above, but it cannot be explained, as to why the announcement was to the effect that he was treated in a hospital in Japan and that he died there and not at Taihoku, as has been stated before us by all the witnesses, except by the explanation that the question of death is false.

At Page 30, it has been written as follows:"Extract from Top Secret letter No. SLO/CS/1 dated
1.3.46 from C.I.C.B., to A.D. (J)

"My dear Wright,

regarding the disposal of the body. Isoda and the captured signal state that he died at midnight in the Talhoku hospital and that his body was sentent flown to Tokyo by the Formosan Army. Domei, on the other hand, state that he died in Japan, while Habib-ur-Rahman states that he was cremated and buried in Taihoku. The discrepancy here is great and appears suspicions In addition, if it is a deception plan it is one which has been extremely carefully and ingeniously organised......

In conclusion it can be said definitely that Bose left Saigon and probably that there was a plane crash at the take-off at Taihoku. It is possible that Bose escaped

from the crash unburt and either hid in Formosa on his own initiative or was hidden by local authorities who took an adhoc decision

I can think of no other channel which would be worthwhile exploring"

This clearly shows that at the conclusion of the investigation, the suspicion remained that Nataji had escaped and hid himself somewhere and this is therefore strong challenge to the findings of my colleagues that Nætaji was dead.

A letter at Page 32 written just before the one considered above, also arrives at the same conclusion.

"No. C-5, Intelligence Bureau, (H.D.), New Delhi 3, Dated the 19 Feb. 46, Secret,

My dear Young,

We have at last completed an examination of alleged the information available here relating to the death of Bose, and the result is not entirely satisfactory for it reveals many discrepancies which, until clarified, make any definite conclusion on this incident a little doubtful The SACSEA Commission No.1 report dated 6 November, 1945 states:- It is beyond doubt that he (Bose) had plans to go underground together with a number of selected friends of his movement. The ear-lier report from the Commission dated 18 October, 1945, suggested that the Japanese had undertaken to give Bose the necessary protection (to go underground).....

Major Courtenay Young, Yours sincerely,

Major Courtenay Young, Intelligence Division, C.I.C.B., H.G. SACSEA, Singapore.

Yours sincerely, Sd. W. Mck Wright.

The facts elicited from these extracts from Top Secret Reports clearly show that the findings of my colleagues, that the aircraft accident took place and

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that Netaji died, cannot be correct, as British and American Intelligence officers, inspite of thorough investigation in all those areas, soon after Netaji's departure from Saigon on 17/8/45, themselves failed to arrive at that conclusion and had to remain content with the suspicion that Netaji was alive somewhere.

As regards the ashes, this report says at Page 17, "Ashes May Not Be Boses. Second, what happened to his remains? The ashes, supposed to be his, were bought to Tokyo. But ashes don't prove who the dead man is, they might be anybody's or they may not be those of a human being at all" and about the photographs, it has been observed at Page 18, "The above story cannot be taken as final until the photographs stated to have been taken at this spot, and the actual remains of Bose have been examined."

above, the British Indian Police Officers, both British and Indian, as well as British and American Military Intelligence Officers, made thorough investigations and search for Netaji in all the areas, where they thought he could possibly have been, soon after his departure from Saigon on the 17th August, 1945, but inspite of

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their sincere efforts to arrest him under a warrant under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance, which they were armed with, or as a War Criminal, for having waged war against the Victoriaus Allies and, especially, against his King and Emperor, they not only failed to in their mission but were unable to trace his whereabouts. As a result of this frustration, it would ordinarily have been expected of them to report that Netaji died as a result of that aircraft accident, but it is strange, that the result of such vigorous and on-the-spot enquiries, ledits them to come to the finding, that they could not secure conclu-

- -sive evidence that Netaji was dead and that they were left with no other alternative, but to give the final verdict that he was probably living and hiding some-
- -where. I consider myself exceedingly fortunate to have succeded in securing some Top Secret Reports, the findings in which must be admitted by everybody to be very important and exceedingly reliable, and extracts from which, quoted above, fully support my findings, and in my being able to secure a few photographs, sket-
- -ches and other papers, which, along with other important papers, were indispensively necessary for writing my report and which our Government have intentionally withheld from me, for some of the reasons, stated by me already and which, I believe, will be readily understood by my countrymen and others. By the Almighty's Grace and Blessings, I have been able to surmount at least some of the obstructions and hindrances that were intentionally placed in my way by our Government to make it impossible for me to write this report and that He

only has enabled me to fulfil my duty in a humble manner

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and with my limited capabilities, not only to my humble self, but also to my Government and to my esteemed countrymen.

DEATH DENIED, INITIALLY BY CHAIRMAN, THEN BY 14 OTHERS.

The remaining evidence on record is, however, in quite a different strain, viz., that Netaji is not dead. The Chairman made a public announcement recently, that out of about 70 witnesses examined, only four stated that Netaji was not dead for Madres, Dy. Chairman, All India Forward Bloc. fc and they were Shri U.M. Thevar, M.L.A., who was the first to appear before us, Abut, for certain reasons, declined to make any statement and Sarbashri S.M. Goswami, Dwijendranath Bose and Arabundu Bose, the two named last being Netaji's nephews. This number is far from being a correct one. It should be fifteen. It compels me to repeat, that due to His Grace, these fifteen persons were at one time led by no other person that the Chairman of this Committee, who, according to the statement of Shri Arabindu Bose before us on 26.4.56, publicly declared at a meeting near the Octeriony Monument in Calcutta on the 23rd January, 1951, Netaji's Birthday Anniversary, as the main speaker, that Netaji was alave. Evidently with the intention of proving that he did not make such a declaration, he called upon Shri Bose to produce some evidence to prove this allegation against him, whereupon Shri Bose made the following statement on 8.6.56 :- "The Chairman has challenged the veracity of my statement and wanted me to produce some evidence that he actually made that sort of statement. At that time I had told him that thousands and thousands of people would come and bear me out on this point of they were put this question whether Shri Shah Nawaz Khan had made such statement

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in these meetings or not. The Chairman had mentioned whether there were any reports on the same lines in the newspapers. I have gone through the old files of only two Calcutta newspapers, namely, the Hindusthan Standard dated 24th January, 1951 and the Ananda Bazar Patrika dated 25th January, 1951 and have got the following excerpts from the news published in the papers", which are quoted here, viz., Hindusthan Standard (front page), dated 24th January, 1951 - 4..... Said Major General Shah NawazaKhan hoisting the National Flag amidst shouts of Netaji Zindabad', 'Jai Hind' and 'Bonde Mataram'. The General expressed the hope that Netaji would come back in their midst at the time when they would be celebrating his next birthday."

Verbatim tranglation of excerpts from news published in the Ananda Bazar Patrika, dated 25th January, 1951, are: "..... Tumul Bondemataram, Jai Hind abong Netaji Zindabad probhiriti Dhwanir moddhe pataka uttalan karite uthiya Major General Shah Nawaz Khan balen agami bathsar jakhan tahara Netajir 56th janmothsab koriben, takhan tini swayang tahader majhe ekanta bhabe thakiben boliya asha karen."

So the Chairman himself made an announcement in a public meeting in Calcutta on 23.1.51, where more than 100 thousand persons were present, that Netaji was alive. He is now definitely of the ppposite opinion and it may be due to his having received some secret information after 23.1.51 about Netaji's death or it may be due to some other reason.

In addition to the four persons named by the Chairman, the following eleven have also stated before us that Netaji did not die (). Captain Gulzara Singh, Lt. N.B. Das, Mr. Kazo Satoh, Col. Thakur Singh, Set.

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Mr. N. Kita Lawa Gol. H.L. Chopre, Dr. S.N. Dutt, Shrimati Ila Pal Chowhury, and Sarbashri Asiwini Kumar Gupta, Jagadish Chandra Sinha, Narayan Das and Satyendra Nath Sen, out of whom Mr. K. Satoh and Lt. N.B. Das have stated that they saw Netaji take off in a separate plane without Col. Rahman in it and Dr. S.N. Dutt has given very clear and cogent reasons that Netaji is alive. He has very thoughtfully narrated a story from the evidence on record which is certainly worthy of serious consideration. It is "Sherlock Holmes would probably sum up the situation as follows :- At Taihoku, La minor place accident was stage-managed by a deli--berate collision with a boulder. This would support the police officers' statement of having seen the plane under repairs at the airport. Netaji's face was then heavily bandaged up to avoid identification and Col. Rahman's hand was touched with earbolic acid. They were then rushed of to a hospital. During the night, the pilot, the navigator, General Shidei and Netaji, the four 'dead' victims of them crash, left for their destination. In the morning, it was given out at might, locally that Netaji have died and a covered deadbody or an empty coffin was placed in a room in the hospital. Four days later, after the completion of further evidence in support of the plane crash and the news of his safe arrival at his destination, the death of Netaji was announced in a broadcast! Another observation made by him is worth recording here, viz., "1. If he were alive at that time, why did the Japanese Government broadcast his death ? The answer to the first question is that the Japanese Government wanted to curry favour with General MacArthur after the actual surrender. It would have been an act of extreme meanness

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and downright treachery on the part of the Japanese Government to have handed over Netaji, their erstwhile friend and collaborator to the Anglo-Americans - and of this they were incapable as a self-respecting and a cultured nation. The only other alternative therefore was to broadcast his death after he had left, and continue to support it with what manufactured and tutored evidence they could place before the Enquiry Commission. They could not very well say that Netaji had escaped from their territory to an unknown destination, as they would have been accused of aiding and abetting the flight of a man who, in the eyes of the Anglo-Americans, was a wer criminal.

Mr. N. Kitazawa, witness No. 61, was the Deputy of the Japanese Ambassador in Burma at that time. He is a top-ranking Diplomat and a Member of the House of Representatives, Japan. He stated that when the British forces began to advance, the Japanese forces started evacuating from Rangoon on 23.4.45 and Netaji and his party also left Rangoon a day or two later. His Govern-- ment decided to give protection to the Burmese Ministers and so in accordance with their instructions, he accom--panied 6 or 7 Burmese Ministers with their families from Rangoon for taking them to a safe place. Eventually, Dr. Ba Maw, the Prime Minister was taken to Japan and given asylum there. His Government had also decided to give protection to the Heads of all the States that had helped them in the prosecution of the war, viz., Burma, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, the Phillipines, China, Manchuko, Indonesia and Thailand, Accordingly, Mr. Hachiya, the Japanese Minister to Netaji's Government, informed Netaji, that if he wished to seek shelter in Japan, his Government would give him every facility to

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do so. Netaji accepted this proposal and moved away with that intention. On 16.3.45 or 17.3.45, he went to Saigon aerodrome and saw Netaji off from there. He reached Saigon on 5.3.45 and though he stayed at the official residence of the Japanese Ambassador there up to 23.3.45, he received no information and evidently the same with his Ambassador also that Netaji's plane had crashed and Netaji had died at Taihoku on 13.3.45. This is exceedingly unusual and could never be explained, except probably by saying that the incident did not take place. On the other hand, he was informed at Saigon, that Netaji waited to go to Soviet Russia via Manchuko, but he was persuaded by his Government to go to Japan instead.

Shri Aswini Kumar Gupta, witness No.8, who was Joint Editor of the Hindusthan Standard, has stated that in May 1951, when he was on a special assignment in the North Eastern Frontier Agency, he visited Manipur and Nasa Hills area, where he met the great Naga leader, Mr. Phizo, who is in the limelight at the present moment. Mr. Phizo told him that he was informed previous to 13.3.45, that a plane crash involving Netaji would be announced, but he was not to believe it. On another occasion in December 1950 or in January 1951, when he was travelling in the Mishmi Hills area, he saw Netaji's picture in the houses of the Mishmis and he was told by them that at a place called Rima, the Chinese Army had given them news about Netaji and they also knew that Netaji had visited the Naga Hills and other areas. Some Mishmi headman also told him that when they declined the veguest of the Chinese Commanders to help them in making roads, they were told by the Chinese that one of the great Indian leaders was with them. The Chinese

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took some of them to an interior place, where they saw a person in military uniform, resembling Netaji's picture, sitting in a tent. The Chinese Commanders then told them that he was Nataji. On the third occasion, when Shri Gupta was in Kalimpong in October, 1949, he met a Maharashtrian Scholar, probably hold--ing a doctorate degree and who was doing research work there, who saddenly brought out a group photo--graph and showed it to him and asked him whether he knew anybody in that group. He told the scholar that there was one in the group, who resembled Netaji very much, but he was in a closed collar suit and not in military uniform. The scholar then told him that this was the reason why the photograph was shown to him, but on asking him about Netaji's whereabouts, he kept silent. When Shri Gupta was shown the group photograph, facing Page 8 in the book, "Netaji Mystry Revealed" by Shri S.M. Goswami, witness No.16, he said there was oneperson in it, who resembled Netaji, but this was not the group photograph, which he was shown at Kalimpong. Shri Gupta is a respectable and educated gentleman and does not appear to be unusually interested in Netaji and so there is no reason why he would make statements that were not true.

The deposition of Shri S.M. Goswami may now be taken up. He was at one time a Special Officer in the Anti-Corruption Department of West Bengal and is now doing business. He has been making investigations regarding Netaji's whereabouts or otherwise both in Indiax and abroad, during the last few years and has published abook, "Netaji Mystry Revealed". When in 1949, he went to Germany, he met Herr Heins Von Have, who told him that Netaji was alive. This he has written in some details at Pages 11 & 12 of his book, named

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above. At Page 41 of the same book, he has stated about a news that was flashed by the Associated Press from New Delhi on 29.3.45, that an American correspondant told Shri Jawarlal Nehru that Netaji was alive and ought to be treated as a War Criminal, as his men caused murder to many Americans and he him--self had forcibly extracted money from the poor in Malay and Burma." On the following page, he has repor--ted a similar news issued by Reuter from London on 2.9.45 and by A.P. from Kandy (Ceylon) on 3.9.45. He has made a few other similar statements and given reference to newspaper reports, which, not being in my possession, I refrain from referring to them. At Page 1 of his book, he has made a reference to an extract from a report by the Manchester Guardian, which is to the effect that "Though Subhas Bose was reported to have been killed in an aircraft in Formosa at the end of the war, - his body was not found and a legend grew up that he was in hiding Further on, he stated that he had with him a booklet "Trade Union Delegation in China", at Page 4 of which, was group picture of a Mongolian, Delegation said to have visited Peking in 1952, with a person third from the left, having a striking resemblence to Netaji. I regret I am not in possession of this booklet or the enlargement of this picture either, which he stated he had filed before the Committees. Col. H.L. Chopra has supported Shri Goswami, by saying that a person in that group photograph was Netaji.

Shri S.A. Iyer in his book, "Unto Him A Witness" has made a few interesting observations which are as follows:- Page 69, "But where was Netaji going? We did not ask him and he did not tell us. But we knew

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and he knew that we knew. The plane was bound for Manchuria." Page 71, "shall I ever see him again ? If so, when and where ? There were so many bombers and transport planes in that very aerodrome, Legal or illegal, it should be possible for a Japanese pilot to turn the propellers, start the engine and take off with us aboard the plane and fly us to wherever Netaji may be." Page 72, "At 5.15 P.M. 17th August, the plane took off from Saigon aerodrome carrying Netaji. God knows, where !" Pages 75 & 76, "Each one of us knew very well how all the five of us were impatient to reach Netaji Then Abid cut short the talk in his characteristic way. Look here Ayer Saheb, Netaji will not rest for a moment wherever he may be So you ought to go and there is no need to argue about it. If he is already in Moscow or on his way, you must reach him as early as possible. There will be plenty to do so. So, we stand down in your favour, and we want you to go." Pages 34 & 35, "No, no. Oh, no. Netaji can't be dead. It is impossible. Netaji is immortal. How can he die before he sees India completely free. No. No. He is not dead. He is very much alive somewhere. I don't believe what this man says. This story is fake." "Look Colonel, I went to be frank with you. Not a single Indian in India or East Asia will believe this story unless you produce conclusive proofs. You must now take me at once to Taihoku. I must see Netaji's body with my own eyes. Whatever happens, I must be taken to Taihoku" The Colonel replied "I shall do my best. We have already told Taihoku to take photos and collect all positive evidence of the accident", "I must be taken to Taihoku", I mumbled again. At last we landed It was nearby 10.00 P.M.

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I took it for granted that it was Taihoku Page 36," "I felt like wanting to fly at the Colonel's throat when Aoki replied: - No, we are in Taichu, not Taihoku". "Why", I barked. From these words, it is apparent that Shri Iyer had a reasonable doubt that Netaji's death, ds announ-

_ ced was concected.

PHOTOSTAT COPY OF DR.RADHA BINOD PAL'S LETTER.

Mention has been made in an earlier part of this report of the name of Dr. Radha Binode Pal, the jurist of international fame. (App 6-) is a photostatic copy of a letter written by him on 14.2.53 to Shri A.M. Nair of Tokyo and which was filed by Shri Arabindu Bose in which he has written, "As a matter of fact, I could not accept as true the story of Netaji's death at Formosa. In any case, I feel that the whole thing demands a thorough investigation. Statements by individuals made here and there will not convince me as to the truth of the whole story given out. I have reasons to doubt its correctness." "It is very well known that Dr. R.B. Pal was one of the Judges in the War Criminals' Tribunal at Tokyo and his dissentiant judgement in it is historic. As such, I believe. he had ample opportunities of coming into contact with the top-ranking Allied Secret Service Officers. It is impos--sible for him to make any statement, until he could vouch for its correctness. I would bek therefore accept the same fully.

SHRI M.K.GANDHI & RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS BELIEVE NETAJI ALIVE.

I have already quoted certain extracts from the Allied Secret Report, No. 10/Misc/I.N.A. and what is quoted below is considered to be very important and they appear in Pages 38 & 39. "Gandhi stated publicly at the beginning of January that he believed that Bose was alive and in hiding, ascribing it to an inner voice Congressmen believe that Gandhi's inner voice is secret information which he had received This is however,

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a secret report which says Nehra received a letter from Bose saying he was in Russia and that he wanted to escape to India The information alleges that Gandhi and Sarat Bose are among those who are aware of this it is probable that the letter from Bose arrived about the time Gandhi made his public statement. In January also Sarat Bose is reported to have said that he was convinced his brother was alive. Another piece of intelligence which connects Bose with the N.W. Frontier is a letter fritten by the President of the Frontier Students Congress. In this letter, the writer said that Bose was in T.T. and that he was going there himself The information received from internal sources is puzzling and the same can be said about external information. On the 7th of January, the Russian paper "Pravda" denied in strong terms that Bose was in Russia. Before then, however, the Chilzei Malang had been coupling a live Bose with Russia and in December a report said that the Governor of the Afghan Province of Khost had been informed by the Russian Ambassador in Kabul that there were go many Congress refugees in Moscow and Bose was included in their number. There is little reason for such persons to bring Bose into fabricated stories. At the same time. the view that Russian officials are disclosing or alle--ging that Bose is in Moscow is supplied in a report received from Teheran. This states that Moradoff, the Russian Vice Consul General disclosed in March that Bose was in Russia where he was secretly organising a group of Russians to work on the same lines as the I.N.A. for the freedom of India. Taihoku, Congress and Russian representatives in Teheran and Kabul are the most important objectives in this case as it stands now.

1

cha- sd/--- 8.4.46"

The reliability and importance of this secret report have already been stressed. It is clear from the lines noted above that both internal sources, viz., Indian and external sources viz., abroad, have had sufficient materials to say that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was expected to be living somewhere.

SHRI HARIN SHAH'S ENQUIRY IN 1946.
The evidence of Shri Harin Shah, the journalist, has been given much prominence by my colleagues, though, admittedly, he had very little personal knowledge of the facts stated by him. To analysis his deposition, it would appear, that far from supporting the alleged death of Netaji, it would, disprove it. According to him, in the Japanese newspapers "Taiwan (Formosa) Nichi Nichi Shinbun" published from Taihoku on 22.8.45, it was reported that Netaji died on 19.8.45 at midnight and that Lt. Gen. Suechengche, not Shidei, died immediately and 4 other General and Colonels were injured. Then again, when Shri Shah went to the Bureau of Health and Hygiene at Taihoku for consulting the Death Certificate Records and permission to cremate Netaji's body, he met Dr. Kan, the Officer-in-Charge and the 2 clerks, who were in service there at that time. They stated, that as the body was that of a distinguished person, they were not allowed to see it, but it was taken out of the coffin, placed on a wooden plank, wrapped in cloth and then transferred to a bier, which is quite a new story.

He took photostat copies of the following documents:-

The doctor's report was translated into English by Mr. Chung and is as follows:-

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From

¹⁾ Doctor's report on the death of Netaji,

²⁾ The police officer's report and
3) the certificate issued by the Bureau, permitting cremation. They were written in Japanese.

From the Army Hospital, To The Bureau of Health and Hygiene.

Date of the Report: 21st August, 1945.

Certificate of the Death.

Name of the person

- Okara ochiro (meaning big werehouses of food and Ichiro means eldest son).

Sext.

Birth

Occupation

Reason of death

Nature of sickness

Time of sickness

Time of death

Place of death

Dated

Name of the doctor and the seal

- Male
- Born in the Heiti 22nd year, April 9.
- He was Taiwan (Formosa) Military Government Army's obedient officer.
- By sickness.
- Heart failure.
- 17th August, 1945
- 19th August, 4 P.M.
- Army Hospital.
- 21st August
- Chuluta Toyeji Chentza, Siskwan (Japanese University).

On asking the clerks, Shri Shah was told that false details were noted, according to the instructions of the Japanese Officer, accompanying the body. This reason cannot be accepted, because if the person had actually died, no further action could be taken against him and the necessity for secrecy could not ante any longer. As against this, Netaji's death was given great publicity by all the different sources, sommafter his alleged death. I fail to understand the utility of this ridiculous piece of evidence evidence to prove Netaji's death.

The Police report, according to Shri Shah, was more or less a confirmatory paper on the lines of the doctor's report, but the cremation permit from the Taipeh (Taihoku)

Bureau of Health and Hygiene was as follows:-

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"Column 1

Column. 1 - Official Permit of the Bureau to cremate the body.

Column 2 - Native Place - Tokyo

Present address - Taipeh (Taihoku which is the other name of Taipeh)

Column 3 & 4 - Same as in Doctor's certificate with regard to death, Name, Sext. Birth, Date and occupation of the deceased.

Column 5 - Where the body will be cremated -Taihoku City Government Crematorium.

Column.6 - Time and date for cremation - 6 P.M. 22nd August, 1945.

Column 7 - Relationship of applicant - His close friends.

Columns 8 & 9- The capital printed Japanese letters show that this is an application for the Government to cremate that body.

Column 19 - Blank

Column 11 - Date of application - August 21st, 1945.

Column 12 B Blank.

Column 13 - Army and the number of the deceased Army in Formosa, No. 21123. In Japanese
it was put down as Taiwan Daimichi nichi
Bruhai.

Column.14 - Name of the applying Japanese Officer of the Police station - Yoshimi Yani Yoshi.

The Officers' seal in red is also on the paper.

I cannot but make an observation that this is another ridiculous piece of evidence to prove Netaji's death.

The next point, existed considered by Shri Harin Shah, is cremation. It has already been stated that the 3 witnesses, viz., Major Nagatomo, who was the 2nd Adjutant to the Formosan Army Commander at Taihoku and who was deputed by the Army command to arrange for the cremation, Col. Habib-ur-Rahman and Mr. J. Nakamura, the Interpreter meant for Netaji and whose services, appear to have been requisitioned even after Netaji's death, have given 3 different versions. It will presently be seen, whether the fourth version follows the rule, that has generally

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been

been maintained, regarding the evidence from the Aircraft Accident onwards, or whether it will be an exception. Shri Shah Shah stated that Mr. Chu Tsuang, a Formosan, was in Charge of the same crematorium also at that time and who narrated the following story :- The coffin was a very big one and 7 or 8 Japanese officers accompanied the body in plain clothes and they reached at 3 P.M. It took about 8 hours for the body to be consumed and the officers paid the ordinary fee of 18 yens. The coffin was so big, that it could not be accommodated even in Class I Chamber and so the body was taken out and placed inside another coffin, evidently, a smaller one and which was put inside the chamber for cremation. According to the usual practice, he collected the ashes the next morning in the usual wooden box, after which, an Indian, with a bandaged forearm and a few Japanese who came in a truck and in a Sedan Car, took away the box. This, being the fourth different version regarding cremation, the general rule has been maintained. As such, the only conclusion, that can possibly be arrived at, is that the story regarding cremation is concected and false, and it would naturally be so, as the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place and that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Did Not Die, as has been held already.

Another important point, referred to by Shri Shah, is that, on teaching Taihoku in August, 1946, the first idea that struck him was to get a confirmation regarding Netaji's alleged death from the War Graves' Commission, that was in Session there and he, accordingly, met Lt.Richards, Officer Commanding, Research Division, American Head Quarters, Taihoku, who, however, said that he never came accross any information or mention about Netaji's grave. It is my firm belief that if Netaji had actually died at Taihoku, all the people there, young or old, rich or poor, would certainly have known about it and his grave would have been in a very prominent and conspicuous place.

NO ENQUIRY HELD, STATES JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE.
In this connection, the statements of Gen. H. Isayama,

witness No. 57, are rather important important, as he was Chief of the General Staff, Formosan Army with Head Quarters at Taihoku and as such, he would be expected to know everything about the alleged plan crash and all other subsequent incidents. In addition to this, Gen. Shidei was his classmate and he was informed that Gen. Shidei, on arriving at Taihokumaerodrome had enquired about him. He has started his narration with a statement rather suspicious viz., that he heared about the plane crash and everything else including Netaji's death whykan when he went to his Officer the next morning from a staff Officer and that there was no official enquiry about it, _ Even upto the time of his leaving Formosa in Aparil, 1946. It is notunderstood that the report the why the General stated later on resulting from any enquiry regarding this accident was submitted by staff Officer Lt. Col. Shibuya through him to the Imperial General Headquarters, Tokho, which is, however definitely denied by that Officer. It is exceedingly strange that both this staff officer as well as the Chief of Staff, Gen. Isayama heard about the plane crash and the death of such a gib big person as Netaji and also of Gen. Shidei on the following day, through Major Nagotomo has stated that he regularly informed the Headquarters there regarding every detailed incident viz., the plane crash. Netaji's

injuries etc. very frequently. This would also to create a reasonable suspicion that the plane crash and Netaji's death, as alleged, did not take place. A report was also received by the Committee from the Japanese Foreign Officer that no enquiry was made regarding this incident, which is rather unusual. The same Officer also sent us a copy of the service book of Gen. Shidei, in which the cause of death is recorded as "Death by War". This is for far from being correct, as the War had ended and Japan

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had surrendered. Accepting the plane crash to be a faked story, the entries in his Service Book should show death and nothing else, but no evidence has been adduced range regarding the Rajo Operator, N.C.O. Tominaga or the Navigator Sergeant Okshita and the other 1 or 2 persons. probably Engineers, forming part of the crew. The Service book entries regarding Major Takizawa, Chief Pilot and N.C.O. Aoyagi, Co-Pilot and the other members of the crew, alleged to have died have not been produced . Either. The evidence regarding death of both these Pilots is also very insufficient and shaky and that, regarding their remains, is even worse. Capt. Nakamura stated that he burried the entrails of these 3 persons, which is a new and uncorrobo--rated story ,whereas another witness Capt. Arai, even went to the extent of saying that Gen. Shidei was brought to the Hospital, where he expired. The evidence of the doctors is that N.C.O. Aoyagi was also treated in the Hospital, where he died later on and not inside plane, as stated by some witnesses.

BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DISBELIEVE COL. RAHMAN.

From the Top Secret reports of the British and Americanax Americans Intelligence Officers, as a result of thorough investigations soon after the alleged incident, it appears that they failed to obtain conclusive proof that Netaji died as a result of a plane crash. To quote only a few extracts, it states at Page 3, "Habib-ur-Rahman's report is unsatisfactory. The multitude of discrepancies in accounts of the actual air crash as given first to CIC in Tokyo and later to CSDIC, is being taken up", and at Page 17, "The Indian (Col Rahman) who supposedly was with Mr. Bose on the same plane has been seen with his hands and face bruised. But this again is no conclusive proof. He might have been involved in some other accident". It is. therefore, clear that even these officers failed to accept Col. Rahman's version, as to the manner in which he received those burns S.C.An

those burns and injuries. This is with regard to Col. Rahman only, but with regard to the alleged incident, one military officer, W.Mckwright, in his No. C.5, Intelligence Bureau (Headquarters), New Delhi 3, dated the 19th February 1946, while reviewing the whole story, wrote to Major C. Young, Intelligence Division, C.I.C.B. H.G., SACSEA, Singapore at Page 32, "We have at last completed an examination of the information available here relating to the alleged death of Bose, and the result is not entirely satisfactory for it reveals many discrepancies which, until clarified, make any define te conclusion on this incident a little doubtful" and at page 36, he has concluded, "You will understand our pressing anxiety to get to the truth & of waether Bose is actually and permanently dead. Govern--ment want to know where they stand over the matter, in view of claims by Gandhi and others in India that he is still alive. Our examination so far only permits us to say that, unless there was a very cleverly contrived and executed deception plot invalving a very few of the highest Japanese officials, Bose is almost certainly dead." It will, therefore be agreed on all hands that these reports . based on the thorough investigation, are sufficient by themselves to falsify the ff definite findings of my colleagues that Netaji died as the result of a plane crash, a our enquiry has been superficial and not at all exhaustive.

crash, who was a bomber mechanic attached to like there was a minor plane accident there and the only 2

there was a minor plane accident there and the only 2 immates

without of the plane, one resembling Netaji and the other
a Japanese, came out of the plane unscathed and started

takk talking to each other. Incidentally, this witness
stated Netaji was wearing a big round wrist watch, which
gives the lie direct to Col.Rahman's Version of a

rectangular ... 5.c.Am

Johnson

rectangular wrist watch.

NETAJI'S WRIST WATCH.

The wrist watch used by Netaji has been mentioned earlier under the heading "Itinerary", Col. Rahman produced a rectangular wrist watch, with a beater strap with the edges slightly burnt and which eventually came into the possession of the late Sarat Chandra Bose, who got it from Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, who in tarn got it from the late Bhullabhai Desai. The Colonel said that he got this watch from Dxk Dr. Yoshimi witness No. 48, under whose treatment at the Military Hospital at Taihoku, Netaji was said to have expired. The Doctor has denied all knowledge of this statement made by the Colonel, which therefore, remained uncorroborated though it should have been supported by the doctor. Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, who produced before the Committee a photograph of this watch, (App. c ----), challenged the Colonel regarding statement of his, when they met at the birthday anniversery celebration of Netaji at the Belgachia Villa in Calcutta on the 23rd January, 1947, but the Colonel failed to give any reply to him. No other witness has stated that Netaji ever used this rectangular wrist watch, nor by has any photograph of Netaji been filed showing Netaji wearing that watch. It is highly improbable that this watch would escape any damage, though the plane is alleged to have crashed in such a manner that 2 or 3 intimates of the plane died instantaneously. The time shown in the watch is about 8 minutes past 1, which can in no way be explained, as the plane is alleged to have crashed at 2.38 P.M.

On the other hand, Shri S.M. Goswami has stated that

Netaji wanting never wore that watch, but always wore a

round wrist watch, which was presented to him by his father.

Col. K.H.L. Chopra, who was in the I.N.A., has stated that

Netaji always wore the same round wrist watch and he never

wore any other wrist watch. Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, one of Netaji's nephews, and who stated to have worked with his uncle, regarding the latters political activities and who also helped him to move out secretly from Calcutta in January 1941, also stated that when Netaji left Calcutta, the only article taken by him, out of all those, which he was using in Calcutta, including clothing, spectacles, etc., was this round wrist watch, which he insisted on taking with him, as it was of great sentimental value to him being a present from his revered mother . Shri Arabindu Bose, another of Netaji's nephews and who, also along with Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, helped Netaji in getting away secretly from Calcutta has fully and indetails supported the statements made by his cousin. He has filed a photograph (App. d ____), showing Netaji wearing his famous round wrist watch" during his sojourn in the Far East. He has gone further and stated that, as Netaji could not spare his round wrist watch of his and also his pair of spectacles reading glasses, cigeratte case, cigeratte lighter, Hindu religious book and other small atticles, which he usually carried on his person and as there was no possibility of getting substitutes for any of them, it was impossible for Col. Rahman to bring back any of these personal effects of Netaji, as proof of his & alleged death. Instead of any of these articles, the Colenel has brought a rectan--gular wrist watch, (App. c ____), which was one of the many such watches, which were presented to Netaji by Dr. Jose Laurel, then then President of the Phillipines and which Netaji presented to the Colonel and also to the Chairman of this Committee, when he was in the I.N.A. and to others, Shri Kundan Singh witness No. 65, who was Netaji's personal valet from the date of his first arrival at Singapore from Tokyo on 2.7.43 till the date of his final departure from Bangkok on 17.8.45 has stated that the round wrist watch (App.d ---) was the only wrist watch Netaji ever wore during

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this period. Netaji, however, had a round pocket watch, which he generally placed under his pillow and which he carried in his attache case. I am, therefore, fully convinced, from the evidence that has been adduced, that Netaji never wore the rectangular wrist watch (App. c ——), which Col. Rahman produced, saying that it was worn by Netaji at the time of his alleged death and so the colonel's attempt has ended in a miserable failure. This is another conclusion, which has helped to falsify Netaji's alleged death.

I shall, therefore, conclude, that on a careful consideration of all the evidence that has been placed before us and from all the other papers, photographs, aketches, etc. that I have been able to secure and after mature deliberation and careful thought, I am strongly of opinion that the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place And That Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Did Not Die, As Alleged.

MYSELF, A DESERTER ?

There are 1 or 2 other points, which should be incorporated in this report, otherwise, it may be construed to be a serious ommission. Firstly, there does not appear to be any mention in the report submitted by my colleagues to the Government that a separate dissentient report is expected to be submitted by me, though they were fully aware of that fact, Being an ex-Military man, the Chairman considered me to be a sort of a deserter, whose duty and responsibility had ceased, when I parted company with him in the course of our Committee's sitting on 16.7.56 at New Delhi. On 14.7.56, when I disagreed with the findings of my colleagues, I requested him to let me know what my next move should be and he replied that I would have to write a separate dissenting note, to which, I immediately said that it would be upfaill task for me, as I would have

to do it all by myself. Spiese Subsequently to that,
the Chairman, the Prime Minister, the Joint Secretary,
Ministry of External Affairs, the Chief Minister of West
Bengal and others knew about this and the latest comminucation in this connection is the Joint Secretarys' No.
6630 JS (E) marked *Expens "Express Delivery" dated
7.9.56, requesting me to send my Note by 10.9.56, though
the Postal seal shows that it was posted at Karol Bagh,
Delhi on 10 9.56, and was received by me on the afternoon
of the following day, viz., on 11.9.56.

MY PERSONAL NOTE.

The next point is regarding a note made by me for my personal use on 30.6.56, in which Tracorded the Suggestions made by all three of us for the preparation of my draft report. Some of the highest officials of the land, having failed in all other ways to persuade me to sign the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one fall back on this note of mine as a trump card published xinxthe and tried their best to compel me to sign my colleagues repor alleging that I had signed that note, which contained a statement that said that after examining the witnesses, I was convinced that Netaji was dead. The matter was pursued further and the help of the press was also taken and it washduly published in the newspapers on 9.8.56, "No Note of Dissent. Two members of the Committee have already signed the report. The third member, it is understood, may not sign for special reasons. The Committee, however, has in its possession a statement signed by him saying that after examining the witnesses, he was convinced that Netaji was dead. He has not appended any note of dissent or submitted a separate report -(U.P.I)" In addition to newspaper reports, the matter came up before the Parliament on questions put by Shri N.C. Chatterji, Shri

Shri H.V. Kamath and probably by others on 12.9.56, to which the Prime Minister gave a reply, which, in the opinion of these members, was that the answer was not satisfactory and the issue was evaded. However, the matter did not stop there either. The Chief Minister of West Bengal requested me to meet him in his office on 15.8.56, which I did. In the course of a lengthy and at times, a heated conversation he dealt with this point along for at least 20 minutes and in as different ways, tried his teast to compel me to sign my colleagues' report on the main ground that on 30.6.56, I had signed a statement that was said by them to have contained the finding that Netaji was died as noted above. This note of mine has been printed at Pages 70 and 71 of the Report of my colleagues and as it contained the suggestions of all three of us, some of those suggestions may have been of the nature of findings, but they were definitely not "points agreed to". In my opinion, the trump card fared, because the house of cards collapsed, as will be forme out from Item No. 7 viz., "Shri Thevar's Statements and statements of Shri Goswamin their statements should be discussed while dealing with Netaji's death or otherwise and a little more in details separately later on! The words , "Netaji's death or otherwise" clearly show that there was no definite finding or opinion expressed in this note that Netaji was dead. On the other hand, it shows that the question of Netaji's death in this note remained undecided. This is further supported from the fact that Shri Thevar and Shri Goswami were definitely of opinion that Netaji was not dead, but was alive and that opinion of theirs was conveyed intheir statements. I have failed to understand, how this note could be said to have contained a definite finding that Netaji was dead. Item No. 5 would, in my opinion, also show that there was no definite finding about the "Ashes" Either. It is also

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my opinion that this is not simply a mis-statement of facts; but a false statement, deliberately made, and the to give colour and support to it, the Heading, "Principal points Agreed To For Draft Report, Dated 30.6.56" was intentionally concocted. There is no Heading in the Original note of mine, it only bears the date 30.6.56. Chricusly will be further aroused as to why the dates by the side of the signatures are 2.7.56 and not 30.6.56. I would, therefore, unhesitatingly state that it was rank dishonesty and meanness to coin and concoct a headline with the intention of proving a false charge against me, which, by the Almighty's Blessings, has ended in a dismal failure.

APPEAL TO MY COUNTRYMEN.

I would, with all humility, appear to my esteemed countrymen not to accept the reports submitted by my learned cobleagues or by my humble self, but to make a demand to our Government to place at their disposal the whole of evidence, that was made available to the Committee and I would earnestly request them to form their own opinion after a careful perusal and consideration of the same and, if the general opinion be that the aircraft accident did not take place and that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose did not die, as alleged, to demand an impeachment of all those who have taken part in this nefarious game.

I consider myself extremely unfortunate in having been the victim of such machinations on the part of some of the highest officials of our Government, apparently, because I did not fall in with their opinion that Netaji was dead and because my considered opinion was that that the evidence placed before us, justified the only con-

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-clusion....

conclusion that Netaji did not die, in view of the circumstances alleged. He is His Grace has given me the requisite strength and courage to do what I have been able. to do in the service of my esteemed country-men in my own humble way, keeping aloft the banner of Truth and Justice.

SATYAMEBA JAYATE! JAI HIND!

Smon C. Box 9.10. 5b

Calcutta, Mahalaya,

(Suresh C. Bose) NON-OFFICIAL MEMBER &, 3rd October, 1956. NETAJI ENQUIRY COMMITTEE.

- A. S.C. Bose's letter to Prime Minister d/2.4.56.
- B. Inspection Note d/19.6.56 of Charred Articles in National Museum.
- C. Newspaperx dippingx 12x3 fac. List of Witnesses Examined.
- D. Newspaper Clipping d/9.8.56.
- E. S.C. Bose's letter to Chairman d/10.8.56.
- P. Prime Minister's reply d/13.8.56.
- G. S.C. Bose's reply to the Prime Ministerd/15.8.56.
- H. S.C. Bose's report to the Press d/17.8.56.
- I. Col. Habibur Rahman's sketch of the plane.
- J. Col. Nonogaki's sketch A of the plane.
- K. Major Kono's sketch A of the plane.
- L. Capt. Arai's sketch of the plane.
- M. Sketch of the plane accompanying the report of the Japanese Govt.
- N. Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto's) sketch 1.
- O. Col. Nonogaki's sketch B.
- P. Col. Nonogaki's sketch C.
- Q. Photograph of the crashed plane filed by Col. Rahman.
 - R. Ditto. of the place of crash.
 - S. Ditto. of a hazy white dome-shaped object.
 - T. Ditto. of a person sitting on a chair.
 - U. Major Takahashi's sketch.
 - V. Major Kono's sketch B %I.
 - W. Major Kono's sketch B I.
 - X. Capt Nakamura's sketch II.
 - Y. Major K. Sakai's skectch A.
 - Z. Major Nagatomo's sketch showing 3 furnaces.
 - a. Mr. J. Nakamura's sketch B showing only 1 furnace.
 - b. Photostat copy of Dr. Radha Binod Pal's letter to Shri A.M. Nair.
 - c. Photograph of rectangular wrist watch.
 - d. Ditto. of Netaji wearing a round wrist watch.

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(AM. A)

Suresh C. Bose

62, Pataudi House, New Delhi.
Dated 2nd April, 1956.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

Dear Sir,

As a member of "Netaji Enquiry Committee", I think the following items mentioned in brief, among others, need clarification:-

- 1. Terms of Reference: The External Affairs Department in their letter dated 3.2.56 to me have mentioned "— circumstances of the disappearance of —", whereas the same department in their letter dated 16.3.56 to me have stated "—circumstances of the death of —".
- 2. As regards the manner in which the enquiry would be made, I asked Shri Shah Nawaz Khan yesterday as to whether the enquiry would be open to the public or to the press or to both or whether it would be held in camera. He replied that all Government of India enquiries are done secretly & only reports are made public.
- 3. Whether the itinery of the "Enquiry Committee" will be decided by any party other than the Committee itself or by the Committee alone & which may be added, omitted or altered in accordance with the requirements suggested as the investigation proceeds.
- 4. Whether with regard to witnesses, documents, papers etc. necessary to be examined or inspected, the procedure mentioned in item No. 3 above will be followed or not.
- 5. With due respect to Shri Shah Nawaz Khan, I am of opinion that as this enquiry is more or less of a judicial nature & not appertaining to military matters, his position in the Committee as Chairman is not appropriate & because he does not appear to be in possession of much additional information, which would be helpful to the Committee regarding the places to be visited by us or regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry.
 - 6. It is considered important by me on behalf of the Committee to know whether the name of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was & still is in the list of War Criminals drawn up by America & her Allies. If his name still exists & if they request the Government of India to hand him over to thm, if he be bound on Indian soil, for being tried as a War Criminal, whether this Government will have the option of handing or not handing him over to them for the aforesaid pourpose.
 - As I consider this Enquiry to be a very important one & as it will be of great concern to millions of persons throughout the world, it requires nature deliberation & sound judgment. As such, it is my humble opinion that <u>Dr. Radha Binode Pal</u> be requested & persuaded to join the Committee & to lead it.

I remain, Yours faithfully,

Sd/- Suresh C. Bose 2.4.56

(Suresh C. Bose)

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- Packet No. 11. Charred rings. Kundan Singh says he recognises them, but they are charred.
- Bundle No. 2. Charred gold mixed with melted metal.

Kundan Singh recognises -

- (i) a gold cigarette case encrusted with precious stones as the one gifted by Hitler to Netaji.
- (ii) a star shaped pendant.
- (iii) a paper knife.
 - (iv) medal of Rani Jhansi regiment.
 - (v) Part of Cigarettee lighter used by Netaji.
 - (vi) belt buckle used by Netaji with civilian clothes.
- Bundle No. 3. Kundan Singh recognises a small knife used by Netaji for manicure.
- Packet No. 12. Charred rings and chains. Kundan Singh recognises them bout says they are charred.
- Packet No. 13. Button stude etc. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charged.
- Packet No. 10. Charred ear-rings with stones and rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.
- Packet No. 9. Charred bangles, brooches and nose rings. Kundam Singh recognises them but says they are charred. Recognises a gold rope as part of a garland presented to Netaji by Mr. Habib of Rangoon.
- Packet No. 8. Charred rings and nose rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.
- Packet No. 5. Charred ear-rings, nose rings set with stones.
 Kundan Singh recognises but says they are charred.
- Packet No. 4. Charred neckles pieces, medals and rings. Kundan Singh recognises metal beads of necklaces.
- Packet No. 2. Charred and broken bangles, pins, buckles etc. Kundan Singh recognises -
 - (i) metal charkha emblem presented to Netaji with his name engraved.
 - (ii) a metal tricolour ribbon holder presented to Netaji.
 - (iii) half of small oval gold case used by Netaji for carrying Supari.

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Packet No. 6. Charred and broken anklets and bangles. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

- Packet No. 7. Charred and broken rings, nose rings and pendants. Kundan Singh recognises but says they are charred. Identifies -
 - (i), One long ear-ring of gold as belonging to wife of one Mr. Banerjee of Singapore who used to look after Netaji's household.
- Packet No. 3. Charred and broken bangles, pendants, snuff box, medals, coins and rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred. Identifies.
 - (i) Other half of oval gold supari box of Netaji.
- Packet No. 1. Charred wim rings and pendants. Kundan Singh recognises 3 heavy rings.

The weight of the four boxes in which jewellery and other valuable were kept would be approximately 2 to 2½ maunds including the weight of boxes. The weight of the charred valuables shown to me today would probably not be more than 10 seers.

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LIST OF WITNESSES EXAMINED BY THE COMMITTEE.

Marie Control	LIST	OF WITNESSES EXAMINED	RI	THE COMMITTEE.	e minuses	March March 1980 - The Control of the Control
				医甲基氏 医乳管炎 经产品		
	Sl.	Name		Date	Pla	ace.
	No.			经不完成的债券 中央公		
-		Olassi Olassia	900	& 4th April, 1956.	1	New Delhi
	1	Shri Thevar				New Delhi
	2 3	Shri Debnath Das		5th April, 1956		
	3	Capt. Gulzara Singh		6th April, 1956	250	New Delhi
	4	Col. Habibur Rehman		6th to 9th April, 19	776	New Delhi
	4 5.	Col.Pritam Singh		10th April, 1956		New Delhi
	6	Shri S.A. Ayer		11th, 12th & 14th		
				April,1956]	New Delhi
	7	General Bhonsle		16th, April, 1956		New Delki
	8			16th April, 1956		New Delhi
		Shri A.K. Gupta		16th & 17th April,		1011 200-11-
	9.	Sri Harin Shah			4	New Delhi
				1956		
	10.	Col. Thakur Singh		17th April, 1956		New Delhi
	11	Shri Majumdar		23th April, 1956		Calcutta
	12	Mr.i Kunizuka		23rd April, 1956		Calcutta
	13	Lt.N.B. Das		23rd April, 1956		Calcutta
	14	Shri H.K. Roy		24th April, 1956		Calcutta
	15	Shri Kalipada Dey		24th April, 1956		Calcutta
	16	Shri SpM. Goswami		24th April, 1956		Calcutta.
	10	SILL Digiti. Goswania		and 9th June, 1956		
	77	almi I a aink-				Calcutta
	17	Shri J.C. Sinha		25th April 1956		
	18	Shri Deben Das		25th April, 1956		Calcutta
	19	Shri H. Singha		25th April, 1956		Calcutta
	20	Mr .T. Negishi		25th April, 1956		Calcutta
	21	Cob.H.L. Chopra		26th April, 1956		Calcutta
	22	Shri D.N. Bose		26th April & 8th		
				June, 1956		Calcutta
	23	Mrs.T.Pal, Chowdhury, M.	P.	26th April, 1956		Calcutta
	24	Shri A. Bose		26th April & 8th		
	4	Sill + R. Doss		June, 1956		Calcutta
	25	Pandit Raghunath		o and,		
	6)			28th April, 1956		Bangkok
	06 0	Sharma				Bangkok
		S. Ishar Singh		28th April, 1956		
	27	Shri U.C. Sharma		28th April, 1956 .		Bangkok
	28	Shri A.C.Das		30th April, 1956	**	Bangkok
	29	Shri Ramneo Gosai		1st May, 1956		Saigon
	30	Shri A.M. Sahay		1st & 3rd May, 1956		Saigon
	31	Shri Dastgir		2nd May, 1956		Tourane
	32	Mr .T. Hachiya		8th May, 1956		Tokyo
	33	Shri Narain Das		8th May, 1956		Tokyo
	34	Capt. Arai		9th & 19th May, 195	6	Tokyo
	35	General S. Isoda		10th & 12th May, 19		Tokyo
	36			11th May, 1956	120	Tokyo
	36	Mr. J.Murti				
	37	Lt.Col.Nonogaki		14th May, 1956		Tokyo
	38	Mr. Watanabe		14th May, 1956		Tokyo
	39	Dr. Tsuruta		15th May, 1956		Tokyo
	40	Mr. Sato Kazo		16th May, 1956		Tokyo
	41	Major Kono		16th May, 1956		Tokyo
	42	Mr. Suriya Miyata		17th May, 1956		Tokyo
	43	Major Takahashi		17th May, 1956		Tokyo
	44	Col. Yano		18th May, 1956		Tokyo
	45	Major Kinoshita		21st May, 1956		Tokyo
				21st May, 1956		Tokyo
	46	Lt.Col.Takakura		20nd Mar 1056		A PART OF THE PART
	47	Mr.T.Hayashida		22nd May, 1956		Tokyo
	48	Dr. Yoshimi		22nd & 23rd May,		Tokyo
				1956		
	49	Mr.Sen		22nd & 23rd May, 19	956	Tokyo
	50	Lt.Col.Shibuya		24th May, 1956		Tokyo
	51	Capt. Yamamoto		25th May, 1956		Tokyo
	52	Mrs. Yamamoto		25th May, 1956		Tokyo
	53	Major Sakai		28th May, 1956		Tokyo
	,,	major banar		-500 200, 2500		

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From prepage...

	"我们是一个人,我们就是一个人的。"		A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR
Sl. No.	Name	Date	Place
54 55 56 57 58 59 61 62 63 64 65 66 67	Mr.Kazo Mitswi Mr. Nakamura Rev.Mochizuki General Isayama Mr.Ota Hide Maru Mr. Miyoshi Major Nagatomo Mr. Kitazawa Shri Asada Col.Figgess Dr. S.N. Dutt Shri Kundan Singh Shri Ramamurti Shri A.M.N.Sastri	29th May, 1956 30th May, 1956 30th May, 1956 31st May, 1956 31st May, 1956 1st June, 1956 1st June, 1956 2nd June, 1956 2nd June, 1956 5th June, 1956 9th June, 1956 19th June, 1956 21st June, 1956 27th June, 1956	Tokyo Calcutta New Delhi New Delhi

Col.T.Sakai -written statement.

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NETAJI DIED IN A FORMOSA HOSPITAL DURING LAST WAR.

ENQUIRY FINDINGS : REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TOMORROW.

NEW DELHI. August.8.

The Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee, appointed by the Govt. of India, has come to the conclusion that Netaji Bose s death is established and that it occured in Formosa during the Second World, War, it is authoritatively learnt. The Committee's Chairman Mr. Shah Nawaz Khan, who was a high-ranking officer in Netaji's Indian National Army and now parliamentary Secretary to the Railway Minister, is expected to submit the report to the Prime Minister on Friday.

The Committee took evidence from some 70 witnesses in Japan, Thailand, India and other places, and 66 of them told the Committee they had no doubt about the death. The four witnessel who thought Netaji was alive were Mr. Thevar, Madras M.L.A., Mr. Goswami, who produced the photo of a Mongolian Trade Union Leaderresembling Subhas Bose, faxikax and two members of the Bose family.

DOCTOR EXAMINED.

The Japanese doctor who treatednt Bose after the air accident near Taipeh, it is understood, certified that Bose died in the air accident. The Committee examined the records of the Military Hospital where he was treated, the funeral records, obtained the evidence of the nursing orderly and others who were with Bose at the time of his death. Of the seven passengers of the ill-fated plane in which Bose travelled the Committee examined 6 and all of them were of the same opinion. It is understood the British Consul in Formosa, who was requested by the Government of India, to record the evidence of the Chinese nurse who attended on Netaji could not trave the nurse.

Heads of the then British Intelligence Service in Tokyo and of the American Intelligence Service in the Far East were examined by the Committee. Other who appeared before the Committee included Mr. Himansu Kumar Roy and Mr. Kalipada De, two senior members of the Indian Intelligence Service, who were engaged in a search for Netaji in South East Asia and the Far East under instructions from the then British Government of India to bring Subhas Bose dead or alive were also examined by the Committee.

NO NOTE OF DISSENT.

Two members of the Committee have already signed the report. The third member, it is understood, may not sign for special reasons. The Committee, however, has in its possession a statement signed by him saying that afterexaming witness with the convinced that Netaji was dead. He has not appended any note of dissent or submitted a separate report. - [UPI]

AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA CALCUTTA. Thursday dated 9.8.56.

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(AME)

TELEPHONE: 44-5959 GELEGRAMS: 'SUVASBOS'

2, Moira Street, Calcutta - 1 10th August, 1956.

The Chairman, Hotaji Enquiry Committee, 1. Canning Lane, NEW DELHI.

Dear Sir.

Fatrika, Calcutta of yesterday's date, under the heading, "Netaji died in Formosa Hospital during last war - Enquiry Findings: Report to be submitted tomorrow," I have to inform you that I have been shocked, and this, for two main reasons, firstly, that the findings of the Enquiry Committee should not have been given publicity through the Fress before submission of same to the Government and, secondly, that you had stated to different persons at different places, both in India and abroad, on innumerable occasions, that this Enquiry was being made in a secret manner and its report would be submitted confidentially to the Ministry of External Affairs, for submission of the same to the Prime Minister, who would themplace it before the Parliament, when for the first time the it would gain publicity.

I would refer you to the sittings of the Committee, in man which, apart from the three members and the stenographer, only the witness and whenever necessary, the interpretar were the only persons present and it was invariably held under closed doors. You will also please remember that when Mr. Hattori of the Japanese Foreign office made the request in Tokyo to be present during the examination of the Japanese witnesses, he was so kindly arranging to produce her before us, I was the first to express my regret for our inability to do so, as we had not shaw allowed such a prod procedure before. So our sittings were carried out more or less in a secret manner.

In a reference made by me to the Prime Minister on 2.4.56, viz.,
"Ms regards the manner in which bhis enquiry would be made, I asked
Shri Shahnawas Khan yesterday, as to whether the enquiry would be open
to the public or to the press or to both or whether it would be held
incamers. He replied that all Government of India enquiries are
done secretly and only reports are made public". Both of us were
with the Frime Minister, when this and other points were clarified

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by him, and he was further pleased to reply on this point on 14.4.56.

as follows :- "It is desirable that members of the Committee should not give any interviews or make any statements to the Press. They should give avoid even informal talks on this subject with others who might hive the information to the Press. Sof the Prime Minister was pleased to go even further and to caution us to such an extent as to see that our deliberations did not reach the Press either direct or even through any other source.

I am aggrieved to state that in this respect, you have intentionally and deliberately disobeyed the clear instructions given to you by the Prime Minister, by having made the above-mentioned announcement in the Press.

It is a mystery to me as to why in this amnouncement, you did not remain content only with your findings, but went to the extent of justifying the same by introducing details, some of which, however, to my knowledge, appear to be incorrect, but, if correct, have been intentionally withheld from me, e.g., examination of Military Mospital records and those regarding the funeral.

As regards the contents of your announcement under the heading, "No Note of Dissent", which I emphatically state you know to be false, I have to state that you have not only withheld facts, but have also distorted the same with the expectation that you will be exonstated from all blame. I can assure you that people are not hoodwinked so easily. "No, Note of Dissent" is not a usual thing that would be e expected, especially when only two out of three members have signed and submitted a report, and so the first quention that would strike my countrymen is that there must have been unusual in circumstances to bring about this unusual result.

As regards the statement, alleged to have been nigned by no, the less said the better, as a reply would necessitate the inclusion of certain allegations against you, which I would prefer to avoid at this stage.

In reply to your telegram of the 29th July last, which reads as follows :- "From Shahnawas Khan Chairman Netaji Enquiry Committee your telegram of the twentyfourth stop as decided all reports were to be written and finalised in Delhi stop you were not authorised to go

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anywhere also to write any report stop no question of sending papers to you arise unless you return to Delhi stop as you are swere committee's life axtends to thirtyfirst July and report or reports must be submitted to Government by then stop unless you send whatever report you wish to reach me by the thirteen July will assume you have no submission to make," I have to state that the contents of the same ore either incorrect, unsuthorised, unreasonable or imporper and the tone ungestlementy.

As me decision that reports were to be written and finalised in Delhi was taken with my knowledge or with my consent, written or verbal, this statement is anything but correct.

The question of not authorising me to go anywhere for writing any report, as stated by you, did not arise and there was no occasion for it, but I informed the Beauty Secretary, External Affairs, with whom you had put me in contact, that I was returning to Calcutta for reasons known to him.

I may state for your information that even in important suits pending before District as well as High Courts, in which correct judicial procedure is strictly followed, judgments have been sent from elsewhere and even from outside India.

As regards your statement, that "no question of sending papers you arise unless you return to Delhi," I am constrained to state that it benefits a bully and not a sensible person, having the least respect for reasonable constitutional procedure. I wan may remind you here that on 16.7.56 during our sittings at New Belhi, I requested both Shri Naitra and you to send me the remaining portion of your joint draft report, as I was entitled to be impossession of the whole of it and on the basis of which, I would have to write my dissentiant report and which Shri Naitra promised to send me in sections, as soon as he completed the same. This was, however, not carried out, evidently, due to your interference. I had to speak to him about this, as presumably, due to your incompetence in writing it, he had to do so on your behalf.

Your statement, vis., "as you are some Committee's life excends to thirtyfirst July and reports must be su libes to Covernment by them. "I regret very much to state was is a shape of releas

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statement. On your considered estimate of five weeks, which terminated on the 30th April, 1956, Government's approval was obtained and the Finance Department sanctioned an expenditure of about No. 27,500/- for the Counittee. This period elapsed, when we were still in Calcutta and had not proceeded abroad. On the eve of our departure from Tokyo to India, you expressed the view that the report must be submitted by the 15th June, which you subsequently extended to the 30th idem and finally to the 16th July positively, as the Prime Minister would be returning to India and the Parliament coming into session soon. Unable to do so by that date, you put it off to the end of that week or latest on the following Monday, the 23rd July, I was not informed of any further extension of date by you, as I parted bapany with you. In your telegram dated 29.7.56, you informed me for the first time that the life had been extended to 31.7.56. This life appears to draw out more easily that the most elastic article one can think of. In yesterday's paper, I found that it has been dream out to 10.8.56, which I do wish will be the final limit of your electic estimate of life.

Then, in your telegram is sued from Delhi on 29.7.56 to me in Calcutts, you have said, "unless you send whatever report you wish to reach me by the thirteen July will assume you have no submission to make". The tone and demand here again befit more a bully then a gentleman.

Accepting that thirteen July to the correct, 13.7.56 appear to be quite a reasonable date that fits in with your electic estimate, as in spite of my verbal request to you in Delhi on 16.7.56 and my telegrams dated 17.7.56 and 21.7.56 from Calcutta to cond me the mice sarry papers, you have intentionally refrained from doing so and thirteen have no intention of doing so easily. If, however, thriteen be a salargum telegraphic department mistake for thirtieth, meaning 30.7.56, which you surely could not have meant, as it is an impossibility, then the only epithet, that comes up uppermost in my mind for this unreasonable demand of yours, is one which I refrain from using.

As you have introduced the names of British and American Intelligence Services in this brief announcement of yours, you have

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intentionally omitted to record what their finding was, because it did not support your view. The evidence on record shows that from the time of the announcement of the Japanese that Metaji died in a plane crash, they believed it to be a hoax, that it was a eleverly-conceived master deception plan on the part of the Japanese and others and that Metaji was living and hiding somewhere. They immediately despatched discrent teams of efficers to arrest Netaji under the provisions of the Enemy Agents' Ordnance. After scouring the territories concerned in a frantic k search for him, they were unable to trace his whoreabouts, but in spite of that could not come to the definite conclusion that Netaji was dead. This was the final opinion held by them and probably the main object of this enquiry.

as I regret not to have received any papers from you, as requested several times by me, I would again reiterate here my legitimate demand for the same and to observe that you have no right whatsourer to withhold such as a papers from me and that such conduct of yours is quite in keeping with what you have gen-erally meted out to me during the fourse of this enquiry and that our Government and my countrymen will surely consider your conduct in its proper perspective. Please note that delay in the submission of my dissentient report due to your inaction is solely your responsibility and that you will have to fender explanation to Government and to the people for the same, not to speak of the opinion they will form regarding you.

I would request you to arrange and send me bank cheques in my favour in payment of the two bills submitted by me semetime ago and about which, you have personal knowledge.

I remain, Yours truly,

Sc. lon

50. S.C. Box

possess them. In the ordinary course, the Ministry will examine these papers and will place the report before the Cabinet. If the Cabinet so decides, the sport will then be placed before Parliament. That will mean its publication also. Probably the report will be placed before the Cabinet soon. It is likely to be printed.

That is the procedure, and Shri Shah Nawaz Khan an the other Member of the Committee have nothing to do with the report now, as the Committee karaxasking has ceased to function. Should you, however, wish to send any kind of note, we shall consider it. I am afraid no papers can be sent away from here now. If you so wish, you can come here and examine such papers as we have.

You refer in your letter to the Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee to some announcement in the Amrita Bazar Patrika of the 9th August, and you accuse the Chairman of having broken the rule of secrecy in making this announcement. On enquiry, I find that he has made no announcement and, infact, that he did not even know of this item which appeared in the Amrita Bazar Patrika. As a matter of fact, the report was submitted to me many days before that announcement in the Press. It would appear that the reference in the press was some kind of an intelligent guess by some reporter or some clerk in our office here. Obviously, the Chairman, of the Enquiry Committee had nothing to do with it. Netaji Enquiry Committee to some announcement in the Amrita

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- Jawharlal Nehru.

Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, 2, Moira Street, Calcutta - 16.

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SURESH C. BOSE.

Telephone: 44-5955 Telegrams: "SUVASBOS". 2, Moira Street, Calcutta - 16. 15th August, 1956.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi.

My Dear Shri Nehru,

I thank you for your kind letter No. 414-PMO/56 of yesterday's date.

I have been very much disappointed to learn that you find it difficult to understand my letter. If it be the Engligh, I cannot claim to write it upto the standard of an Englishmen, If, however, it be the subject matter of the letter, it may be due to the fact that one, who has a strong conviction regarding a certain matter, sometimes fails to understand how another could possibly hold the contrary view.

I regret, I will have to encroach on your valuable time, as my reply to the points mentioned in your letter, on the basis of statements received by you, as well as certain circumstances concerning me, as a member of the Committee, may be a bit lengthy and for which I may be execused.

I stayed in Delhi with my mauther daughter on the first occasion from 27.3.56 to 17.4.56 and on the second occasion from 17.6.56 to 12.7.56, i.e., for a total period of 48 days, for which the Government did not have to spend anything for my board and lodging there. As she was suddenly asked to vacate her quarters, I had to shift from there at about 10.10 PM on 12.7.56 and a frest friend of mine there, helped me out of an awkward situation by giving me shelter. On the morning of the following day, when I met the Chairman of our Committe, I requested him to arrange for my stay in Delhi. He was good enough to contact somebody immediately and after my repeated requests, we were informed the next morning. viz., 14.7.56, that a commodation had been secured for me at Kotah Rouse. As I had no idea of that place, I enquired of the fixks Chairman about the room, bathroom and food there. He assured me that they were cuite nice. As I wanted to see about it myself, after finishing our work all three of us went there on our way home, but we were astonished to find that accom odation had been arranged in a hutment and not in the main

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building. I told the Chairman forthwith that I considered this to be an insult and I demanded accommodation in the Imperial Notel, which I could justly demand, as only a few years ago, I had stayed on my own in Maidens, after failing to get rooms in the Imperial and that it was very urgent, as I was incoveniencing both my kind friend as well as my self. The Chairman said that as it was about 1.45 P.M., and being a Saturday, the officer had gone home. On this, I told him that as Y Covernment had provided telephones in your residences, urgent work was meant to be taken up from kkez there outside office hours. Evidently, no action was taken and inconvenience continued. On the monring of 16.7.56 I enquired of the Chairman again as to why nothing had been done regarding my stay in Delhi, though that was the fourth day and I told him that I could no longer inconvenience my friend and myself. He then contacted somebody, whom I proposed to meet personally for explaining the situation I was in. At the same time, I requested the Chairman to get into touch with the Imperial Hotel. At about 11.30 AM. Shri S.K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, informed us that a room had provisionally been reserved for me there and that he would confirm it before lunch. As there was no news about till 2.45 PM. I phoned Shri Roy, who met me soon after and told me that after speaking to Shri Kaul, Joint Secretary, he would meet me again at about 4 PM. In the meantime, I went to the Imperial Hotel, where I was informed that a room had provisionally been reserved for me and that they were awaiting confirmation from the External Affairs Department. Shri Roy did not meet me, as promised, nor did he send me any information. When at about 6 MM. , the driver of the staff car of the External Affairs Dept. came to enquire of me as to at what time the next day he would bring the car for taking me to the Imperial Hotel, I asked him whetherhe had brought any letter or news from the office or from Shri Roy regarding my shifting there. He replied in the negative.

The same morning during our sitting in the Committee Room, I was informed by my colleagues that xxxxx I could no longer sit with them, as I had dissented from them. On this, I requested Shri Maitra to send me the remaining portion of their draft report for enabling me

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to write my dissentient report. He promised to do so section by section as soon as he completed each.

As dissentient jud gments in District as also in High Courts are sent from elsewhere and even from outside India, I did not consider it indispensibly necessary for me to stay in Delhi for that purpose, especially when even after four days of inconvenience, nothing had been done about my stay there and as no assurance had been given to me that something would be done soon. I was, therefore, compelled to leave Delhi. If your officers are callous, non-obliging and indifferent there is a limit to my endurance.

As regards the report given to you by my colleagues "That they did not know" that I was "Likely to sign the report later or send a separate note", I emphatically state that they did know. I am astonished to find men holding such positions, making diabolic false statements. Shri 3.N. Maitra, who was selected to write the report, and who undertack to submit the draft report by 10.7.56, submitted only a portion of the same on 13.4.56, when all three of us stat started discuring it. He had mentioned about discrepancies in the statements of witnesses in some places of his report. I was not satisfied with the explanations given by him and I told him that there were many more of such on many major points. As such, I would have to consider the evidence very carefully and then inform them as to whether I could for those reasons, agree with their finding that the plane, alleged to be carrying Netaji, crashed and whether Netaji died.

when we get the next day, viz., on 14.7.56, for further discussion of the draft report, I expressed my regret to them for my inability to agree with their finding. On asking the Chairman as to what wants should be my next move under such circumstances, he told me that I would have to write a separate dissenting report, on which I reme ber having told him distinctly that it would be uphill work for me as I would have to write such a preport all by myself. I went further and told them that, in view of the multitude of discrepancies in the st tements of witnesses, whether they would not agree with me that the plane crash did not take place and so Netaji did not die.

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They said they would stick to their own finding.

The next day, 15.7.56, being a Sunday, we assembled on 16.7.56, when the Chairman told me that, as I had dissented from them, it would not be proper for me to sit with them any longer, when they would be busy in writing their report. I,accordingly, requested them to send me the remaining portion of their draft report and copies of relevant papers, which I was legitimately entitled to, so as to enable me to write my separate report. In their presence, I took a few sheets of paper from the Secretary, Shri R. Dayal and a sked him to send me copies of depositions of the remaining witnesses he had not given me together with all other papers, I had requested the Chairman, for. I have not received any of these papers as yet, in spite of several requests by me to the Chairman, even by telegrams.

As my presence was no longer required there, I told the Chairman that I wanted to meet the officer, who was arranging for my accommodation. As no orderly was available, Shri Maitra was very good to come to the staff officer's room and to ask the new Right Sikh gentleman, who had been deputed to help us as a Stenographer to take me to Shri S.K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, which he did.

I, therefore, fail to understand how under such circumstances
my colleagues could make up their mind to tell a gentleman of the
position of the Prime Minister of India that they did not know that
I would not sign their report or that I would submit a separate
dissentient report. If they did say so. as stated, I am constrained to
say that it was is a brazen-faced lie.

I am very much aggrieved to learn that no papers can be sent to me. I never wanted or work thought of the original papers. As a member, I am legitimately entitled to one set of copies of all relevant papers. I would humbly suggest that it would cost the Government very much less by making and sending a copy of those papers to me here than by paying me the expenses of my journey from here to Belhi and back and for my stay there. I forget, however, that for poor people like us expenses do matter, but not for those in high circles, especially, Governmental ones.

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(Ath a) Contol. when the Chairman curtly turned down my request for relevant papers, I suspected that without inspiration from high-ups, he would not have had the sads audacity to decline the legitimate request of his colleague. My suspicifon has now been confirmed. As regards the announcement in the newspaper referred to, it is my humble opinion, that it would be desirable to have official new given publicity by the office mester in a straightforward manner, rather than remain completent and allow its surreptitious leakage by disloyal subordinates and outsiders. Before concluding. I would inform you with due respect that as the Government has been pleased to numinate me as a member of the Committee and as it has to spend so much money and time on me and as I have spent my time and energy on this piece of work, which I agree to undertake. I would be failing in my duty to muself, to the Covern ment and to my countrymen, if I did not submit a report, which I consider it incumbent on me to do. I will, therefore, mulmit submit my report to the best of my lighted capabilities and as you will be pleased to realise that, as I have been doing so under several handicaps, inconveniences and want of facilities, there will naturally be a certain amount of delay, which would otherwise not have been caused and which consequently means an additional expenditure to the Government on my account. I am, however making a very sincere and earnest effort to complete it as quickly as possible and I expect to get it ready for submission within about ten days from today at the latest. Kindly excuse me for remarks, if any, which you may consider to be too strong. with regards, I remain, Yours sincerely, Sd/- Saresh Chandra Bose. DOM 5. c. hom Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India,

It astonishs me to peruse a report published in the Hindustan Standard of 10.9.56 that there is no note of dissent. All the Government officials in Delhi as well as in Calcutta know and it was also published in the newspapers that I had dissented from my colleagues on 14.7.56 during the sittings of the Committee in New Delpi and as such, I was advised by the Chairman to write a separate dissentient report. I have been writing that report ever since that date, but have been seriously handicapped in doing so, as copies of the remaining draft report of my colleagues as well as of all relevant papers on the record, including sketches, drawn by witnesses, photographs, excerpts from books, periodicals and newspapers referred to by some of the witnesses have not been supplied to me, inspite of my requests, both verbal and also by telegrams and letters to the Chairman of the Committee, the Prime Minister and the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

I am constrained to say that attempts have been made in various ways, viz., by influencing, persuading and coaxing me to sign the report submitted by my colleagues, so as to make it a unanimous one and that the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who had also a hand in the matter, having failed in his attempt to do so, requested the Prime Minister in a reply to his letter received in that connection, to arrange to send me all these papers. This was not complied with.

Having failed in all such attempts, they have now taken recou--rse to a personal note containing my signature and which goatained the suggestions of all the members of the Committee and which I handed over in good faith to Shri Maitra on his request, as he had not made any note. It is not correct to say that this note contained the findings of the Committee, because it was top early to do so on 30.6.56, as the last witness was examined on 27.6.56. It has a simply a skeleton for a deeph report and mention was included in it of the main points for the deaft copert.

When on 13.7.56, all three of us started discussing the draft report, only a portion of which had been written by Shra Maitra, I remar--ked that though he had mentioned only some discrepancies, and had ex--plained them due to lapse of time and non-tutoring of the witnesses, there were many more discrepancies in the evidence on the points we were discussing. On the following day, when we continued discussing the


the draft report further and reached the portion that the finding of the Committee was that Netaji had died, I regretted my inability firmly to agree with that finding, whereupon the Chairman advised me that I should write a separate report, disagreeing with them. I suggested to them that in view off the "multitude of discrepancies" that existed in the exidence, whether they would not be pleased to change their finding and to agree with me that such flimsy evidence could not justify their finding, but that the only finding arising therefrom should be that Netaji did not die. They said they were not prepared to change their opinion. The discussion of the draft report stopped there.

When we met again wet on the following Monday, 16.7.56, the Chairman informed me that as I had dissented from them, I could no longer take part when they discussed their draft report. With their permission, I accordingly parted company from them. This was the position up to 16.7. 56, which was more than a fortnight from 30.6.56. They had not completed writing their draft report, not to speak of having completed discussion of the same. The writing of the final report for submission to Government was, therefore, nowhere in the offing and I believe, it was submitted by them on 3.8.56.i.e., not two but five weeks after 30.6.56.

In deference to truth and candour, I consider it to be my duty to bring these facts to the notice of my countrymen and I would earnestly request them not only to peruse the report of my colleagues, but also that of mine, which I expect to submit in the course of the next few days, inspite of all handicaps and obstructions that have intentionally been placed in my way, together with the evidence that has been recorded by us and to form their individual opinion therefrom and which I hope will at the same tame enable them to form some idea of the intention behind such propaganda against me in the Press.

SD. S. C. lom

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By Col. Rehman

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SKETH PLAN Submitted by Coptin M. Jamanoto (Nakamura) (Aff. N.) BBB Tent where they took rest y OV. E = A Hailing Tent for Haintmaner s.c.hm

(AH. 0) 195

Plan Showing The Preneray & the Tent AT Tarkoku Aerodrome, Formosa 15.6.19 W

ss. N. Nonogeki

14/5/1956

5.c. bor

SU. S. W. Khen

W. S. c. Bon

145.56

(Ath. P) 196 Plan showing the Runway MAIN BODY OF PLANE Plane took of here. N. Nonogaki s.c. hom

(AM.Q) 197



PHOTOGRAPH OF ALLEGED CRASHED PLANE AND PLACE OF CRASH.

5. c. Bon

(ARM R) 198



PHOTOGRAPH OF SAME ALLEGED CRASHED PLANE AND PLACE OF CRASH.

S.C. Son



PHOTOGRAPH SAID TO BE OF COL. HABIB-UR-RAHMAN, SITTING IN FRONT OF AN URN AND NOT A COFFIN.

S.c. som

(Apr S.)



PHOTOGRAPH OF HAZY WHITE DOME-SHAPED OBJECT SAID TO BE OF A WHITE SHEET-COVERED COFFIN.

S.C. Am

(Apr. U) Major Takahashi U 200 Plane crashed here

| Sold | Plane crashed here
| Sold | S 1, 2 3 an Various frihous bulied I movie M > Plane took off here Ш J. Takahashi 5. c. Dr

(AH.V.) Major Komo (b) /BOSE (a) S. c. An

Major Kono S.c.Am Sketch Plan by Copt Jamamoto (Nekamura) I (AH: X.) 203 5. c. sm

(AH. Y.) 204 Sketch of Japanes Bomber in which Netaji travelled from Saigon to Taihoku (Formora) Major K Sakari 무무물 04 5 06 무 2 PETROL TANK ENTRANCE 0 0 10 11 12 ARAI 5. c. br

(AM. Z.) 205 Sketch A Showing Junices Major Nagotoni 5. c. sm

(AH. a) B 206 Sketch Plan of the Crematorium at Taihoku Entrence - Door Col Rehman and other officers shood here 5. c. sm

(Aph 6)

CALCUTTA-6

14th Feb. 195

Dear Mr. Nair,

I am thankful for your letter dated the 5th instant.

It is really surprising that my name should be used in that manner. I did not go to any temple either with or without the ambassador to see the alleged ashes. As a matter of fact I could not accept as true the story of Netaji's death at Formosa. In any case I feel that the whole thing demands a thorough investigation. Statements by individuals made here and there will not convince me as to the truth of the story given out. I have reasons to doubt its correctness.

I am glad that Mr.Shimonaka and Mr.Tanaka are doing their best to educate the public mind of Japan. Satyen has come back. He tells me that Mr.Shimonaka has already engaged a house near Yokohama for starting the school that I suggesteduring my last visit. I shall indeed be happy if the scheme materializes.

Kindly remember me to all my Japanese friends and convey to them my best regards.

ith kindest regards,

Yours sincerely;

Patholined ?

(RADHABINOD PAL)

PHOTOSTAT COPY OF LETTER, DATED CALCUTTA, 14TH FEBRUARY, 1953 BY DR. RADHA BINOD PAL TO SHRI A.M. NAIR, TOKYO (JAPAN).

S.c. Son

(Apph d)



PHOTOGRAPH OF NETAJI AT IMPERIAL HOTEL, TOKYO (JAPAN) IN 1944, WEARING ROUND WRIST WATCH.

5. c. Bon

(Aprh c)

Netaji's half burnt watch

PHOTOGRAPH OF A HALF-BURNT RECTANGULAR WRIST WATCH BRO

PHOTOGRAPH OF A HALF-BURNT RECTANGULAR WRIST WATCH BROUGHT BY COL.HABIB-UR-RAHMAN AND MADE OVER TO THE LATE SARAT CHANDRA BOSE BY SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, ALLEGING IT TO BE NETAJI'S WATCH.

S. C. Bon